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ABSTRACT 
The difficulty of achieving Britain's economic objectives 
has resulted in successive governments searching for a new and 
effective economic tool to use in addition to existing fiscal 
and monetary policies. This instrument could be the prices 
and incomes policy which has been evolved in an attempt to 
solve the problem persisting in many developed economies; 
that of controlling the growth of inflation while maintaining 
full employment. 
While the national leaders of employers federations and 
trade unions have expressed their views on the policy, little 
is known about the views of practicing managers and rank and 
file trade unionists, ie. the men involved in actually imp- 
lementing the policy. This study attempted to bridge part 
of this gap and sought to discover the extent of managers' 
understanding of and their opinions on many features of the 
prices and incomes policy. The report was based on a survey 
of the opinions of 270 senior managers engaged in a wide range 
of manufacturing industries. 
The most general finding was that the respondents' know- 
ledge of the prices and incomes policy was somewhat limited. 
Despite the imperfect understanding of both the policy and 
its aims, considerable support existed for such a measure. 
The managers with a greater degree of comprehension of Britain's 
economic difficulties and the prices and incomes policy were, 
however, more inclined to support the policy than those with 
a lower level of understanding. To examine this finding more 
closely a study was made of environmental factors which could 
have affected the respondents° knowledge of the policy with a 
view to discovering means of raising managements' apparent 
low level of understanding of economic affairs. 
It was also discovered that the majority of the respond- 
ents believed that a prices and incomes policy had a role to 
play in Britain's economic future. Opinion, however, was di- 
vided over the issue of whether the policy should be a 
permanent feature of economic policy or used only as an in- 
strument of control at times of crisis. To enhance the pro- 
spects of the policy's success most of the respondents thought 
that the Government would have to use powers of compulsion. 
Information was also obtained about the respondents' 
views on a second role for the policy as an arbiter of social 
justice in determining the relative level of incomes. This 
facet of the policy also received general approval. 
The overall conclusion of this research is that Govern- 
ment and management should be more fully aware of each other's 
views. This, it would seem, would lay the foundations of a 
deeper understanding on both sides and increase the managers' 
willingness to co-operate with the Government. 
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The Purpose of the Research 
For many years now Britain has been plagued by a recurrent 
balance of payments problem. Successive administrations have emp- 
loyed many methods in their attempts to combat the dangers of 
inflation. In 1962 a new approach to the problem was made. The 
Conservative Government itself assumed the responsibility for 
laying down guidelines for incomes and it instituted a special 
body, the National Incomes Commission, to watch over their ob- 
servance. This marked the beginning of the type of incomes 
policy which Britain has today. It might seem surprising at 
first that a government more dedicated than a Labour Administra- 
tion to a free enterprise system should set up an institution to 
pass pay rises in review but it appeared that pressure had come 
from an unexpected quarter. Phelps Brown has declared that 
the instigation to a return to economic planning 
came not from socialist circles but from top 
management. "(1 ) 
Indeed, Phelps Brown has given many instances of managers in some 
of the nationt largest companies trying to put an end to the 
series of "Stop -Go" policies which had bedevilled the British 
economy in the 1950's. 
(1) E.H. Phelps Brown, Guidelines for Growth and for Incomes in 
the United Kingdom: some Possible Lessons for the United 
States, in George P. Shultz and Robert Z. Aliber, Editors, 
Guidelines, Informal Controls and the Market Places University 
of Chicago Press, 1966, p.144. 
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In December 1964, shortly after the Labour Government came 
to power, the Joint Statement of Intent on Productivity, Prices 
and Incomes(1)was signed by representatives of the Government, 
employers' organisations and the T.U.G. In this statement, 
management and unions not only accepted the principles of keeping 
the rise of incomes in line with that of productivity and 
stabilizing the price level but pledged to try to assist the 
Government to give "effective shape" to the Government's prices 
and incomes policy.(2) 
This seemed to be achieving what certain writers had believed 
to be necessary for some years.(3) Phelps Brown has stated that 
management could have done more to control wage increases pointing 
out that the most willing of trade union leaders could not do 
better than the managers in his industry gave him a chance to do.(4) 
The Labour Government, having obtained management's agreement 
to assist in the formation of the policy realised at an early 
stage that the policy would only be effective if management supported 
it. 
(1) December 16th 1964. 
(2) Some felt management should have more say in determining the 
incomes policy. See for example J.R. Crossley, Collective 
Bargaining, Wage Structure and Labour in the United Kingdom, 
in E.L. Hugh Jones, editor, Wage Structure in Theory and Practice, 
North Holland, Amsterdam, 1966, p.192. 
(3) Even Taylor proposed that management and men should work to- 
gether to increase the size of the surplus instead of squabbling 
over its division in order that wages could be increased, 
profits raised and the price to the consumer of the final 
product could be reduced. F.W. Taylor, Testimony before the 
Special House Committee,1912, (Reprint of Public Document, 
Harper Bros., New York , pp.28 -30. The Surplus was composed 
entirely of wages and profits. If material costs, selling 
costs and indirect expenses were subtracted from the selling 
price of a good the surplus remained. 
(4) E.H. Phelps Brown, op.cit.,p.161. 
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The uccess of the olic will1 de end po the 
extent to which unions and. employers an otthers 
concerned with the fixing of incomes apply it in 
practice. "(1) 
The Labour Government replaced the National Incomes Commission in 
1965 with the National Board for Prices and Incomes ( N.B.P.I.). 
This new Board not only had a judicial component and sat as a court 
of inquiry into past events watching over the guidelines of pay 
and prices but also made recommendations designed to influence 
future decisions. The N.B.P.I. relies mainly on persuasion rather 
than exhortation or command(2)and this is where the policy relies 
on management. In any given wage bargaining situation there are 
limits beyond which managers are not prepared to go.(3) The maxi- 
mum increases allowed under the incomes policy criteria may, 
however, be well within a firm's normal limits for allowing pay 
rises. Management therefore holdsthe key to the success of the 
policy. Will the managers obey the policy or will they allow 
their own firm's interests to come first? 
From 1965 to the time of writing the incomes policy has con- 
tinued more or less unchanged apart from the twelve month period 
commencing in July 1966 of the Prices and Incomes Standstill and 
the Period of Severe Restraint which afterwards led to delaying 
(1) Machinery of Prices and Incomes Policy, Cmnd.2577, H.M.S.O., 
London, 1965, p.4. 
(2) See Robert B. McKersie, The British Board for Prices and 
Incomes, Industrial Relations,, Vol.6, No.3, May 1967, p.282. 
(3) See Leland Hazard, Wage Theory: A Management View, in George 
W. Taylor and Frank C. Pierson, editors, New Concepts in 
Wage Determination, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1957, pp.45 -47. 
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powers over price and income increases being retained by the 
Government. Little is yet known, however, of how managers as a 
whole regard the policy now its novelty has disappeared. Do 
managers really know what the policy is attempting to do? Have 
they made any attempt to understand it? If they don't under- 
stand the policy, will they oppose it? What will managers do if 
they don't like a prices and incomes policy? 
This study attempts to fill the gap in the knowledge about 
firstly management's attitude towards the policy and Britain's 
economic difficulties and, secondly, managers' comprehension of 
the policy and the economic situation. Some of the country's 
economic difficulties have been basically the same for years and 
it would be expected that managers would be familiar with such 
problems. To understand the setting for the research it is per- 
haps necessary to have a cursory glance at these problems which 
the Government felt had to be resolved and which management must 
help to tackle. 
The Historical Setting of the Study 
Shortly after the 1964 General Election the Labour Government, 
realising the economic dangers the country was facing, tried to 
awaken industry and the general public to the financial crisis. 
" -We have got to get out of the red quickly. It 
is no use running away from the fact that we are 
heavily in debt to the rest of the world, and our 
first job must be to pay our way, - we have got 
to make sure that we do not get into this sort of 
mess again "(1) 
(1) Working for Prosperity: The National Plan in Brief, H.ïv1.S.0., 
London, 1965, p.3. 
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The problem seems to lie in the fact that Britain has suffered 
from an inflation which is liable not only to endanger the real 
income of the individual citizen, but also the earning power of 
the country, thereby affecting the standard of living of the 
nation. This has been put rather succinctly by the Council of 
Prices, Productivity and Incomes : -(1) 
The amount of goods and services available to us has 
been rising, taking one year with another, at the rate 
of about 6d in the £ each year; but year by year we 
have helped ourselves to more money income at the rate 
of 1/+d in the L; and prices have had to take up the 
excess 10d." 
What is wrong with rising prices? Firstly, on Britain's 
capacity to offer foreign buyers good value for money hinges the 
dual aims of a rising standard of living and of maintaining full 
employment. Thus, if our goods were too expensive, a reduction 
in the level of exports would ensue, leading to unemployment and 
lower standards of living. The standard of living would continue 
to fall until we could compete with the lower priced goods in the 
export markets to enable us to purchase our necessary imports. 
The National Plan(2)pointed out that in the preceding decade 
the United Kingdom's share of world exports of manufactures had 
declined in value from 20% to 14%. Also wage costs per unit of 
output in manufacturing industries rose faster here than in the 
economies of several of our main competitors. In addition, it 
(1) Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, Fourth Report, 
H. 4. C.O. , London, 1961, p.14+. 
(2) The National Plan, Cmnd.2764, H.M.S.O., London, 1965, p.65. 
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stated, several industrialised countries were pursuing, with 
varying degrees of success, policies designed to secure price 
stability and to keep money incomes in line with real output.(1) 
Therefore, to stop a further decline in our competitive position, 
the Plan declared that similar action was needed in the United 
Kingdom. 
The second problem associated with rising prices is that 
investors are loath to place money where its value is being ex- 
cessively reduced through the process of inflation. 
Thirdly, persons living on a fixed income find its real 
value diminishing and are not in a position to remedy the posi- 
tion by claiming increments to their monetary incomes. Jack(2) 
stated:- 
"there is the recognition that in a period of in- 
flation the wage -price spiral is frustrating to 
all wage -earners and most injurious to some 
Beveridge(3)held the same view:- 
"Every time a group of employers and a group of 
working people agree to raise the wages to be 
paid for the same product they are doing some- 
(1) See, for example, B.C. Roberts, National Wages Policy in War 
and Peace, Allen and Unwin, London,1958 and F.W. Paish and 
Jossleyn Hennessy, Policy for Incomes ?,3rd.Edition, Hobart 
Paper No.29, I.E.A., London, 1967, and T.L. Johnston, 
Collective Bargaining in Sweden, Allen and Unwin, London,1962. 
(2) D.T. Jack, Is a Wages Policy Desirable and Practicable, 
Economic Journal, Vol.LXVII, No.268, pp.285 -286. 
(3) Lord Beveridge, as reported in The Manchester Guardian, 23rd. 
October, 1953 - reported in Barbara Wootton, The Social Found- 
ations of Wage Policy, Allen and Unwin, London, 1955, p.188. 
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thing to diminish the value of money, to make 
life harder for people living on pensions or 
on savings from the past 41 
The factors holding Britain back have long been subjects of 
dispute(1)but in considering an incomes policy this research is 
more immediately interested in the problem of inflation. Britain 
has not found inflation simple to control. 
Even restraint in wage increases at the centre by the Gov- 
ernment, T.U.C. and Employers Federation cannot, of itself, stop 
inflation. Restraints on negotiated and fixed national rates 
cannot stop the employer raising the basic pay rate at the place 
of work by merit, long service and overtime payments in addition 
to easing existing incentive schemes. This phenomenon, known as 
wage drift, has had a considerable effect on the economies of 
many industrialised countries. The wage drift is believed to be 
caused not only by primary factors such as labour shortage and 
payment by results but also through secondary factors - the recti- 
fication of a wage structure distorted by primary drift.(2) Both 
primary and secondary drift are, Phelps Brown has written, within 
management's power to controi.(3) 
(1) See, for example, Council on Prices Productivity and Incomes, 
Fourth Report, H.M.S.O., London, 1961, pp.4 -13., and Richard 
E. Caves et al, Britain's Economic Prospects, Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1968, pp.4 -6. 
(2) See E.H. Phelps Brown, Wage Drift, Economica,, Vol.XXIX, No.116, 
November 1962, p.348, describing a study by Lars Aarvig, 
Inquiry on Wage Drift 1958-59, (Mimeographed Norsk Arbeits- 
giverforening, Oslo) 1961. 
(3) Ibid., p.353. 
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Possible Ways to Deal with Inflation 
But do management feel that control of inflation lies within 
their grasp? Do they feel that an incomes policy could help them 
to fight inflationary wage claims or would they prefer other poli- 
cies, perhaps a policy to reduce the demand for labour? Would 
such a policy of unemployment affect growth and investment plans? 
Would such a policy be politically acceptable? Would indeed the 
apparent alternative, the limitation of free collective bargain- 
ing, be acceptable to management? To see how these policies would 
fit into the British economic and industrial scene it is perhaps 
relevant to consider the conceptual framework of policies of 
employment, prices, incomes and freedom in bargaining. 
Free collective bargaining has been a long established 
institution of the labour market of the United Kingdom. Full 
employment has been a major goal of successive Governments since 
the war and now the objective of a rising real standard of living 
with more stable prices has become vital in Britain's attempt to 
shake off her recurrent economic difficulties. It has been said, 
however, that theoretically, at least, one can have any two of 
these desirable things but neither theoretically nor in practice 
is it possible to have all three. This three- cornered incompati- 
bility has been referred to as "the uneasy triangle "(1). The 
Economist(2)set out the problem: 
(1) See The Economist, August 9th 1952, p.322. 
(2) Ibid., pp.322 -323. 
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"A community can have stability of prices and full 
employment if it can bring itself to do without 
free collective bargaining. A really effective 
control of wages would require an all -powerful 
central authority not only holding down aggregate 
wage increases to whatever sum was genuinely justi- 
fied by real national productivity but also sorting 
out relative wages according to some sound objective 
standard 
"Alternatively, full employment can be combined with 
free collective bargaining, but only by paying the 
penalty of an incessant upward spiral of costs and 
prices. Full employment means high bargaining power 
for the workers, high bargaining power means wage 
increases which, in greater or less degree outrun 
the growth of productivity; these high wages not 
only raise costs but, by swelling demand, pull up 
prices and generate high profits; high prices and 
profits whet employers' eagerness to obtain more 
labour; and so da capo 
"Or, as a third possibility, an economy can have 
stability of the value of money and free collective 
bargaining if it is willing to sacrifice full emp- 
loyment. The central monetary authority, with its 
control over purchasing power and credit, can make 
it hopelessly unprofitable for employers in general 
to meet demands for higher wages the workers 
whom it does not pay to employ, to supply a market 
where there is not much money about, will simply re- 
main out of work." 
For a long time Britain had held fast to the aim of full emp- 
loyment and to the institution of free collective bargaining with 
the accompanying rise in prices and problems with the balance of 
trade. This is, of course, extremely dangerous for a country, 
such as Britain, depending so much on international trade for its 
livelihood. (1 ) 
(1) See B.C. Roberts, Centralised Wage Policy, Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol.V, No.2, June 1958, p.158. 
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Policies adopted by successive Governments to curb Inflation 
Has the manager ever come into contact with the fruits of 
this theory? Has he had an opportunity to hear of or to ex- 
perience different policies to curb the growth of prices? 
To close the inflationary gap between the rise in incomes 
and productivity growth Turner(1)has said three basic policies are 
used: 
(i) Attempts to control demand -by monetary and fiscal policies to 
reduce Fie amount oT` money available Tor returns zo Iá.b6ürRiñ 
Fie economy. Z23 
The problem with this policy is that an overall withdrawal of 
money has an effect not only on consumption spending and employ- 
ment but also on investment spending which can affect long term 
growth. 
(ii) Attempts to control or 'restrain' increases in wages and other 
costs. 
In this case the hope is that the growth in production would 
catch up with the now restricted rise in incomes. 
(iii) Inducements to increase productivity either by more invest - 
ment or-br- increases iñ eTT iency. 
This has been supported by the opposing advocates of the 
first and second policies. 
(1) H.A. Turner, Employment Fluctuations, Productivity and Cost 
Inflation in ì\ianufacturing Industry, International Liabour Re- 
view, Vol.LXXXI, January -June 1960, p.379. 
(2) Richard E. Caves et al..., Britain's Economic Prospects, Allen 
and Unwin, London,1968, found it difficult to distinguish be- 
tween the effects of monetary and fiscal policy as both 
policies seemed to be used at the same time. 
A suggestion is made that fiscal policy should be used as the 
main instrument for the attainment of domestic objectives and 
monetary policy to regulate the balance of payments. 
As a result of her poor trading performance it would appear 
that Britain could no longer allow prices to be unstable. In the 
terms of "the uneasy triangle" either full employment or free 
collective bargaining would have to be abandoned as a major goal 
to allow the aim of stable prices to take its place. But, which 
one should be abandoned? Have the majority of views expressed 
favoured the retention of one objective or the other, convincing 
managers that one policy only is correct? 
Arguments about the Policy to reduce Excess Demand and the Level 
of Employment.(1) 
Paish(2)has stated that every year between 1949 and 1964 in 
which the balance of payments on current account worsened, money 
incomes were rising much faster than the productive potential, the 
margin of unused resources was well below 6% and unemployment well 
below 2k%. The worst deficits in the balance of payments co- 
incided with years of rapidly rising incomes and low unemployment. 
Wage drift, too, is believed to be related to employment, being at 
its worst in times of high demand for labour.(3) 
Should then the policy of full employment be abandoned? 
(1) As mentioned earlier the policy of encouraging productivity 
growth can be used alongside this policy as well as the object- 
ive of restraining wages. 
(2) F.W. Paish and Jossleyn Hennessy, Policy for Incomes ? - Hobart 
Paper No.29, I.E.A., London,1967, pp. 42 -43. 
(3) E.H. Phelps Brown, Wage Drift, Economica, Vol.XXIX, No.116, 
November 1962, p.339. 
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The policy of full employment has been inherent in British 
social and economic policy since the experience of heavy unemploy- 
ment in the 1930s. Keynesian(1)ideas for maintaining full employ- 
ment were accepted by influential people including Lord Beveridge(2) 
whose own book also urged full use of national resources, both of 
labour and capital. Indeed, in 1944 the Government accepted 'as 
one of their primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance of 
a high and stable level of employment'.(3) 
Others have not been unduly worried if the level of unemploy- 
ment did fluctuate. Roberts(4)felt that as a result of monetary 
policy and fiscal policies employment would have to move up and 
down. Parkinson(5)felt that the implications of even 3% unemploy- 
ment should not be exaggerated, pointing out that a constant ex- 
pansion of output associated with a greater stability of prices 
would be preferred even if some marginal workers had to seek new 
jobs. Paish,(6)using Phillips' estimates of the level of unemploy- 
ment, which is compatible with the rates of increase in production 
per head and wages being equal at about 2- 20,(7)believed that 
(1) John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money, MacMillan, London,1ß36. 
(2) William H. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society, Allen 
and Unwin, London, 1944. Beveridge, however, suggests 'full 
employment' would be achieved if the unemployment level was 3% 
- a figure high by today's standards. He does, however, state 
that full employment is achieved only if there is an existence 
of more vacant jobs than unemployed men. 
(3) Employment Policy, Cmd.6527, H.M.S.O., London,1944. 
(4) B.C. Roberts, National Wages Policy in War and Peace, Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1958, pp.165 -166. 
(5) J.R. Parkinson, Wage Stability and Employment, Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol.V, No.2, June 1958, p.98. 
(6) F.W. Paish and Josselyn Hennessy, op.cit., pp.25 -31. 
(7) A.W. Phillips, The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate 
of Change_of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861 -1957, 
Economica, Vol.XXV, No.100, November 1958. Phillips had assumed 
a level of productivity increase of 2% per annum. Paish adapted 
Phillips' estimates 
to take account the unemployable and those 
13 
restriction of demand could be used and usefully supplemented, 
though not replaced, by an incomes policy. If, however, un- 
employment rose above 2 j, and wages were still rising too fast 
a further restriction of demand with the ensuing increased un- 
employment would have to be introduced. 
Other writers have cast doubts on measures affecting demand, 
and therefore the level of unemployment, being able to curb rising 
wages. Robertson(1)asserted that if the unemployment was not 
general, while weakening claims in a certain industry initially, 
it would not be fully effective over the whole wage claim period 
since increases in other industries - unaffected by recent re- 
dundancies, would make way for the relative wage argument. Ex- 
pressing the same opinion about the effectiveness of measures 
controlling demand, Corina(2)gave evidence of several studies 
which suggest that trade unions' attitudes and influence greatly 
affect the rate of increase of wage rates, independently of the 
demand for labour. He also suggested that inflation could not be 
cured by a slight rise in unemployment,(3)stating that the economy 
really needed a national policy on productivity, prices and incomes. 
(1) D.J. Robertson, The Inadequacy of Recent Wage Policies in 
Britain, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol.V, No.2, 
June 1958, p.104. 
(2) John Corina, The Development of Incomes Policy, Institute of 
Personnel Management, London,1966, pp.22 -23 in making this 
point quotes also L.R. Klein and R.J. Ball, Some Econometrics 
of the Determination of Absolute Prices and Wages, Economic 
Journal, September 1959, and A.G, Hines, Trade Unions and Wage 
Inflation in the United Kingdom 1093 -1961, Review of Economic 
Studies, October 1964. 
(3) Ronald G. Bodkin, The Wage- Price -Productivity Nexus, University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Fhiladelphia, 1966, p.279, deduced that 
a rather large increase in unemployment must be incurred to in- 
duce a given decrement in the rate of increase in prices. 
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Corina's ideas amount to a mixture of the second and third types 
of policy mentioned by Turner. There are, however, problems 
with this type of policy. 
Arguments about Policies of Income Restraint affecting the Principle 
of Free Collective Bargaining 
The first problem with income restraint is that it is not at 
all easy to obtain the correct machinery to operate the policy. 
Even yet the policy is seen as being experimental.(1) 
There is also evidence that such a policy can lead to greater 
industrial conflict as firm lines could result in pay disputes. 
Another point to be considered is whether or not the attitude in 
the country is right for an incomes policy. Mr. MacMillan, then 
Prime Minister, recognised this in the House of Commons while 
introducing the National Incomes Commission : - 
" to reconcile an incomes policy in a free 
society means digging right down into the roots 
of our philosophy in our free society an 
incomes policy cannot be imposed. It can only 
come from acceptance. "(2) 
The "digging right down into the roots of our philosophy" 
would appear to raise the fourth problem involved in the intro- 
duction of an incomes policy - the fact that such a policy re- 
stricts freedom by threatening the collective bargaining system 
(1) See John Corina, Can an Incomes Policy be Administered ?, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.V, No.3, 
November 1967, p.309. 
(2) Mr. MacMillan as reported in The Times,, 27th July, 1962. 
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and the arbitration courts. 
Collective bargaining, as Corina(1)has stated, is still the 
underlying principle of the system of wage determination in 
Britain. Yet, as Corina pointed out, it is becoming increasingly 
recognised that traditional wage bargaining, conducted in a dis- 
jointed and isolated fashion, too frequently leads through its 
effect on the domestic and export price levels to a fundamental 
conflict of economic interest between the bargainers and the 
community.(2) Many other authors share this view. Guillebaud(3) 
wrote that both employers and unions should remember that at the 
conference table there is a vacant place which could be described 
as 'the Public Interest'. Cairncross(4)felt that "it is the 
silent third party, the consumer, the man with the fixed income or 
little bargaining power who is the victim of these negotiations 
from which he is debarred ". Flanders(5)made exactly the same point: 
"The parties to collective bargaining can, and often do, 
decide their policy without regard to any broader interest 
than their own; and, if they wanted to, they are in no 
position to take fully into account interests unrepresented 
at the bargaining table." 
(1) John Corrna, The Labour Market, Institute of Personnel Manage- 
ment, London, 1966. 
(2) Ibid., p.6. 
(3) C.W. Guillebaud, Wage Determination and Wages Policy, Second 
Edition, Nisbet, Welwyn, 1967, p.75. 
(4) A.K. Cairncross, Wage Policy and Inflation, Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol.V, No.2, June 1958, p.84. 
(5) Allan Flanders, Can Britain have a Wage Policy ?, Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.V, No.2, June 1958, p.114. 
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Not everyone, however, agrees with this. Jensen,(1)for example, 
thought that there was no satisfactory substitute for collective 
bargaining if freedom of private decision making in the labour 
sector was wanted. He went on to state that if the Government 
entered into pay negotiations the three party process would be 
unable to function. 
The question of freedom is important but Oberer(2)believed 
that freedom can be attained only under law(3)and quoted 
Rutledge(4) to illustrate his point: 
"I believe in law. At the same time I believe 
in freedom. And I know that each of these things 
may destroy the other. But I know too that, 
without both, neither can long endure." 
Oberer(5)concluded, in a bizarre fashion, that he did not 
like to leave "the cream of public interest in the sole charge of 
(1) Vernon H. Jensen, The Process of Collective Bargaining and the 
Question of its Obsolescence, Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol.16, No.4, July 1963, p.546. 
(2) Walter E. Oberer, Freedom and Public Policy; The Rule of Law 
and a 'Court of Economics' for Price -Wage Problems, Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review,, Vol.16, No.4, July 1963, p.539. 
(3) This would at first appear to advocate a departure from normal 
British practice. K.W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, 
Penguin, Middlesex, 1965, p.9, stated that "most workers want 
nothing more of the law than that it should leave them alone" 
- his book, however, reveals how far reaching is British 
Labour law. 
(4) Wiley Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith.(Lawrence, Kansas; 
University of Kansas, 1947), p.6. 
(5) Oberer, op.cit., p.544. 
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labour and managements cats." What he felt was needed was "a 
third cat, a kind of 'public watchdog cat' to skim off the con- 
sumers' share of the cream ". 
Wootton,1)believing that it was fantastic that, in 1955, such 
a vital issue as wages had found no place in political discussion, 
felt that this third party should be nominated in the political 
arena and perhaps should take control over the wage determination 
process. 
If there were to be a change a problem would exist about 
which form the new process of wage determination would take. 
Flanders(2)assessed the problem accurately a few years ago when 
he posed a series of questions about the future of collective 
bargaining: 
"What happens to collective bargaining is going to 
depend on economic and political developments at 
present quite obscure. How long, for example, will 
something like full employment be maintained? How 
drastic will be the measures required before we can 
fully restore our national solvency ? "(3) 
It would appear that both policies of reduction of demand 
and incomes restraint have their advocates. In addition both 
(1) Barbara Wootton, The Social Foundations of wage Policy, Allen 
and Unwin, London 1955, p.166. 
(2) Allan Flanders and H.A. Clegg, editors, The System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain, Blackwell, Oxford 1963, p.315. 
(3) Allan Flanders, Collective Bargaining: Prescription for Change, 
Faber and Faber, London 1967, pp.34-35, argued later that only 
one aspect of the voluntary principle had to go. Collective 
bargaining would still be used to determine wages. A vol- 
untary (non -legislative) system of bargaining should be re- 
tained. What should go is the preference of the bargaining 
parties for complete autonomy in their relations. 
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types of policy have been used by post -war Governments, so managers 
even if they had not heard the arguments for each type of policy 
would at least have had a taste of the various policies which have 
been tried, particularly policies using fiscal and monetary re- 
straints and prices and incomes restraints. 
During the 1950s mainly fiscal and monetary policies were 
used in an attempt to try to keep stable prices while balancing 
rising real wages with productivity increases. These policies, 
however, produced a poor strategy for growth.(1) At the beginning 
of the 1960s (1962) the Conservative Government sought to tackle 
rising incomes by the mechanism of the National Incomes Commission. 
Income restraint was continued and expanded by the incoming Labour 
Administration in 1964. The National Plan, incorporating the 
prices and incomes policy, was introduced in an attempt to prevent 
the 'stop -go' cycle which had become familiar to the British scene. 
The present Government seems to have come to a similar con- 
clusion to Fogarty12)in the short term at least, namely that any 
successful policy to keep prices stable by relating pay to 
national production is likely to be many- sided, drawing on the 
strong points of one to offset the weaknesses of another. This 
can still lead to problems. Turner(3)illustrated the recent un- 
(1) See J.C.R. Dow, The Management of the British Economy, 1945 - 
.6_Q, Cambridge University Press, 1964. 
(2) Michael Fogarty, The Just Wage, Chapman, London, 1961, p.232. 
(3) H.A. Turner, The Progress and Poverty of Incomes Policy, 
Progress, Vol.52, No.292, 2/1967, Unilever, 1967, p.36. 
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desired effects from the simultaneous use of policies to cut de- 
mand and to restrain prices and incomes. 
It may well be that the gradual growth of the policies of 
price and incomes restraint(1)may mean a curtailment of 'free' 
collective bargaining in Britain, especially if an incomes policy, 
concerned with the balance of trade and social justice,(2)is 
advocated and accepted by many as a permanent institution.(3) The 
implementation of such a policy will, of course, depend partly 
upon the co- operation of management.(4) 
The Structure of the Dissertation 
Having briefly surveyed the setting of the incomes policy and 
some of the problems connected with its implementation the structure 
of the dissertation can now be seen in its context. 
(1) For the gradual growth of incomes policy in the United Kingdom, 
see E.H. Phelps Brown, Guidelines for Growth and for Incomes 
in the United Kingdom: Some Possible Lessons for the United 
States, in George P. Schultz and Robert Z. Aliber, editors, 
Guidelines, Informal Controls and the Market Place, University 
of Chicago Press, 1966, pp.1i -3 -163. 
(2) For suggestions about the use of an incomes policy, see John 
Hughes and Kenneth Alexander, A Plan for Incomes, Fabian Re- 
search Series 247, Fabian Society, 1965. 
(3) There is, however, plenty of opposition to the use of an in- 
comes policy. At the T.U.C. Conference in 1968, 7,7461000 to 
1,022,000 voted in favour of the repeal of the Prices and In- 
comes Act and "full" support for the 1TI.U.C.'s voluntary pro- 
posals scraped through only by 4,266,000 votes to 4,232,000. 
Even the Labour Party Conference in 1968 voted 5,098,000 to 
1,12+,000 in favour of repealing the Prices and Incomes £tct 
and of rejecting any further legislation to control basic 
Trade Union rights. 
(4) The criteria for incomes rises, machinery of the policy and 
powers laid down by the present prices and incomes legisla- 
tion will be described in appendices which reference is made 
to in Chapter 3. 
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Basically the dissertation is concerned with discovering 
what a sample of managers at the beginning of 1968 knew about 
the prices and incomes policy and what opinions they held about 
certain aspects of the policy. 
This chapter deals with the background of the research. In 
the next chapter the method of enquiry and the sample will be dis- 
cussed. The remainder of the report is concerned with the 
findings of the survey. 
Chapter 3 assesses the respondents' comprehension on specific 
questions concerned with the incomes policy and Britain's economic 
problems. In Chapter 4 an attempt is made to build up a picture 
of the understanding shown by the individual manager. This assess- 
ment of a manager's comprehension is compared in following 
chapters with the opinions he expressed about the policy. 
The next three chapters seek to discover the managers' 
attitudes towards the prices and incomes policy. Chapter 5 con- 
siders the managers' opinions on the uses and desirability of 
the prices and incomes policy while Chapter 6 looks at the way 
their firms obeyed the policy in the past. Chapter 7 is con- 
cerned with the managers' opinions on compulsory powers and the 
role of the Government in the determination of prices and incomes. 
The next five chapters consider the respondents' views on 
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pay increases and relative income levels. Chapter 8 examines 
the managers' opinions on two traditional criteria for income 
increases which have been condemned by the Government. Chapter 
9 looks at one facet of the 'social justice' aspect of the 
policy and reviews the respondents' feelings on lower paid 
workers and a national minimum wage. The managers' views on 
another facet of social justice are investigated in Chapter 10 
where an assessment is made of the choices of groups they felt 
most or least deserved a pay increase. Chapter 11 deals with 
the criteria the managers believed were used to determine pay 
and those they would like to see determine incomes, while in 
Chapter 12 the prospects of a national system to determine in- 
comes on a more equitable basis are discussed. 
The general conclusions are presented in the final chapter. 
22 
CHAPTER 2 
THE illETHOD OF ENQUIRY 
As a guide to managers' views on the Government's incomes 
policy it was decided to conduct a survey of Scottish managers 
employed in a variety of industries. This would enable an in- 
sight to be obtained into the opinions of managers involved in 
a cross -section of trades rather than merely discovering the 
feelings of one particular industry. Previous experience with 
a questionnaire which had been given to managers in some 22 
firms indicated that response rates might have been poor if this 
method had been used for the survey, and accordingly it was de- 
cided to obtain data by the use of interviews. As these inter- 
views would be lengthy it was decided that 250 interviews would 
be a reasonable goal. 
The Sample 
The difficulty of obtaining an industrial sample 
Certain problems exist in obtaining a representative sample 
of industrial managers which do not exist in selecting a random 
sample from the general public. In the latter case random se- 
lection from the Register of Electors can give a good cross -section 
of the populace. In the industrial setting, however, certain 
types of industry are more prominent, in labour or capital emp- 
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loyed terms, than others; some firms are larger than others; 
some managers are more important than others; some firms will 
not allow the researcher access to their employees. Choosing a 
selection of firms to enable a representative view of industry to 
be obtained has been attempted many times in past researches. 
Some, such as Isabel Blain,(1)to ensure entry into firms selected 
for the study have been unable to claim a representative sample 
by only choosing firms felt to be interested in the research pro- 
ject. 
Others have restricted their choice by only considering 
firms over a certain size. Thus, the Acton Society Trust(2)in 
their survey on management succession dealt purely with organisa- 
tions in manufacturing industry employing more than 10,000 persons. 
The National Institute of Industrial Psychology(3)using a similar 
method contacted all manufacturing establishments in the country 
employing over 250 people. These studies were, however, much 
larger enquiries than could be handled by a single research worker. 
One method of confining the work to manageable size has been 
to consider only a limited number of industries. Barna4)for 
(1) Isabel Blain, Structure in Management, National Institute of 
Psychology, Report No.17, London,1961+. 
(2) Acton Society Trust, Management Succession, Acton Society 
Trust, London91956. 
(3) National Institute of Industrial Psychology, Joint Consulta- 
tion in British Industry, Staples Press, London,1952. 
(4) Tibor Barna, Investment and Growth Policies in British 
Industrial Firms, N.I.F.S.R., Occasional Papers XX, Cambridge 
University Press, 1962. 
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instance, in a study into investment and growth policies decided 
to look at only two industries by choosing one growth industry 
and one more stable industry. A similar approach was used by a 
P.E.F. group(1)looking at attitudes in British management. This 
group selected six industries representative of "old and new 
industries, science -based and non science -based industries, con- 
tracting and expanding industries, capital and consumer good 
industries, localised and non localised industries, and American - 
influenced and wholly British industries ".(2) 
A different method of confining the work to a manageable pro- 
portion has been to restrict the study to certain regions in 
Britain. Thus Clements(3)looked at private manufacturing in 
Manchester and the surrounding Employment Exchange areas, but 
made no attempt to make the sample statistically representative. 
He covered mainly the textile and engineering industries, other 
industries were represented but not to any great extent. Very 
few really small firms were included. Woodward(4)contacted 
(1) P.E.P., Thrusters and Sleepers, George Allen and Unwin, 
London,1965. Also published as P.E.F., Attitudes in British 
Management, Penguin, Hiddlesex,1966. 
(2) Ibid., p.16. 
(3) R.V. Clements, Managers. A study of their careers in Industry, 
George Allen and Unwin, London,1958. 
(4) Joan Woodward, Industrial Organisation: Theory and Practice, 
Oxford University Press, 1965. 
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firms in South -East Essex which were "classified into one of the 
fourteen categories listed under the heading of 'all manufacturing 
industries' in the statistics prepared by the 1..inistry of Labour ".(1) 
A list as comprehensive as possible, of 203 firms in the area was 
drawn up and Woodward felt that all sizeable firms were included 
though some smaller firms might have been missed. Another 
regionally based survey was that of the Manchester Joint Research 
Council.(2) This study also considered manufacturing industry 
only omitting agriculture, the extractive, construction and 
clothing industries and the service trade and professions. The 
industries chosen were grouped into four classes: (a) textiles, 
(b) engineering, (c) modern and (d) miscellaneous industries. To 
make sure firms of different sizes were fairly evenly represented 
the selection of firms was made on a random basis with one excep- 
tion. This was that firms with fewer than fifty employees were 
omitted on the grounds that whatever aspects of interest they 
might have would be gathered from discussions with the slightly 
larger firms. A stratified sample (with orders from the Standard 
Industrial Classification as strata) was then drawn based on the 
number of establishments in each strata. 
The regional multi -stage approach appeared to be the most 
suitable for this study. This method was, therefore, adopted and 
efforts were made to eliminate some of the weaknesses of the re- 
search methods quoted above to construct a sample representative 
(1) Ibid., p.7. 
(2) Manchester Joint Research Council, Industry and Science, 
Manchester University Press, 195+. 
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of industry as a whole. 
In the present study an attempt has been made to use a pro- 
cedure which would provide as representative a sample of managers 
in different types of industry and all sizes of firms as could be 
achieved within the constraints laid down by cost and a one -man 
research unit. 
Design of the sample 
A four stage sampling procedure was used to obtain respondents 
representative of industrial managers employed in different sizes 
of firms. 
This consisted of, firstly choosing the geographical boundaries 
of the study, secondly selecting a variety of industries, thirdly 
obtaining a cross -section of firms of different size and, fourthly 
determining the type of manager to be interviewed within each firm. 
Stage 1 : The Choice of Geographical Region 
The research was to be located in "Central Scotland ". This 
was defined as Edinburgh, Glasgow, Fife and the Lothians which was 
an area within an approximate 50 mile radius from Edinburgh. 
Stirlingshire had been used for preliminary pilot interviews and 
was, accordingly, omitted. 
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Stage 2 : The Choice of Industries 
In the context of incomes policy the experience of managers 
in certain industries is more relevant than others. Thus various 
headings from the Industrial Classification(1)were omitted from 
the survey. 'Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing', 'Insurance, 
Banking and Finance','Professional and Scientific Services', 
'Miscellaneous Services', 'Public Administration and Defence', and 
'Distributive Trades' were omitted in an attempt to produce a 
homogeneous sample based on the manufacturing side of industry. 
'Gas, Electricity and Water', 'Transport and Communication' and 
'Mining' were largely nationalised concerns and it was felt it 
would be inappropriate to question managers in these industries 
on aspects of the Government's policy. Finally it was decided to 
omit 'Quarrying' and 'Construction' to enable the survey to be 
concerned purely with managers who had a background of the factory 
shop -floor as opposed to open -air sites. 
The manufacturing industries were then divided into groups 
to enable the sample to be a reasonably representative cross - 
section of Orders III - XVI in the Standard Industrial Classifica- 
tion. Using the Census of Production for 1958(2)all Minimum List 
Headings were allocated to one of three groups - Food Products, 
Consumer Goods (ie. for the private consumer) and Producer Goods 
(ie. for industrial consumption). The first section was relatively 
(1) Central Statistical Office, Standard Industrial Classification, 
H.M.S.O., London,1958. 
(2) Board of Trade, The Report on the Census of Production for 
1958, H.M.S.O., London91960 -61. 
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simple to compile as all Minimum List Headings came from Order III 
of the Census of Production. Each Minimum List Heading in Orders 
IV - XVI was allocated to either the Consumer or Producer category 
on the basis of the value of its products. If the greater value 
of the Minimum List Heading's sales of principal products went for 
private or for industrial consumption then the entire Minimum List 
Heading was classed as belonging to that sector which used most, 
in terms of value, of the Minimum List Heading's products. 
In most cases Minimum List Headings apart from food products 
fell quite clearly into either the Consumer or Producer Product 
categories.(1) The weighting of each of the three categories then 
had to be decided. As the research was concerned with the atti- 
tudes of managers whose acceptance or rejection of the incomes 
policy affected their employees it seemed appropriate to weight 
the three categories by the number of employees involved in the 
production of the three types of products. The figures for emp- 
loyment in each Minimum List Heading were found in the Census of 
Production(2)and the following result obtained.(Table 2.1) 
(1) The values of the products of each Minimum List Heading were 
obtained from Table IV in each relevant part of the Census of 
Production for 1958. These tables gave the sales of the principal 
products of the industry by larger firms, including sales by 
establishments classified in other industries. (All these firms 
employed twenty -five or more people.) 
(2) The figures for the employment in each industry were taken from 
Table III in each relevant part of the Census of Production 
1958. Table III gave an analysis by size of enterprises within 
each industry and also the employment figures for firms emp- 
loying more than twenty -five people. Table I which gave the 
total employment in each industry for all firms was not used, 
firstly as very small firms (1 -10 employees) were not con- 
sidered in the survey and, secondly to base the figures of 
value of products and employment on the same size of firms. 
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Employees 670,000 1,237,473 5,156,818 7,064,797 
Percentage of 
Total Employees 9.5 17.5 73.0 100 
Weighting Factor 1 2 7 10 
On the basis of these weighting factors five, ten and thirty -five 
Minimum List Headings were selected by the use of random number 
tables from the Food, Consumer and Producer products categories 
respectively. 
Stage 3 : The Selection of the Firms 
The Scottish Council (Development and Industry) was approached 
to supply the names, addresses and employment figures of all firms 
within the chosen geographical area(1)who supported the Council 
and were categorised in one of the selected fifty Minimum List 
Headings. In this way the names of 282 firms were obtained. The 
employment figures of these firms were then used to enable the 
sample of firms to be selected on the basis of size. This was 
necessary in order to give a cross -section of Large (1000+ emp- 
loyees), Medium (100 -999 employees) and Small (11 -99 employees) 
Firms. (2) The weighting of each of the three sizes of firm cate- 
(1) The Scottish Council's own area classification of the selected 
area was used. 
(2) Medium sized firms were later sub- divided into two groups of 
(a) 250 -999 employees (Larger Medium Firms) and (b) 100 -249 
employees (Smaller Medium Firms). This was done, however, only 
as a guide to analysis and had no bearing on the stratification. 
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gories is shown below. 
Table 2.2 - Weighting of the Size of Firms 










Number of Firms ob- 
tained from Scottish 
Council 17 90 175 282 
Weighting Factor 1 5 10 16 
Stage 4 : The Choice of Respondents 
It had been decided to interview only the more senior managers 
in each firm as presumably these would be the managers more con- 
cerned with applying the prices and incomes policy within their 
firm. 
A senior manager was defined as an executive director, a 
general manager, a works manager or his assistants and functional 
managers who could influence developments (thought not necessarily 
in the incomes area) within their own specialisms.(1) 
If more than the required number of executives were available 
it was intended to interview the most senior men and to choose 
àJÖng the other managers of equal status on the basis of their 
(1) The managers were divided, on occasion, for analysis purposes 
into top management (those who influenced the external policy 
of the firm) and middle management (those who influenced only 
factors within their own functional area). 
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functions to obtain a cross- section of viewpoints within the firm.(1) 
If fewer than the required number of senior managers were avail- 
able only the senior men were to be interviewed. No interviewing 
of any lower strata of management was to be attempted. 
Having decided upon the type of manager to be interviewed 
the next stage was to decide upon how many of these senior managers 
would be interviewed in each size of firm. 
It was felt that as each interview would last for about one 
hour six interviews would be the maximum number which could be ob- 
tained in any one day. Since experience had shown that senior 
management appreciated all interviews being completed in one day, 
especially if the interviews did not seem to enable the firm to 
receive any tangible benefit, it was felt that six interviews 
should be the maximum number in any firm. This would enable a 
cross -section of a firm's senior management to be interviewed and 
also increased the prospects of co- operation by disturbing the firm 
as little as possible. It was decided to obtain the same number of 
interviews in large and medium sized firms. Few of the large firms 
had many over one thousand employees and a number of the medium 
sized firms employed just under one thousand persons so to dis- 
tinguish between firms of these sizes would have been somewhat 
arbitrary. At the other end of the scale, medium sized firms of 
(1) For example, if two interviews had still to be obtained and 
three managers of equal rank were available for interview, 
two being concerned with the sales side of the business and 
the other with production, the production manager and only 
one of the managers concerned with the sales side would be 
interviewed. 
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just over one hundred employees would normally have fewer than six 
senior managers so it was felt that the adjustment of numbers at 
this end of the scale would occur due to the lack of suitable 
candidates for interview. 
Figures giving the number of employees in manufacturing 
industries(1)at June 1961 showed that out of a total of 8,178,000 
employees, 1,642,000 come from small firms (11 -99 employees) while 
6,536,000 employees come from large and medium firms (100 -1,000+ 
employees). These figures show that one man in every five is emp- 
loyed by a smaller firm with a staff of ninety -nine or less per- 
sons. Given that six managers were to be interviewed in the 
larger firms it appeared that two managers(2)would have to be 
interviewed in the smaller firms. From the pilot interviews, 
however, it had been found that the smaller firms were more re- 
luctant to admit the researcher and often one manager effectively 
controlled all the functions in the small firm. To compensate 
for such shortfalls three senior managers in small firms were to 
be interviewed wherever possible. 
The 282 firms, regardless of their Minimum List Headings, 
were placed into Large, Medium and Small Firm categories. To meet 
the objective of 250 interviews it was found that about 64 firms 
would have to be visited. If all of the firms co- operated and 
(1) Ministry of Labour Gazette, Vol.LXX, îN.4, April 1962, p.145. 
(2) 1.5 managers to be strictly accurate: 
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all the interviews required were obtained 264 interviews would be 
undertaken. This was due to the constraint of the size of firm 
necessitating requests for co- operation being sent to batches of 
16 firms and also the constraint of the number of interviews in 
each firm which meant that a maximum of 66 interviews would be 
undertaken in each batch of 16 firms. (Table 2.3) To obtain 250 
interviews four batches of sixteen requests for co- operation would 
have to be sent. 
Table 2.'1 - The Effect of the Constraints of 
Size and Number of Interviews in 
each Size of Firm 




























Total 16 - 66 
Using the names supplied by the Scottish Council every firm 
in each of the size categories was allotted a number and four, 
twenty and forty firms drawn by use of random number tables from 
the large, medium and small firm categories respectively. Since 
the firms in the three size categories belonged to fifty Minimum 
List Headings a random cross -section of these industries was ob- 
tained simultaneously. 
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The Sample Obtained 
Each firm was contacted by letter(1)and if no reply was re- 
ceived within three weeks a reminder was sent.(2) If still no re- 
ply was obtained the firm was considered to have refused to co- 
operate in the survey. Eventually some 208 firms were sent re- 
quests for co- operation and 85 firms were visited (a response rate 
of 40.9 %) before the required number of interviews was obtained. 
These requests were sent out in batches of sixteen, one to a 
large firm, five to medium sized firms and ten to small firms. No 
problems were encountered with the first stage which was concerned 
with the geographical location of the firms of the sampling pro- 
cedure. Of the 85 firms eventually visited, 46 were in Glasgow, 
22 in Edinburgh, 12 in Fife and 5 in East or West Lothian. The 
second sampling stage had given a cross -section of manufacturing 
industry. Table 2.4 shows that the number of firms visited in 
each product group corresponds closely with the employment in each 
of these groups. 
Table 2.4 - Breakdown of Firms visited, analysed in 








in each category 
(Table 2.1) 9.5 17.5 73.0 100 
Number of firms visited 8 14 63 85 
Percentage of firms 
visited 9.4 16.4 74.1 100 
(1) See Appendix 1. 
(2) See Appendix 2. 
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The more detailed breakdown in Appendix 3 showed, however, 
that the number of firms selected from each Minimum List Heading 
were not the same. Just under one third of the firms visited were 
classed under one Minimum List Heading - 489, "Other Printing, 
Publishing, Bookbinding, Engraving, etc." 
At first, the explanation for this appeared to be that only 
one -fifth of the interviews had not been conducted in one of 
Scotland's two major cities and according to Florence(1)the 
larger cities tend to specialise in publishing and printing books 
and periodicals. Professor Florence had earlier(2)given the 
location co- efficient(3)for publishing to be 0.70 which was only 
surpassed by nine other industries out of 131 with only two 
equalling the co- efficient for publishing. This indicates that 
the publishing industry is concentrated in certain areas of the 
country - one of which as can be seen from the Department of Emp- 
loyment and Productivity statistics - seems to be central Scotland. 
These figures(4)indicated that while the national percentage 
of employees employed in Minimum List Heading 489 "Other Printing, 
(1) P. Sargent Florence, Economics and Sociology of Industry, 
C.A. Watts, London,1964, pp.64 -65. 
(2) P. Sargent Florence, Post -war Investment, Location, and Size 
of Plant, N.I.E.S.R., Occasional Paper XIX, Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press, 1962, pp.38 -43. 
(3) For definition, see P. Sargent Florence, assisted by W. Baldamus, 
Investment, Location, and Size of Plant, N.I.E.S.R., Economic 
and Social Studies VIII, Cambridge University Press, 1948, p.34. 
(4) See Appendix 4. 
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Publishing, Engraving, etc." is 1.1 %, Glasgow has 1.6% and 
Edinburgh 2.2% of its labour force employed in this Minimum List 
Heading, giving what Florence would term location quotients(1)of 
this Minimum List Heading for the two cities of 1.5 and 2.0 re- 
spectively. The sample, however, was not drawn from all industries. 
Indeed, employees in manufacturing industries (Orders III -XVI) from 
which the sample was taken comprised only 26.4% and 35.9°0 of the 
total number employed in Edinburgh and Glasgow respectively. Of 
the labour force employed in manufacturing industries 17.7% in 
Edinburgh and 9.7% in Glasgow worked in firms classified into 
Order XV, "Paper, Printing and Publishing ".(2) 
If printing and publishing firms were represented pro- 
portionately among the supporters of the Scottish Council it would 
be expected that a good proportion of the sample would be drawn 
from Order XV. Yet it would appear that printing and publishing 
firms were over -represented, 31.9% of the 282 firms whose names 
were supplied by the Scottish Council were classified into Order 
XV and most of these firms came from Minimum List Heading 489. 
This, it would seem, caused the bias in the sample. 
Table 2.5 (Column 2) shows that in the third stage of the 
sample design (the selection of firms on the basis of size), there 
was a slight oversampling of medium sized firms but on the whole 
(1) P. Sargent Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London0953, p.37. 
(2) See Appendix 4. 
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the proportion of firms in each size grouping visited was almost 
the same as planned.(1) Since several firms refused co- operation 
additional batches of requests were sent which culminated in 85 
firms being visited and 270 interviews being obtained. 
Table 2.5 - Response Rates to Requests for Co- operation. 












































Total 208 85 40.9 270 3.2 
In Stage 4 the small firms' managers were over -sampled as 
more managers were available for interview than had been expected.(2) 
In terms of employees in small firms compared to larger firms, 
interviews in small firms should have been only one fifth of the 
total(3)yet the final outcome revealed that twice the necessary 
(1) The weighting factors for size were one large firm, five 
medium firms and ten small firms in every sixteen firms selected. 
(2) The assumption that the smaller medium sized firms would not 
have six senior managers available for interview did appear to 
be correct. While 4.3 interviews were obtained in each medium 
firm, in 15 visits to firms with 250 -999 employees 79 inter- 
views were obtained, a response rate per firm of 5.3 inter- 
views, and 16 visits to firms employing 100 -249 persons pro- 
duced only 54 interviews - a response rate of 3.4 per firm. 
See Appendix 5 for the number of interviews in each type of firm. 
(3) See Ministry of Labour Gazette, Vol.LXX, No.4, April 1962, 
p.145. 
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number of interviews in small firms had been obtained. 
To sum up, the sample obtained was not quite as representa- 
tive as had been hoped but this is probably inevitable when 
sampling from industry on a small scale. In relation to some of 
the surveys mentioned previously, however, the sample compares 
favourably. There are, however, four shortcomings which must be 
remembered when evaluating the results. 
(1) A selective factor occurs in the sample as the 
research was dependent upon the co- operation of 
firms to allow interviews to take place.(1) 
(2) Small firms are over- represented in the total 
sample. 
(3) The sample is heavily weighted by managers in 
the publishing industry. 
(4) This survey is more representative of Central 
Scotland than Britain as a whole though a 
guide may be given to the attitudes prevalent 
among senior management in Britain. 
The Interview Schedule 
The sampling procedure had been devised when the interview 
schedule was almost ready for use. The development of the 
schedule(2)proceeded over a long period. The schedule was drafted 
(1) It could well be managers in the firms who refused to co- 
operate (59.1 of those contacted) may have had views different 
from those of the managers willing to co- operate. 
Another selective factor was introduced by the selection only 
of firms who were supporters of the Scottish Council. The 
Council had been chosen after difficulties had arisen in ob- 
taining the names of a sufficiently large number of firms 
from which to sample. 
(2) The interview schedule is reproduced in Appendix 6. 
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after the results of two other interview schedules concerned with 
refining the area of research had been considered and a questionn- 
aire dealing with the wage -freeze had been completed by over 100 
managers. These preliminary surveys had taken place in Stirling - 
shire and the trial drafts of the schedule used for this research 
was also tested in that county. Just over one hundred pilot 
interviews were undertaken to test the usefulness of various 
questions and the order in which they should be asked to allow 
the interview to flow smoothly. 
The questions were a mixture of many types. Eight of the 
questions were open -ended to allow the respondent to express his 
views freely on the subject. Another 26 of the questions were 
open -ended probes into reasons for choosing a particular answer. 
For example, if the respondent had replied "yes" to a certain 
question he was asked why he gave this reply and if he had 
originally given a negative answer he was asked "why not ? ". Four 
questions gave the managers a limited choice of answers. To 
assist the respondent where there were limited choices for his 
answer (and on one occasion where the question was rather complex) 
he was given a card on which were printed both the question and 
the limited choice of answers. 
After three preliminary questions on information received 
about the prices and incomes policy the questions probed the level 
40 
of a manager's comprehension of the Government's economic object- 
ives and its incomes policy.(1) After this the manager's opinions 
on the desirability of the policy and compulsory powers were ob- 
tained. Next, the manager's views on the criteria for pay in- 
creases laid down by the Governiaent were sought and then their own 
ideas on the most useful criteria were obtained. Finally, the 
manager was asked whether he felt the policy was successful and 
what form he believed the policy should take in the future. At 
the end of the interview information was obtained about the 
manager's firm, work experience, age and education. 
Processing and Checking of Data obtained 
The interviewing was conducted between mid -February and the 
end of May 1968. The answers were then classified into meaningful 
groups of similar replies. To do this one hundred questionnáires 
were selected by the use of random numbers and the answers to each 
question were examined in order to determine the grouping of 
similar answers. Once the answers for any one question had been 
categorised a coding scheme was drawn up from the categories into 
which most replies had fallen. This coding scheme was then used 
to allot codes to answers to the particular question from all the 
questionnaires. The data were copied onto specially prepared 
transfer sheets and were transferred from these sheets to punch 
(1) The respondent's answer to each of these questions was graded 
into one of four groups based on the understanding shown in 
his reply. These groups were: Group A - good answers; Group 
B - adequate answers; Group C - vague answers; Group D - poor 
answers. 
41 
cards. Checking procedures were undertaken at three stages. 
Firstly to check that the correct codes had been allotted to the 
answers in each questionnaire the codes in ten per cent of the 
questionnaires, beginning from a random starting point, were re- 
examined. In the event of a mistake being found two questionnaires 
on either side were checked to see if there had been a continua- 
tion of any one error. The same procedure was adopted when the 
codes were copied from the questionnaire on to the transfer sheets. 
A third check was made to reveal any mistakes made by the 
girls punching the codes. Answers had been recorded in such a 
way that if the total number of answers to any question was not 
270 a count had already been made of the managers who had given 
a long answer which covered more than one answer classification. 
The number of categories into which each of these long answers 
had fallen was noted and the expected total number of answers to 
each question was compared with the total given by the punch cards. 
The total number of errors discovered was extremely small. Once 
the checking procedures had been completed tables were constructed 
showing the distribution of answers to the various questions and 
the analysis of the results began. 
In this exploratory survey no attempt will be made to pro- 
duce correlations since firstly, the sample is not random, and 
thus on the advice of several statistical authorities, no 
statistical significance tests have been used as it would be 
spurious to attribute to the findings of the survey an authenticity 
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which they did not possess. Secondly, a correlation, even if 
significant, is not necessarily a definitive definition that the 
explanation given is correct; many other factors may have to be 
taken into account.(1) 
In this thesis some tentative hypotheses will be formulated 
on the basis of the evidence provided by the survey. Fresh 
primary data drawn from a more random and representative sample 
would be necessary to give the researcher the opportunity of imp- 
roving upon or rejecting these ideas. 
(1) See also W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social 
Justice, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London31966, pp.7 -8. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the respondents' 
understanding of the incomes policy and its econamic setting. T`o 
this end the managers were asked questions on the objectives 
the policy, inflation, devaluatin, criteria for income increases, 
the machinery of the prices and incomes policy, the Government's 
reserve powers and the penalties for disobeying the policy. 
Respondents' Comprehension of the Objectives of the Incomes Policy 
The first of the questions testi E the managers' understanding 
of the policy was: 
"In the light of what you have read or 'eard, what 
would you say are the objectives of the Government's 
prices and incomes policy ? "(1) 
Surprisingly, more than half of the respondents (51.4) could not 
give a precise description of the objectives of the Government's 
policy. (2) Indeed Table 3.1 reveals that almost one manager in 
(1) The objectives were given by th National Plan. 
"Planning for econo ic growth requires policies for price sta- 
bility and for the orderly growth of e- ,incomes. An attack 
on the problem of costs is one of E ;e essential measures if 4ur 
competitive positio = is to be improved, and the balance of pay- 
ments strengthened Price stability recuires that the 
growth of money incomes should keep in line with the growth of 
real output 
1e National Plan, Qand.2764, ì. Wß.3.0. , London,1 965, p.65. 
See Appendix 7 for the distribution of answers to this question. 
(2) After answering each of the comprehension questions the 
managers were asked "Do you know aching else:" until they 
replied in the negative. 
Table a.1 
Classification of respondents in terms of 
the degree of comprehension shown in answer 
to the question: In the light of what you 
have read or heard, what would you say are 
the objectives of the Government's prices 
and incomes 2olicy ?" 
Respondents classified by the 
degree of comprehension shown 







Group A - Good Answers 
Respondents who displayed a clear 
idea of the objectives of the 
policy and who showed an under- 
standing of relationships between 
some of the key objectives 
Group B - Adequate Answers 
Respondents who displayed some idea 
of the objectives of the policy but 
who showed little knowledge of 
inter -relationships between the key 
objectives 
Group C - Vague Answers 
Respondents who showed that they 
knew one or more of the economic 
factors involved but whose answer 
was vague 
Group D - Poor Answers 
Respondents who gave either a de- 
scription which had nothing to do 
with the objectives of the policy 














every five (Group D - poor answers)(1)gave either an incorrect or 
meaningless description of the aims of the policy or no descrip- 
tion at all. The following are some examples: - 
"We're on a sticky wicket. (Probe) To stabilize things." 
"Prices are too low and wages are too high - they're 
trying to even them up." 
"To make money for them to spend." 
The next third of the respondents (Group C) were not much better. 
This group gave answers of a vague nature which hinted at part 
of the objectives of the policy but described them in an unclear 
manner, such as:- 
"To stabilize the economic structure of the country 
as a whole." 
"To stabilize the economy by ensuring that incomes 
do not rise quicker than is viable." 
"To get the financial structure of the economy into 
a reasonable order." 
In addition, within this group are contained the answers of managers 
who felt that the objective of a prices and incomes policy was only 
to stop prices and incomes rising and could give no reason for the 
Government desiring to stabilize prices and incomes. 
The 63 respondents in Group B showed evidence of comprehension 
of some of the main features of the prices and incomes policy but 
did not attempt to relate any of these features to each other. For 
(1) It will be remembered that four grades of comprehension were 
used; Group A - good answers; Group B - adequate answers; 
Group C - vague answers; Group D - poor answers. 
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instance : - 
"To bring the balance of payments into correct 
focus and to bring the country out of debt and 
to get prosperity in the future." 
"To control prices and incomes. To control the 
inflationary trend when prices and incomes spiral. 
To control the growth of the economy." 
One manager in four (Group A) gave a good description of the 
policy which showed an understanding of the inter -relationship of 
some of the policy's key features. Of these answers some were 
very good and showed how increases in productivity could help to 
attain the objectives. For example: 
"To improve the balance of payments by ensuring 
that firstly, personal incomes don't rise faster 
than the growth in G.N.P. and secondly, to en- 
sure that price rises are kept to a minimum due 
to their effect on costs and on wage claims." 
"Principally to permit our manufactured goods 
to be competitive internationally. To allow for 
a rise in real earnings at all levels by wage 
rises being tied to productivity increases to 
stop costs shooting up." 
Yet answers of this quality were given by only a handful of the 
managers. Despite the fact that management have such a vital 
part to play in implementing the prices and incomes policy less 
than half of the managers (48.5 %) in this sample(1)had an under- 
standing of the key features of the policy. 
A national sample of the total population found, in 1966, 
(1) In Groups A and B of Table 3.1. 
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that only 21.6% of the general public could give adequate or 
good descriptions of the prices and incomes policy.(1) That 
twice as many managers could give answers as good as these 
members of the general public to a slightly different question 
on the policy's objectives is no consolation. If over half of 
the managers in the sample cannot give at least an adequate de- 
scription of the aims of the policy how can they be expected to 
realise the contribution they could make in improving the nation's 
economic position? Perhaps the managers did know what the policy 
was trying to tackle but found difficulty in explaining it. A 
question on the meaning of inflation gave them a second chance to 
reveal their understanding of the problems the policy was attempt- 
ing to resolve. 
Managers' Understanding of Inflation 
The word 'inflation' is frequently used by politicians and 
economists in the mass media to describe one of Britain's most 
persistent economic problems. Yet 'inflation' was found to have 
little meaning to the ordinary citizen in a recent national sample 
survey. 
(2) 
While so few of the general public could understand the in- 
(1) Hilde Behrend, Harriet Lynch and Jean Davies, A National 
Survey of Attitudes to Inflation and Incomes Policy, 
Occasional Papers in Social and Economic Administration, No.7, 
Edutext, London,1966, p.14. 
(2) Ibid., p.6. 
Table 1.2 
Classification of managers in terms of the 
degree of comprehension shown in answer to 
the question: "What does the terni inflation 
mean to you ?" 
Respondents classified by the de- 






Group A - Good Answers 
Respondents who showed the inter- 
relation of at least three vari- 
ables involved in inflation such 
as rising prices, rising incomes, 
the quantity of money and goods 
available 
Group B - Adequate Answers 
Respondents who showed the inter- 
relation of at least two variables 
involved in inflation such as 
rising prices, rising incomes, the 
quantity of money and goods avail- 
able 
Group C - Vague Answers 
Respondents who mentioned one or 
two features of inflation (such as 
rising wages rising prices, money 
losing value) without making any 
inter -relationship or gave answers 
which mentioned one or two relevant 
features but which are less speci- 
fic and badly expressed 
Group D - Poor Answers 
Respondents who mentioned one or 
two relevant variables but whose 
answers were meaningless, or gave 
answers which indicated that in- 
flation is something bad and 
answers in which the respondents 
were unable to give a meaning to 













flationary tendencies of certain wage claims put forward on their 
behalf, their role in the implementation of the policy is, re- 
latively, a passive one. Managers, however, are often in a 
position initially to grant or reject these wage claims. It 
appeared important, therefore, that managers should know more 
than the general public about the complexities of inflation. The 
managers' understanding of the phenomenon of inflation was greater 
than that of the general public. When asked, "What does the term 
inflation mean to you?" over one third of the managers (36.3;) 
could describe the inter -relation of two of the variables in- 
volved in inflation compared with only 6.9% of the sample of the 
general public.(1 ) 
The best answers given by management are contained in Group 
A of Table 3.2 While these answers are by no means perfect they 
do show how the key features of inflation interact.(2) For example:- 
"Prices are getting out of hand. We need to keep 
productivity up with wage increases or this leads 
to too few exports and too many imports." 
"Incomes rise faster than the level of output. 
(Probe) Associated with this is the rise in costs 
which leads to deficits on the balance of payments." 
"More and more money available and labour, materials 
etc. becoming more and more expensive. Prices rise 
and wages rise. This leads to problems with ex- 
ports. We need improved work for any income rise. 
Incomes must not be allowed to rise more than pro- 
ductivity increases." 
The answers in Group B were not quite so elaborate as those men- 
(1) See Appendix 8 for the distribution of answers to this 
question. 
(2) It must be remembered that these are unprepared oral answers. 
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tioned above but the 75 managers in this group were able to men- 
tion two factors involved in inflation and to show the relation- 
ship between these factors. 
Exactly half of the sample mentioned one or two features of 
inflation without making any relationship between them. Their 
answers are contained in Group C. For these respondents inflation 
was a fairly straightforward phenomenon. It was simply either a 
loss in the real value of money or a balance of trade problem. 
Sometimes both of these features were mentioned but no apparent 
connection was indicated between them. Within this group, 131 
answers (48.5% of the total sample) are concerned with rising 
prices or the loss of the real value of money. Not one answer, 
however, equated inflation with rising wages alone. 
Group D consists of managers who gave no description of in- 
flation at all or at best a vague or meaningless description. For 
example: - 
"A false sense of security." 
"An attempt to stop the bubble bursting." 
"Too much money and too many goods around." 
It is the number of managers in the two latter groups which could 
perhaps cause anxiety in Government circles. While the proportion 
of the respondents who had an adequate or good understanding of 
the policy was satisfactory with respect to the members of the 
general public with a similar level of comprehension of inflation 
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the fact is that almost two -thirds of the managers had only an 
inadequate or vague impression of what inflation means to Britain. 
As the Government is relying on managers to prevent inflationary 
price and wage rises, the finding that most managers do not have a 
good grasp of the dangers of inflation could have serious implica- 
tions for the Government's hopes of the prices and incomes policy 
being implemented successfully. 
Respondents' Comprehension of Devaluation 
In interpreting the quality of the respondents' answers, the 
managers may have had some excuse for their rather disappointing 
answers to the meaning of inflation, for inflation has been con- 
tinuing for so many years and can almost be considered to have be- 
come part of the economic scene. 
The 1967 devaluation was quite different from inflation. It 
had occurred only three months before the interviews began and the 
mass media had covered the subject in length. Thus a question on 
devaluation would be a guide to see how much information managers 
retained about an economic event; an event of such magnitude that 
the Government had tried to avoid it for some time,(1)it had been 
admitted by the Prime Minister to be a defeat(2)and it seemed to 
(1) See Peter Jay, The Times, 23rd November 1967, p.241 and The 
Sunday Times,, 26th November 1967. Insight: The Eight Day 
Countdown to Devaluation, pp.11 -12. 
(2) Mr. Wilson in a television interview, Thursday 23rd November 
1967. 
Table 3.1 
Classification of managers in terms of the 
degree of comprehension shown in answer to 
the question: "Where does devaluation come 
in all this - what food can it do Britain ?" 
Respondents classified by the 
degree of comprehension shown 
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Respondents who showed the effect on 
the balance of trade and mentioning 
the effects on both imports and ex- 
ports 
Group B - Adequate Answers 
Respondents who gave answers not so 
elaborate as Group A, showing the 
effect upon the balance of trade but 
mentioning only the effect upon ex- 
ports or imports 
Grotp C - Vague Answers 
Respondents who mentioned only the 
effect upon either the balance of 
trade or exports or imports 
Group D - Poor Answers 
Respondents who failed to describe 
devaluation or who gave meaningless 
answers or who could not even 
attempt to describe devaluation. 
TOTAL 100.0 
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have convinced the majority of the population that British prestige 
had been damaged.(1) To explore the impact this event had made on 
the managers the following question was put: "Where does de- 
valuation come in all this - what good can it do Britain: "(2) The 
striking finding was that only one manager in five had some under- 
standing of the overall aims and part of the effect of devaluation. 
This was only two - thirds of the number who had at least a rough 
idea of how inflation could continue to grow. Indeed, while 13.7 
of the respondents could not describe what inflation involved even 
more - one in five - failed to give even the most elementary 
account of devaluation. Thus even a recent event of the utmost 
importance to the economy failed to affect the managers unduly, 
one -fifth seemingly hardly noticing devaluation and its attendant 
publicity. A few managers, however, could give a good or at least 
adequate description of devaluation. 
The answers in Group A in Table 3.3 were rather more elaborate 
than the rather basic replies given in Group B and covered not 
only the strengthening of our competitive position but gave details 
(1) See The Sunday Times Opinion Poll conducted by Opinion Re- 
search Centre, 26th November 1967, p.9. 
Question: "How much damage has been done to British 
prestige by devaluation?" 
A great deal of damage 
Quite a lot of damage 






78% of the sample also felt devaluation would be bad for them. 
(2) See Appendix 9 for the distribution of answers to this 
question. 
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of how this was to be achieved. For example: - 
"Devaluation is meant primarily to make exports 
more competitive in the export markets, to in- 
crease the price of imports and consequently to 
get the balance of payments on the right side." 
"It is firstly to raise the cost of imports 
(which will raise the cost of our manufacturing 
industries depending upon imports). Secondly 
it makes our goods relatively cheap in other 
countries which have not devalued and therefore 
increases our competitiveness." 
Almost three managers in every five only mentioned one aspect of 
devaluation or did not in spite of probes, give the reasons for 
their answer. These answers are classified into Group C and are 
of a much lower standard than the two groups mentioned above: - 
"It gives us an exporting advantage - and nothing 
else at all." 
"To make our goods cheaper for foreigners to buy." 
These answers at least give some indication that the manager had 
an idea of the implications of devaluation. 
Some of the answers in Group D could have been referring to 
almost anything: - 
"It corrects past errors." 
"It was forced on us. It's not intended to do anything." 
"I think it's part of a banker's game of chess." 
Clearly, a certain gap would appear to exist between some managers 
and the Government in their respective concern with the nation's 
finances. Perhaps, in view of the publicity given to devaluation, 
this could be due to a lack of interest in the national economy on 
the manager's part? 
J2 
Res.ondents' Knowled:e of the Criteria for Pay Increases 
The questions so far had tested the managers' comprehension 
of the aims of incomes policy and the economic environment. The 
rest of the questions assessing the managers' understanding of 
prices and incomes restraint were concerned more with the specific 
provisions of the policy which the managers had to carry out in 
practice. Despite the fact that the policy has to be considered 
by managers when determining wage and price increases their know- 
ledge of the extent and operation of the policy was no better than 
their understanding of its economic setting. 
There had been several attempts by governments to lay down 
criteria for income increases since the war.(1) For almost two 
years, however, separated by the pause of twelve months for the 
incomes standstill, the Labour Government's criteria for exeept- 
ional pay increases had remained unchanged. How much did managers 
know about those criteria which they were supposed to observe in 
judging the merits of pay claims? To assess the respondents' com- 
prehension on this issue they were asked: 
(1) For details see Appendix 10. 
Table 3.4 
Classification of managers in terms of the degree 
of knowledge shown in answer to the question: "The 
Government has laid down a number of criteria for 
pay increases over the years; which criteria are 
now accepted by the Government for pay increases?" 
Respondents classified by the degree 






Group A - Good Answers 
Respondents who mentioned at least two 
of the four main criteria laid down by 
the Government as exceptions to the 
'nil norm' and, after 20th March 1968, 
as criteria to allow pay increases up 
to (and in some cases above) an annual 
ceiling 
Group B - Adequate Answers 
Respondents who mentioned one of the 
four main criteria laid down by the 
Government as exceptions to the 'nil 
norm' and, after 20th March 1968, as 
criteria to allow pay increases up to 
(and in some cases above) an annual 
ceiling 156 
Group C - Vague Answers 
Respondents who mentioned criteria not 
specifically linked to the four ex- 
ceptions from the 'nil norm' and,after 
20th March 1968, as criteria to allow 
pay increases up to (and in some cases 
above) an annual ceiling. (For example: 
increased responsibility, merit increases, 
promotion) 
Group D - Poor Answers 
Respondents who did not mention any of 
the criteria for exceptions from the 
'nil norm' and, after 20th March 1968, 
criteria to allow pay increases up to 
(and in some cases above) an annual 
ceiling. Respondents who gave answers 
which did not include any criteria men- 
tioned in Group C. Respondents who 
could give no description of the cri- 













The Government has laid down a number of criteria 
for pay increases over the years; which criteria 
are now accepted by the Government for pay increases ? "(1) 
Almost two - thirds of the sample could mention at least one of the 
four criteria laid down by the Government but only one manager in 
ten could remember more than one.(2) The ten per cent who remembered 
two or more criteria are shown in Group A of Table 3.4. In every 
case except one the manager mentioned productivity as one of the 
two criteria he could remember. (Only one manager mentioned three 
criteria.) 'Lower paid workers' accounted for another 27 of the 
main criteria mentioned by the managers in Group A, only four 
managers mentioning 'the seriously out of line with similar work' 
criteria and none at all naming the increase allowable 'to secure 
a change in the distribution of labour'. 
(1) The criteria were: 
(i) where the employees concerned, for example by accepting 
more exacting work or a major change in working practices, 
make a direct contribution towards increasing productivity in 
the particular firm or industry 
(ii) where it is essential in the national interest to secure 
a change in the distribution of manpower (or to prevent a change 
which would otherwise take place) and a pay increase would be 
both necessary and effective for this purpose; 
(iii) where there is a general recognition that existing wage 
and salary levels are too low to maintain a reasonable standard 
of living; 
(iv) where there is widespread recognition that the pay of a 
certain group of workers has fallen seriously out of line with 
the level of remuneration for similar work and needs in the 
national interest to be improved. 
Prices and Incomes Polic After 0th June 1.6 , Cmnd.3235, 
H.M. G.O. , London919.7, p. . 
(2) See Appendix 11 for distribution of answers to the question: 
"Which criteria are now accepted by the Government for pay in- 
creases?" 
54 
Group B contains answers of managers who could name but one 
of the Government's four criteria. The Government had certainly 
succeeded in communicating that pay increases were justified if 
productivity increased as only 10 of the 156 managers in this 
group named any criteria for a pay increase other than a rise in 
productivity. 
The answers in Group C were not concerned with the major 
criteria mentioned above. Answers in this group were but obvious 
statements of the increasing worth of an employee being rewarded 
by increased remuneration. 
Group D consists of the managers who could give no descrip- 
tion of the criteria or who gave an incorrect description. For 
example, the Government had stated that pay increases were not to 
be awarded to compensate for a rise in the cost of living, yet 12 
of the 270 managers believed that the Government approved pay in- 
creases of this type. In addition, 8 managers mentioned a figure 
of 3 -3-b-% for pay increases but failed to realise that this figure 
was now a "ceiling" not a "norm" as they had believed.(1) 
The poor answers were, however, in the minority. At least 
part of the incomes policy had been effectively communicated to 
the managers. Indeed, closer inspection of the answers shows that 
(1) From 20th March 1968 there was a "ceiling" not a "norm" of 
3 -% for all wage increases satisfying the Government's cri- 
teria. There were certain exceptions to this ceiling. 
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of the 185 managers who mentioned at least one criterion 174 men- 
tioned pay increases were permitted if productivity rose too. 
Thus two - thirds of the sample had remembered one of the two of the 
criteria on which the Government had put more emphasis than the 
others.(1) Indeed, more than one manager in eight remembered the 
other criterion to which priority had been given - the case of 
lower paid workers. 
It would appear that in these cases at least the Government 
had closed part of the communication gap. Certainly the remaining 
two criteria had been recollected by only a handful of managers. 
lerely five mentioned the 'seriously out of line with similar work' 
guideline and only one 'the change in the distribution of labour' 
criterion. 
As mentioned above, the Government had expressly stated that 
less regard was to be paid to certain types of pay increases. Did 
the managers know as much about these negative injunctions(2)as 
(1) See Cmnd.3235, p.6. 
(2) The negative injunctions were as follows: - 
"less regard should be paid to such factors as general compari- 
sons with incomes in other employments and changes in the cost 
of living" 
Prices and Incomes Policy After 30th June 1967, Cmnd.3235, 
H.N. S.O. , London91967, p.6. 
This was later confirmed: - 
"the criteria justifying increases on the grounds of compara- 
bility needs to be applied selectively, and must not be used 
to spread pay increases into areas of employment where the 
original justification does not apply." 
and 
"Pay increases based on a rise in the cost of living are not 
justified under the criteria and should not be conceded." 
Productivit Prices and Incomes Polic in 1.68 and 1.6 
Cmnd.3 90, H.M.S.O., London,19 P9 
Table 3.5 
Classification of managers in terms of the degree 
of knowledge shown in answer to the question: "Of 
which type of increases do the Government, on the 
whole2 disapprove ?" 
Respondents classified by the 
















Respondents who identified the two 
criteria for income increases of 
which the Government disapproved 
Group B - Adeauate Answers 
Respondents who identified one of 
the two criteria for income in- 
creases of which the Government 
disapproved 
Group C - Vague Answers 
Respondents who named the corollary 
of some of the four criteria for 
income increases permitted by the 
Government 
Group D - Poor Answers 
Respondents who gave a description 
which had nothing to do with the 
criteria of which the Government 
disapproved or who could give no 
description of these criteria 
TOTAL 270 100.0 
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they did about the permitted criteria? To test their knowledge 
of this aspect of the policy the managers were asked: 
"Úf which type of increases do the Government, 
on the whole, disapprove ? "(1) 
It can be seen from Table 3.5 that none of the managers was 
able to recall both of the negative injunctions. Indeed, less 
than one manager in ten (Group B) could mention either general 
comparability or the cost of living as criteria condemned by the 
Government. The answers in Group C were merely vague answers, 
slightly better than those in Group D, but not really concerned 
with the criteria of which the Government disapproved. The poor 
answers in Group D (three -fifths of the total sample) either gave 
no description of the negative injunctions or only vague or in- 
correct answers. For instance: 
"anything based on the bargaining power of the party" 
"anything above 6ó" 
Specific claims which had been rejected were also mentioned: 
"The Civil Service" 
"The Miners" 
"The Engineers" 
In the case of the rejection of a specific occupations' claim the 
respondent was asked why the claim had been rejected but in only 
a few cases was an answer forthcoming. It would appear that little 
attention had been paid to this negative aspect of the incomes 
criteria. A guide to managers' attitudes towards these negative 
(1) See Appendix 12 for distribution of answers to this question. 
Table 3.6 
Classification of managers in terms of the 
degree of knowledge shown in answer to the 
question: "What machinery or organisations 
exist to carry the Government's prices and 
incomes policy into effect ?" 
Respondents classified by the 

















Respondents who named at least 
three of the bodies helping to 
carry the policy into effect 
Group B - Adequate Answers 
Respondents who named at least 
two of the bodies helping to 
carry the policy into effect 
Group C - Vague Answers 
Respondents who named one body 
which helped to carry the policy 
into effect 
Group D - Poor Answers 
Respondents who gave a descrip- 
tion which had nothing to do with 
the machinery or organisations 
existing to carry the policy into 
effect or who could give no de- 
scription of either the machinery 
or the organisations concerned 
TOTAL 270 100.0 
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injunctions is given later(1)to see whether or not this lack of 
awareness was due to the injunctions being of a non -controversial 
nature or whether managers simply did not know they existed. 
Respondents' Ideas about the Machiner or Or anisations to carr 
the Policy into Effect 
As a further test of the managers' understanding of how the 
prices and incomes policy worked in practice they were asked: 
"What machinery or organisations exist to 
carry the Government's prices and incomes 
policy into effect ? "(2) 
The managers tended on the whole to avoid detailing the machinery 
involved in the policy and just mentioned the organisations con- 
cerned in implementing the prices and incomes policy.(3) This 
could be due, however, to the semi -voluntary nature of the policy 
and the manager feeling that the firm's part was but minor com- 
pared to the organisations operating the policy. Some managers 
did mention part of the system but none mentioned the whole process. 
Few managers had a really good idea of the way the policy was 
operated (Table 3.6). Only one manager in every fourteen could 
mention three of the bodies concerned with the prices and incomes 
policy (Group A) and only 16.3% of the respondents were able to 
(1) See Chapter 8. 
(2) For details about the machinery and organisations involved, 
see Appendix 13. 
(3) See Appendix 14 for the distribution of answers to the above 
question. 
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mention two organisations involved (Group B). 
Combining these answers with those which revealed only a 
vague notion of the prices and incomes machinery (Group C) it can 
be seen that just over two- thirds could mention one or more of the 
organisations assisting in the operation of the policy. One 
manager in every three (Group D) had little or no idea of how the 
policy was carried into effect. iviost of this latter group of the 
managers could give no indication at all of how the policy operated, 
very few managers gave an incorrect answer. All but one of the re- 
spondents(1)who were mistaken believed that there were no bodies 
existing to carry the policy into effect. These managers may well 
have been giving an opinion about the effectiveness of the policy 
but probes produced no further replies. 
Managers' Knowledge of the Powers to enforce the Prices and Incomes 
Polic 
Had the Government's reserve powers to enforce the policy made 
a greater impression on the managers than the machinery of the 
policy? The Government had powers derived from the Prices and 
Incomes Act 1966 to delay increases in prices and incomes.(2)Very 
(1) Twelve managers gave an incorrect answer. Eleven believed 
that no organisations existed to carry the policy into effect. 
The other answer in this group referred to the 'Productivity 
Council'. 
(2) For details about these reserve powers see Appendix 15. 
Table 3.7 
Classification of managers in terms of the degree 
of knowledge shown in answer to the question: "If 
the Government has reserve powers, what are these 
powers ?" 
Respondents classified by the 

















Respondents who either gave the 
length of the delaying powers or 
who described the process of the 
examination of the claims and 
mentioned that any awards could 
be delayed 
Group B _Adequate_ Answers 
Respondents who knew either that 
the pay increases could be de- 
layed or that claims could be 
vetted by the Government or the 
N.B.P.I. but did not know what 
else could be done 
Group C - Vague Answers 
Respondents who knew that the Gov- 
ernment had reserve powers but did 
not know what these powers were in 
any detail 
Group D - Poor Answers 
Respondents who believed either 
that the Government had no reserve 
powers or did not know whether or 
not the Government had these powers 
TOTAL 270 100.0 
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few managers, however, were aware of the details of these powers 
(Table 3.7).(1) 
The best answers comprised Group . This group, however, 
was quite small. Only nine managers out of the 270 knew the 
extent of the delaying powers of the Government and only eight 
others could mention the notification of claims or the reference 
to the National Board for Prices and Incomes which could lead to 
the possible delaying of the price or income rise. 
The answers in Group B revealed a knowledge that reserve 
powers did exist but gave little detail of what these powers en- 
tailed. In this group the answers were not so elaborate as in 
Group A or even suggested that the powers were more restrictive 
than they actually were in practice. 
Even less accurate answers are to be found in Group C. Here, 
there was an awareness that reserve powers did exist but no idea 
at all about the nature of these powers was expressed. Thus little 
knowledge about the powers the Government held in reserve was in 
evidence among the managers. Merely one manager in every five 
knew the reserve powers consisted of an authorisation to delay 
price and income increases. Including these managers only three 
respondents in every ten could give a rough account of the powers, 
and a further group comprising just under two -fifths of the sample 
knew merely that reserve powers existed. This means that the re- 
(1) For the distribution of answers to a question on the reserve 
powers held by the Government, see Appendix 16. 
Table 1.8 
Classification of managers in terms of the 
degree of knowledge shown in answer to the 
question: "Do you know of any penalties 
which the Government can legally impose if 
a firm defies an order to stop a wage in- 
crease?" 
Respondents classified by the 

















Respondents who gave accurate de- 
tails of the fines which could be 
imposed 
Grou. B - Ade.uate Answers 
Respondents who knew that fines 
could be imposed but gave no 
further description of the im- 
position of the fines 
Group C - Va ue Answers 
Respondents who knew that penalties 
did exist but gave vague descript- 
ions of the penalties 
Group D - Poor Answers 
Respohdents who believed that no 
penalties could be used or who 
could give no description of the 
penalties 
TOTAL 270 100.0 
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maining third of the sample (Group D) did not know if reserve 
powers existed, or worse, felt that the Government had no reserve 
powers at all. In other words, one -third of the sample assumed 
that the operation of the policy was being left entirely to the 
good will of both sidee of industry. 
A further test of the respondents' knowledge of the Govern- 
ment's powers sought to discover how well informed management were 
about the penalties the Government could impose if a firm decided 
to defy an order to stop a wage increase.(1) 
Little publicity had been given to these penalties. Few 
firms were expected to have come into contact with threats of 
legal penalties and accordingly it was believed that managers 
would have little knowledge of the penalties. 
The results tended to confirm this as Table 3.8 shows that 
two out of every three managers had no knowledge at all about the 
penalties, and a few others felt that no penalties were in ex- 
istence.(2) Thus seven managers in every ten had no idea what 
these penalties entailed (Group D). The respondents in Group C 
didlmow that penalties existed but apart from a realisation that 
'something' could be done they had either only a vague idea of 
the penalties or incorrect or vague notions about the severity of 
any sanctions. 
(1) See Appendix 17 for details about these penalties. 
(2) Only ten managers felt that no penalties existed at all. See 
Appendix 18 for the distribution of answers to the question 
on the penalties which could be imposed on recalcitrant firms. 
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Even the managers in Group B had neither knowledge of the 
severity of the fines which could be imposed nor awareness of the 
different fines which could be imposed upon the body corporate or 
the individual employer. 
Indeed only one manager in every twenty (Group A) was able to 
give accurate details of the penalties which could be imposed upon 
recalcitrant employers. Obviously the threat of fines would seem 
not to have made much impact upon the managers in this sample. 
Summary 
In this chapter the respondents' comprehension of the issues 
involved in the incomes policy and their understanding of the 
workings of the policy itself have been assessed. 
In the next chapter the degree of comprehension shown by the 
managers will be re- examined to see if any factors in the managers' 
background contribute to their understanding of the incomes policy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WHICH RESPONDENTS KNEW MOST ABOUT THE PRICES 
AND INCOMES POLICY? 
Chapter 3 was concerned with the respondents' knowledge of 
a variety of subjects connected with the prices and incomes policy. 
While this showed what the respondents as a whole knew about 
aspects of the policy it would also be useful to know whether or 
not any particular types of managers had more understanding of the 
policy than others. Accordingly, a measure of the overall under- 
standing of individual managers was constructed and was used to 
discover whether any groups showed greater understanding of the 
policy than others. 
It was decided to construct what Oppenheim calls an ad hoc 
index by adding together the results of a series of questions 
bearing on the managers' knowledge of the policy and the nation's 
economic difficulties. Such an index is, as Oppenheim points out, 
a crude device but it is still better than relying upon a single 
question.(1) 
In this case, to construct the index of the managers' com- 
prehension, three decisions had to be made: 
i) Which questions should be included in the index? 
ii) Should any questions be 'weighted' on account of 
their importance? 
(1) See A.N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measure- 
ment, Heinemann, London,1966, pp.100 -102. 
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iii) How should the answers given to the selected 
questions be evaluated? 
The Method of Constructing the Comprehension Assessment Index 
To form the index it was decided to include all the topics 
dealt with in Chapter 3 with the sole exception of the question 
concerned with the penalties which could be imposed on a recalcit- 
rant employer. The reason for this omission was that these 
penalties had never been imposed on anyone and had never been ex- 
plicitly mentioned in a White Paper. 
The other questions were concerned with the respondents' 
comprehension of topics which had been publicised either extens- 
ively in the national mass media or in government publications 
which were easily obtainable. In addition, the firms employing 
the managers would have had to implement many of the regulations 
about the prices and incomes policy set out in the government 
publications. Thus, unlike the question concerning penalties, in- 
formation about the topics covered in the questions used to con- 
struct the index could have been acquired by the respondents with- 
out undue trouble.(1) 
(1) Information on the objectives of the policy and inflation had 
been given both in government ublications (such as the 
National Plan and White Papers) and in the mass media. 
Details about the machinery of the policy and the criteria for 
income increases were contained in various White Papers and 
had to be observed in practice. 
The delaying powers of the Government had first been mentioned 
in a White Paper in April 1968 but had been in use since the 
Prices and Incomes Act in 1967 and had received a certain 
amount of publicity. 
Devaluation had been freely commented upon in the mass media 
for many months after the actual event as observers waited to 
see the effect of this measure. 
64 
The index was to be used to see how well managers were 
equipped to implement the prices and incomes policy and con- 
sequently was to test the respondents' understanding not only of 
the mechanics of the policy but also its raison d'otre. Therefore, 
questions of a narrow nature on the operation of the incomes 
policy and wider questions on the economic problems facing Britain 
were used in the construction of the index. No distinction was 
made between the questions dealing with the broader aspects of 
Britain's economic difficulties and those concerned with the de- 
tails of the prices and incomes policy. 
The weighting of certain questions was considered but re- 
jected. It was felt that while the level of comprehension shown 
in answer to some questions was higher than in reply to others 
this would, on the whole, mean that the degree of difficulty ex- 
perienced by the individual managers in answering the question 
would be, relatively, the same for all managers.(1) 
The answers to the seven questions which were to form the 
comprehension assessment index had already been ranked on the 
basis of the understanding shown in response to each question. 
The ranking had been into four groups (A - D) which, as was ex- 
plained in Chapter 3, consisted of Group A - good answers; Group 
B - adequate answers; Group C - vague answers; and Group D - 
poor answers. Using this ranking system the index of the individual 
(1) See Appendix 19 for further details of this decision. 
Table 4.1 
The Comprehension Assessment Ratines 















of Respond - 
ents in Group 
iquch above 
average 11 - 15 27 0 - 10.0 
Above average 16 - 17 38 10.1 - 24.1 




23 - 24 
25 - 28 
38 
31 
74.6 - 88.6 
88.7 -100.0 
65 
manager's comprehension could be worked out by giving him one 
point for a good (Group A) answer, two points for an adequate 
(Group B) answer, three points for a vague (Group C) answer and 
four points for a poor (Group D) answer. Adding the allotted 
points the respondent's index could be obtained. For instance, 
if a manager gave seven very good (Group A) answers his compre- 
hension assessment index would be seven and if a manager gave 
seven poor answers (Group D) his index would be 28. All indices 
therefore would lie between the extremes of 7 and 28.(1) The 
lower the manager's index the greater was his comprehension of 
the incomes policy. 
Table 4.1 shows a summary of the distribution of the managers' 
indices.(2) The distribution with a mode of 20, a median of 19.5, 
had a standard deviation of 3.6.(3) None of the respondents had 
given good answers to all seven questions. Indeed the fact that 
the median is a greater number than 17.5, the mid -point of the 
possible scores, shows that the distribution is skewed by the re- 
spondents' lack of knowledge. (4) 
(1) For example, if a manager gave three good (Group A) answers, 
one adequate (Group B) answer, one vague (Group C) answer and 
two poor answers (Group D) his index would be (3 x 1) + (1 x 2) 
+ (1 x 3) + (2 x 4) = 16. 
(2) See Appendix 20 for the complete distribution of the indices 
of the respondent's comprehension of the prices and incomes 
policy. 
(3) The arithmetic mean was 20.1. 
(4) Pearsonian co- efficient of skewness 0.59. 
66 
To be able to use the scores more meaningfully, the re- 
spondents' indices were divided into five grades, roughly at the 
tenth, twenty -fifth, seventy -fifth and ninetieth percentiles. 
This enabled judgments to be made ôn the connection between diff- 
erent types of managers and their degree of comprehension. The 
group in the centre of the distribution which consisted of those 
managers who lay approximately between the seventy -fifth and twenty - 
fifth percentiles was considered to have 'average' comprehension. 
This enabled each manager to be given a comprehension assessment 
rating such as "much above average comprehension" (above the 
ninetieth percentile); "above average comprehension" (76th - 90th 
percentile); "average comprehension" (26th - 75th percentile); 
"below average comprehension" (11th - 25th percentile) and "much 
below average comprehension" (1st - 10th percentile). 
The Levels of Comprehension of Different Types of Managers 
As explained in Chapter 2, information about the manager's 
background was collected at the end of each interview. The back- 
ground factors were of two types, personal factors such as the 
manager's terminal level of education and his age and factors in 
his working life such as the size of the firm which employed him, 
the information about the policy received by the manager, the 
manager's involvement in pay negotiations, and the manager's 
position in the firm. Each of these factors was analysed in terms 
of the comprehension assessment ratings to determine whether or 
not there was any relation between the level of comprehension 
Table 4.2 
Relation between the Managers' Terminal 



































School 4.1 8.2 4f.9 12.2 30.6 100.0 49 
Senior 
Secondary 
School 3.3 11.7 55.0 18.3 11.7 100.0 60 
Technical 
College 7.9 15.7 47.2 21.3 7.9 100.0 89 
Professional 
Qualifica- 
tion 26.5 17.6 52.9 0.0 2.9 100.0 34 
University 18.4 18.4 55.3 5.3 2.6 100.0 38 
67 
shown by the manager and the background factor. 
The Respondent's Terminal Level of Education and his Understanding 
of Incomes Policy 
An examination of the relationship between the managers' 
terminal level of education and their comprehension assessment 
ratings showed that there appears to be a direct relationship be- 
tween them in the sense that the more education managers had re- 
ceived the more likely they were to be well -informed (Table 4.2). 
This was illustrated by the fact that far more of the professionally 
trained men (44.1 %) and the university graduates (36.8 %) had above 
average or much above average comprehension assessment ratings 
than the senior secondary school (15.0`x) or junior secondary 
school leavers(12.3 %). At the other end of the scale no less than 
two -fifths (42.8 %) of the junior secondary school leavers and 
three - tenths of the senior secondary school leavers had a com- 
prehension assessment rating below average or much below average. 
Only few of the professionally trained (2.9 %) and of the university 
educated (7.9 %) managers had such a low comprehension assessment 
rating. 
The Size of the Respondent's Firm and ills Comprehension of the 
Incomes Policy 
Did the larger firms have managers better informed about the 
incomes policy than those in smaller firms or were the more know- 
ledgeable managers distributed fairly evenly among all sizes of 
firms? 
Table 4.? 
Relation between Size of Firm and the 






































loyees) 10.1 20.3 49.4 12.7 7.6 100.0 79 
Smaller i ed- 
ium (100- 
249 emp- 
loyees) 9.3 11.1 48.1 14.8 16.7 100.0 51+ 
Small (11 -99 
employees) 6.2 9.7 54.9 15.9 13.3 100.0 113 
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The larger firms emerged quite clearly as those with the 
better informed managers. Half of the managers in the large 
firms and three - tenths (30.4;) of those in the larger medium 
sized firms had a comprehension assessment rating above average 
or much above average (Table 4.3). Indeed, three managers in 
every ten in the large firms had a much above average compre- 
hension assessment rating. Compared to these figures the managers 
in the smaller firms were shown to be poorly informed. Only one 
manager in five (20.4 %) in the smaller medium sized firms and 
just under one manager in six (15.9 %) in the small firms had an 
above average or much above average comprehension assessment 
rating. 
Among the respondents with below average or much below average 
comprehension assessment ratings were to be found over twice as 
many, in percentage terms, of the managers in smaller medium 
sized firms (31.5%) and small firms (29.2 %) than managers in large 
firms (12.5%).(1) 
Why should managers in larger firms have more understanding 
of the incomes policy than those in smaller firms? Could it be 
that the more intelligent managers were employed by the larger 
firms? Certainly, large firms tend to recruit more graduates. 
Were the large firms in this sample employers of many graduates 
or those who had had professional qualifications? This certainly 
did seem to be the case as over two -fifths of the managers in 
(1) 20.3% of the respondents employed by larger medium sized 
firms had a comprehension assessment rating below or much 
below average. 
Table 4.4 
Percentage of 270 Respondents who received 
information from (a) Discussion at Work, 
(b) the viass Media, (c) Written Informa- 
tion at Work 
(a) Discussion at work 
(b) Articles or discussion on the 
prices and incomes policy 
followed in the mass media 
(c) Receipt at work of written 
information about the 
prices and incomes policy 






large and over three- tenths of those in the larger medium sized 
firms either had a professional qualification or a degree com- 
pared with only one manager in every five in the smaller medium 
sized firms and small f irms. (1 ) 
Since terminal education involving some degree of further 
education had already been seen to be related to the manager's 
comprehension assessment rating and larger firms had relatively 
more graduates or professionally trained men on their staff than 
smaller firms it was hardly surprising that the larger the firm 
the more likely was the manager to have more comprehension of the 
incomes policy. But there could have been another reason. More 
than twice as many managers in large firms (54.20 received in- 
formation on the incomes policy at their work than managers in 
smaller medium (27.8 %) and small firms (23.9 %).(2) Did the re- 
ceipt of information help managers to understand the incomes 
policy? 
Examination of the Relationship between the Information about 
the Prices and Incomes Policy received by the Respondent and 
his Understanding of the Policy 
The respondents had been asked about the sources of their in- 
formation about the incomes policy. The proportion of managers 
(1) See Appendix 21 for a breakdown of the relation of the size 
of firm to the terminal education of its manager. 
(2) 39.2% of the managers in larger medium firms received informa- 
tion at the place of work - see Appendix 21. See Appendix 22 
for the source of information the managers received at work. 
Table 4.5 
Relation between Managers' Receipt of Informa- 
tion from different Sources and their Under - 





























Policy 13.4 17.9 53.6 10.7 4.5 100.0 112 
Does not 
Discuss 




media 11.1 15.8 50.9 13.2 9.0 100.0 234 
Does not keep 
informed 
through mass 
media 2.8 2.8 47.2 19.4 27.8 100.0 36 
Receives 
written informa- 
tion at work 19.7 20.9 54.6 3.5 1.2 100.0 86 
Receives no 
written informa- 
tion at work 5.4 10.9 48.4 19.0 16.3 100.0 184 
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receiving information from each source is shown in Table 4.4. In 
each case the managers who received information through discussion, 
the mass media or at work had relatively more comprehension about 
the incomes policy than those who did not receive information. 
While each source of information seems to have had an effect on 
the manager's knowledge of the policy not all sources were equally 
effective (Table 4.5). 
Discussion proved to be the least important factor but its 
effect was not negligible. Of the 112 respondents who discussed 
the policy 31.3% had a much better or better than average com- 
prehension assessment rating compared with 19.0% of the 158 re- 
spondents who did not discuss the policy, a difference of 12.3 
percentage points. 
Considering again only those with a comprehension assessment 
rating of above or much above average this difference in compre- 
hension was small compared with the difference in comprehension 
between managers who received information from other sources and 
those who did not. A difference of 21.3 percentage points ex- 
isted between those who received information through the mass 
media and those who did not but the greatest difference was one 
of 24.3 percentage points between those receiving written informa- 
tion at work and those who did not receive such information. 
There are several possible explanations for discussion being 
the least important source of information. The major reason would 
Table 4.6 
Relation between the Managers' Involvement in 
Pay Negotiations and their Understanding of 



































































appear to be that a great difference is found in the levels of 
discussion about the policy. Little factual information might be 
obtained in some conversations and consequently little increase in 
knowledge about the policy would result from the discussion. 
Far more managers who received written information at work 
(two -fifths) than managers who kept informed through the mass media 
(one quarter) had a comprehension assessment rating above or much 
above average. Indeed, only 4.7% of those who received informa- 
tion from their firm had a comprehension assessment rating which 
was much below or below average compared with over one manager in 
five of those who kept informed through the media of broadcasting 
and the press. 
Thus it would appear that while following articles in the 
mass media is a necessary though not sufficient factor, receiving 
information at work might be almost a sufficient factor in en- 
suring that a manager has at least an average level of comprehension 
about incomes policy. 
The Respondent's Involvement in Pay Negotiations and his Under- 
standing of the Incomes Policy 
Turning to another factor which appeared to be relevant it was 
found that managers who were involved in pay negotiations knew 
more about the policy than their colleagues who had no such in- 
volvement (Table 4.6). More than three times as many managers who 
were directly involved in pay negotiations had above average or 
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much above average comprehension of the policy than the managers 
who were not involved in pay negotiations.(1) 
This result was to be expected if only because the negotia- 
tors would have to pay attention to certain aspects of the policy. 
It must be reassuring for the Government, however, that those 
managers actually involved in pay negotiations had a much better 
knowledge of the policy and its aims than other managers.(2) 
The Manager's Age and Position in the Firm and his Comprehension 
of the Incomes Policy 
Little relation was found between either the manager's age 
or his position in the firm and his comprehension assessment 
rating.(3) Slightly more of the younger managers had above average 
or much above average knowledge of the issues than the older 
managers but on the whole there was little difference between the 
age groups. 
Top management(4)had slightly more of their number with a 
much above or above average comprehension assessment rating than 
(1) The managers who were indirectly involved with pay negotia- 
tions (their own definition) came almost half -way between the 
two groups with 22.2% of their number having much above or 
above average comprehension assessment ratings compared with 
32.6% of those directly involved and 12.3% of those not in- 
volved in pay negotiations. 
(2) Yet about one -fifth of the negotiators had below or much be- 
low average comprehension of the policy which would seem to 
indicate that certain negotiators had not paid a great deal 
of attention to the policy. 
(3) For details, see Appendix 23. 
(4) A 'top manager' was one who could influence the external 
policy of his company. This was outwith the scope of a 'middle 
manager's' job. 
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middle management but the difference was only three percentage 
points. A great difference between the two groups was seen, how- 
ever, when examining the next level of comprehension for relative- 
ly many more of the top managers than middle managers had an 
average comprehension assessment rating, indicating that while 
the detailed understanding of the two management groups was 
similar the top manager's understanding had a more solid base. 
This was illustrated further by the fact that many middle managers 
had below average or much below average knowledge of the policy. 
Conclusions 
To sum up, it would appear that the size of firm, the manager's 
educational attainments, his receipt of relevant information and 
his involvement in pay negotiations all have a part to play in 
enabling the manager to comprehend the prices and incomes policy 
and its aims. 
In addition, the size of the manager's firm, the receipt of 
relevant information at his work place and his terminal level of 
education were inter -related. It has already been shown that re- 
spondents in large firms received more information at work than 
their counterparts in smaller firms and many of them held a pro- 
fessional qualification or a degree. There is also a connection 
between the level of terminal education and receipt of informa- 
tion at the place of work. Far more managers with professional 
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or university training than school leavers received information 
at work. (1 ) 
Was involvement in pay negotiations related to these three 
background factors? Apparently not. There was a relation between 
a direct involvement in pay negotiations, the possession of a de- 
gree or a professional qualification and receipt of information 
at work.(2) Many managers in small firms, however, were involved 
in pay negotiations and thus involvement in pay negotiations was 
not only connected with the managers in the larger firms.(3) 
From these findings two hypotheses can be formulated: 
(1) Managers more involved in pay negotiations are 
more likely to understand the economic situa- 
tion and the Government's policies to deal with 
the situation than other managers. 
(2) (Since all the factors appear to be inter -related): 
Managers in larger firms, who receive more in- 
formation at work and who have received a more 
intensive education are more likely to know more 
about the economic situation and the Government's 
policies to deal with this situation than other 
managers. 
Within the second hypothesis three factors appear to be imp - 
ortant, namely the size of the respondent's firm, the information 
he received at work and his terminal level of education. The 
(1) See Appendix 24 which also reveals no clear relation between 
the level of terminal education and following of the policy 
in the mass media. 
(2) See Appendix 25. No real relationship was discovered between 
the managers involved in pay negotiations and following the 
policy in the mass media. 
(3) See Appendix 21. 
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question of which of these factors is the most important in de- 
termining the level of a person's understanding of a government 
policy appears to be an important area for future research. 
From this survey it was seen that while two -fifths of both 
those who received information at work and those with a degree or 
a professional Qualification (1) had an above or much above average 
comprehension assessment rating, exactly half of the managers in 
large firms had an equally good level of comprehension.(2) Thus 
it might be that there are other factors, as yet undiscovered, 
at work in the large firm leading to a greater understanding of 
the prices and incomes policy. 
Only 35% of the respondents employed in large and larger 
medium sized firms, however, had a level of comprehension above 
or much above average.(3) It would appear research in this area 
would have to consider whether special factors leading to greater 
understanding of economic affairs exist in the firms employing 
about 1,000 or more people. 
These tentative findings of the strength of the relation- 
(1) No check had been made on the type of qualification or degree. 
(2) Direct involvement in pay negotiation was not so strongly re- 
lated to the level of a manager's comprehension as any of 
these three factors. Only one -third of those directly in- 
volved in pay negotiations had a comprehension assessment 
rating of above or much above average. 
(3) Only 24 respondents were managers in firms with more than 
1,000 employees and perhaps these managers were not entirely 
representative of the managers of this size of firm. 
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ships between the size of firm, the terminal level of education, 
receipt of information at work and understanding of the prices 
and incomes policy have, however, to be considered in terms of 
their usefulness. Even if further research proved that managers 
employed in large firms had a high level of understanding of the 
policy this would only be of use to the Government in revealing 
in which size of firms comprehension of the prices and incomes 
policy had to be increased. Clearly, there is little likelihood 
of the Government attempting to increase the number of mergers 
simply to raise the level of understanding of the policy. Simi - 
larly, an expansion of further education is unlikely to be pro- 
moted solely to improve people's knowledge of the policy. If the 
Government is seriously concerned with the poor national under- 
standing of the prices and incomes policy it is far more likely 
to increase the flow of information about the policy in an attempt 
to improve comprehension. Even this course might not be adopted 
unless it appeared to be in the Government's interest. Pre- 
sumably before the Government would increase the flow of informa- 
tion it would have to be seen whether understanding of the prices 
and incomes policy is likely to lead to support for this measure. 
Chapter 5 considers this question. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON THE USEFULNESS OF AN 
INCOMES POLICY 
Do Britain's managers feel an incomes policy can help the 
nation? Do they believe that such a policy is better than ex- 
isting methods of wage bargaining? 
In this chapter the respondents' views on these questions 
are considered. To do this, their opinions were examined on 
three topics: (1) the usefulness of a prices and incomes policy 
in tackling the country's economic difficulties; (2) the value 
of the incomes policy in curbing inflation; (3) the respondents' 
preference for an incomes policy or free collective bargaining. 
Respondents' Opinions about the Usefulness of a Prices and Incomes 
Policy in tackling Britain's Economic Difficulties 
Before judging the respondents' views on the usefulness of 
the prices and incomes policy it appeared to be relevant to dis- 
cover what the managers felt had caused the nation's financial 
difficulties. Accordingly the respondents were asked: 
"Who or what do you think has been mainly 
responsible for our economic difficulties 
which have led the Government to the idea 
of prices and incomes planning ? "(1) 
(1) See Appendix 26 for distribution of answers to the question. 
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While certain august bodies have been reluctant to name the 
difficulties retarding Britain's progress(1)few managers had any 
doubts (Table 5.1). The answers showed that over half of the re- 
spondents (56.7) blamed the situation on government errors.(2) 
Of these, more than one -third named the present Labour Government 
as the cause of the economic problems.(3) Not all the managers, 
however, felt the economic difficulties were due to government 
mistakes. Indeed 28.1`0 of the sample held industry culpable. 
Opinion within this group was almost equally divided as to whether 
management themselves were to blame, or whether the Trade Unions 
could have given more help to the nation than they have done in 
the past. In addition, 16.3% of the respondents implied that 
industry had neither been as productive nor as keen to export or 
reduce imports as might have been hoped. In all, just under two - 
fifths of the respondents thought industry was to blame, at least 
in part, for the country's economic ills. 
Other managers felt the responsibility for Britain's plight 
lay not so much with the Government or with industry but with the 
(1) See Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, Fourth Re- 
port, H.M. S.O. , London,1961 , p.7. 
(2) A similar result was given by another national opinion survey, 
conducted by Opinion Research Centre and published in The 
Sunday Times, 26th November 1967, p.9, which asked: "Who is to 
blame for the economic difficulties ?" and found that 37% blamed 
Labour Governments, 21% blamed both Labour and Conservative 
Governments, 20% felt people were not working hard enough, 19% 
blamed strikes, 10% felt the last Conservative Government was 
to blame and 9% accused the Trade Unions. 
(3) Four managers blamed Conservative Governments. 
Table 5.1 
Summary of the distribution of the answers 
of 270 respondents to the question: "Who or 
what do you think has mainly been responsible 
for our economic difficulties which have led 
the Government to the idea of prices and in- 
comes planninL ?" (1) 
Summary of 
Classification of Answers 
Answers attributing Britain's economic 
difficulties to Government errors 
Answers attributing Britain's economic 
difficulties to both sides of industry 
Answers attributing Britain's economic 
difficulties to low productivity or to 
factors involved in a balance of pay- 
ments deficit 
Answers attributing Britain's economic 
difficulties to people's greed or self- 
ishness 
Other Answers 












(1) 60 of the 270 respondents mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, there- 
fore, 330 items in the table. 
Table 5.2 
Distribution of answers of 88 respondents to 
the question: "How could these economic diffi- 
culties be tackled?"(1 ) 







Management and trade unions should work 
together /improve industrial relations/ 
encourage incentive schemes. 26 9.6 
The Government should take action to 
cut its spending /make the prices and 
incomes policy tougher 17 6.3 
Production /exports should be increased 16 5.9 
The problem is insoluble; answers 
indicating that the manager could not 
see a solution to the problem 16 5.9 
The public's level of knowledge of the 
economic situation should be increased 8 3.0 
Other answers 11 4.1 
No answer given 3 1.1 
(1) 9 of the 88 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 97 entries in the table. 
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attitude of the individual citizen. One manager in every eight 
believed that Britain's economy is not so healthy because the 
country has more than its share of selfish or greedy people who 
put their own interests first. 
Although many different views had been expressed about the 
cause of the country's economic problems, 59.6% of the respondents, 
in answer to the question: "Do you think a prices and incomes 
policy can tackle these economic problems ? ", believed that an 
incomes policy could be of use in resolving these difficulties. 
The more the respondents knew about Britain's economic 
difficulties and the prices and incomes policy the more they felt 
such a policy could be useful. Almost two -thirds (64.6 %) of the 
managers with a comprehension assessment rating above or much 
above average believed a measure such as the prices and incomes 
policy would be a valuable tool with which to tackle the economic 
situation. This figure was much higher than that of the respond- 
ents with a below or much below average comprehension assessment 
rating (44.9 %), who held the same opinion. 
Of the 88 respondents (32.6% of the total sample) who did not 
feel that the policy would be useful in alleviating Britain's 
economic problems, several were unable to suggest how the problems 
might be tackled, five managers even declared that, to them, the 
problems seemed almost insoluble (Table 5.2). 
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The other answers fell into four main groups. Some of the 
88 managers felt that the Government should cut its expenditure, 
ors 'as the prices and incomes policy was too weak' to achieve 
much at present, increase the severity of the policy. More in- 
centive schemes or greater co- operation between management and 
the trade unions were suggested by other respondents as industry's 
contribution to Britain's economic recovery and a few more felt 
that industry could help in other ways, namely by increasing pro- 
ductivity or raising the level of exports. 
The Manager's Opinions about the Value of Incomes Policy to 
combat Inflation 
The managers were asked about the contribution a prices and 
incomes policy could make to restrict the growth of inflation - 
one of Britain's more persistent economic problems. 
Firstly, to see whether or not the respondent felt that in- 
flation was a serious problem, each manager was asked: "Do you 
think that there is too much fuss about inflation or is it imp- , 
ortant to stop it ? "(1) The answer was overwhelmingly in favour 
of curtailing the growth of the phenomenon. No less than 86.0% 
of the respondents felt that it was important to curb inflation. 
Of the 23 managers who had the best idea of what inflation in- 
volved(2)not one felt that too much fuss was made about it, all 
(1) This question was asked before the question testing the 
manager's comprehension of inflation. 
(2) From Table 3.2 
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felt that it was important that inflation should be stopped. In 
all, 91.8% of the groups showing the two highest grades of com- 
prehension of the factors involved in inflation felt that it was 
important to stop its growth.(1) Thus it would appear that a high 
level of understanding about inflation leads to a strong desire 
to control the phenomenon. 
Of the 232 managers who felt that it was important to stop 
inflation, 165 (61.1% of the total sample) felt that a prices 
and incomes policy could tackle the phenomenon. 
Greater understanding of inflation was related to the re- 
spondent's views that a prices and incomes policy could be use- 
fully employed against inflation. 78.3% of the managers in the 
group with the highest level of understanding of inflation be- 
lieved that it could be tackled by an incomes policy compared 
with only 40.5°a of those with the lowest level of comprehension. 
Turning from the specific understanding of inflation to the 
broader comprehension assessment ratings a similar result was ob- 
tained. 81.0% of those with a comprehension assessment rating 
much above or above average felt an incomes policy could help 
combat inflation compared with only 55.8% of those with a much 
(1) J.C.R. Dow, Organizing an Opposition to Price Inflation, 
Scottish Rournal of Political Economy, Vol.V, No.2, June 1958, 
p.177, argues that to secure the change of attitude he feels 
is necessary to combat inflation people should be fully aware 
of the consequences of inflation. 
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below or below average comprehension assessment rating. 
Economic information given to the managers at their work did 
appear to make a difference to their opinions on the effectiveness 
of an incomes policy - 68.6% of those receiving information at 
their work place felt that incomes policy could tackle inflation, 
a figure eleven percentage points greater than that of those who 
did not receive such information. A further indication that the 
receipt of relevant information was related to a belief that a 
prices and incomes policy could be employed with effect against 
inflation was found on comparing the views of those who received 
and those who did not receive information about the policy through 
the mass media. In this case 63.7 of those kept informed through 
the mass media believed that an incomes policy could tackle in- 
flation while only 44.4% of those who did not keep informed 
through the media of broadcasting or the press held the same view. 
A comparison of the managers' answers to the questions on the 
usefulness of a prices and incomes policy in tackling inflation 
and Britain's economic problems revealed that most of the re- 
spondents believed that the prices and incomes policy could be put 
to use against some of Britain's economic difficulties. Three - 
quarters of the 165 managers who believed that incomes policy was 
the way to tackle inflation also considered that such a policy 
would deal with Britain's economic difficulties in general. Thus 
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just under half of all the respondents (45.2 %) felt that an in- 
comes policy could really make an impact on the factors retarding 
Britain's progress. In addition, another 82 managers were of the 
opinion that an incomes policy could deal with either inflation 
or ameliorate Britain's economic situation.(1) This meant that 
the vast majority of the respondents (75.6:) believed an incomes 
policy could make a considerable contribution to Britain's economic 
recovery, and suggested that throughout industry a feeling existed 
that the Government was using a policy which businessmen believed 
could assist Britain on her way to economic health. 
Fifty -nine managers (21.9; of the sample) who felt that it 
was important to stop inflation were of the opinion that an in- 
comes policy was not the way to tackle this phenomenon. Several 
of these could give no alternative policy to use against inflation. 
Among those who could think of an alternative measure to tackle 
inflation, two main ideas predominated. Some of the 59 managers 
felt that inflation could be controlled by increasing productivity. 
Apparently they did not realise that increasing productivity in 
the country is one of the Government's major aims and is an 
integral part of the incomes policy.(2) A few other respondents, 
(1) 43 managers felt the prices and incomes policy could tackle 
inflation but not Britain's economic problems in general and 
39 managers believed that the policy could tackle the problems 
undermining the country's economic position but not inflation. 
(2) The Joint Statement of Intent was concerned with productivity, 
prices and incomes. 
The National Plan, Cmnd.2764, H.M.S.O. , London,1965, p.10, 
referred to a Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy. 
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however, did produce an alternative to the policy - a reduction in 
the level of demand caused by a cut in government expenditure. 
Are Chantes necessar in the S stem of Collective Bar ainin :: 
Respondents Views 
Many of the respondents believed that the incomes policy could 
help the Government in its attempts to overcome Britain's economic 
difficulties. Did this mean that the policy was seen as a better 
alternative than free collective bargaining? To discover the 
answer to this question all the managers were asked about their 
preference either for free collective bargaining or for a form of 
control on income determination. The distribution of their 
answers to a question with a limited choice of answers was: 
Some planning of incomes with guidelines 
laid down by the government (56.3ïä); 
A return to free collective bargaining 
(40.0 %). 
Thus by a seven to five majority the respondents decided that 
guidelines laid down by the Government were preferable to the 
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former system of free collective bargaining.(1) 
There seems to have been a good degree of consistency in 
support for or opposition to an incomes policy as 65.8% of those 
who preferred guidelines also felt that an incomes policy could 
tackle Britain's economic problems while only half of the managers 
who preferred free collective bargaining felt these problems could 
be solved by such a policy. Furthermore, 72.3% of those who pre- 
ferred guidelines believed that an incomes policy could assist in 
preventing inflation compared with only 48.1% of those who pre- 
ferred free collective bargaining. 
(1) National surveys of the opinions of private citizens seem to 
have produced different results to questions of a similar 
nature. 
Hilde Behrend et al., Incomes Policy and the Individual, Oliver 
and Boyd, Edinburgh,1967, p.19, found that 56.0% of their 
sample felt that the Government should have some say in what 
pay increases people should have after July 1967 compared with 
37.9% who were opposed to this suggestion. 
The Scottish Daily National Opinion Poll, 22nd ìdarch 1967, 
pp.1 and 6, found in answer to the question: "Should the Gov- 
ernment always have some control over wages ?" the answers were 
'Yes' 40 %, 'No' 51%, 'Don't Know' 7 %. 
See also Dr. K.P. Kelvin, What Sort of Incomes Policy? New 
Society, No.236, 6th April 1967, p.494. Question: "Which do 
you think is more important : 'that the Government should be 
able to exercise control over both trade unions and employers ?' 
31 %; 'that trade unions and employers should be free to settle 
their own affairs?'" 59 %. 
The above results come from a representative sample of the 
whole voting population but when Dr. Kelvin asked the same 
question to New Society readers whom he felt were more intelli- 
gent and obviously more motivated in the sense that they re- 
turned a questionnaire the result was reversed - 65% preferred 
the first alternative and 29% the second - New Society, No.237, 
13th April 1967, p.533. 
An opinion poll taken among 507 executives by Conrad Jameson 
Associates. Ltd. and appearing in The Times, 13th August 1968 
found that 72% felt that "a prices and incomes policy was 
necessary at this time" and only 25% opposed the idea. 
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The more knowledgeable respondents with a good understanding 
of the policy and its economic setting were more in favour of 
guidelines than those who knew less about the policy. Over half 
(55.5%) of those with a comprehension assessment rating much above 
average and 78.9;ó of the managers with above average comprehension 
preferred guidelines laid down by the government to free collect- 
ive bargaining compared with only 44.7% and 35.5% of the respond- 
ents with below average and much below average comprehension 
assessment ratings respectively, who had the same preference. 
It was seen above that the more knowledgeable managers also 
believed that an incomes policy could be used effectively against 
inflation and against Britain's economic problems. 
This evidence would seem to permit the following hypothesis 
to be formulated: 
The more the manager understands about the incomes 
policy and the problems it is attempting to solve 
the more likely is he to support the policy. 
This hypothesis would seem to be of great importance should it be 
proved correct(1)and could have implications for Government 
policy. 
As evidence has shown in Chapter 4 there seems to be reason 
to suspect that the size of firm and /or receipt of information, 
(1) It could be that the reverse is true. People who are 
interested in the policy and feel that it is useful may be 
those who keep themselves informed. 
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and /or terminal education is related to understanding of the issues 
at stake. If these factors are further related to support for the 
incomes policy it would seem that a Government would have a basis 
around which to foster comprehension and support for a measure 
such as an incomes policy. 
Although managers in larger firms were more inclined to prefer 
guidelines than managers in smaller firms(1)it has been mentioned 
before that the Government is most unlikely to increase the size 
of firms simply to increase national understanding of the prices 
and incomes policy. 
From the evidence here, since a higher level of terminal 
education did not bear any relation to preference for guidelines(2) 
it would appear that transmission and ready acceptance of informa- 
tion might be the way for the Government to increase understanding 
of the policy within the country. Of the managers who kept abreast 
of happenings in the economic field in the mass media 58.1 % pre- 
ferred guidelines compared with 41.7% who did not keep informed.(3) 
A smaller difference of 10.1 percentage points existed between 
the managers who received information at their work place and who 
(1) See Appendix 27 for the relationship between the size of firm 
and the preference for guidelines. 
(2) See Appendix 27 for the relationship between terminal educa- 
tion and the preference for guidelines. 
(3) See Appendix 27 for the relationship between receipt of in- 
formation and the preference for guidelines. 
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were in favour of guidelines (62.8% and those who did not re- 
ceive such information and who preferred guidelines to free 
collective bargaining (52.7%). 
Thus it may well be that if the level of respondents' under- 
standing of the policy has a relation to the support for the 
policy, opposition to the policy could be reduced by ensuring 
that more people understood the implications of the policy and its 
task by increasing the flow of relevant information. Just in- 
creasing the information available about the policy would not, 
however, appear to be enough. Katz and Lazarsfeld(1)mention four 
intervening variables (exposure, content, attitude and media) 
which can facilitate or block the flow of communication. 
There would appear to be no lack of exposure to economic in- 
formation. Almost daily, newspapers, television and radio carry 
reports of the economic situation. Yet newspaper reports do not 
have to be read and often the television or radio set can be used 
merely to furnish background 'noise'. Even within this sample 
of 270 managers 13.3% admitted that they did not keep informed 
about the prices and incomes policy through the mass media and the 
86.7% who claimed that they followed the progress of the policy 
through the press or broadcasting did not reveal a great deal of 
knowledge about the policy. The finding that people do not know 
(1) Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence, Free 
Press, New York, 1955, pp.21 -25. 
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overmuch about the issues of the day is not a new discovery. 
Politicians have been faced with this problem for some time.(1) 
Behrend et al.(2)showed that a sample of the general public even 
believed that politicians, by uelating inflation to party policies, 
added to the confusion rather than clarified the issue in people's 
minds. 
Even the content of government publications designed to in- 
form the reader about the economic situation does not appear to 
be conducive to the promotion of interest or general understanding. 
To ascertain the readability of documents relevant to this enquiry, 
it was decided to conduct a test using Flesch's Scales of Reading 
Ease and Human Interest.(3) The findings of the test on three of 
the Labour Government's publications revealed that literature in 
(1) See Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter, Wiley, New York, 
1960, p.172, for an account of the American public's lack of 
knowledge about the Taft -Hartley Act despite great publicity 
accorded to the issue in the 1948 election campaign. 
(2) Hilde Behrend et al., A National Survey of Attitudes to In- 
flation and Incomes Policy, Occasional Papers in Social and 
Economic Administration, No.7, Edutext, London,1966, p.26. 
(3) Rudolf Flesch, A New Readability Yardstick, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol.32, No.3, June 19+8, pp.221 -233. The Scale of 
Reading Ease is based on the length of sentences used together 
with a syllable count of the words in set sample passages. 
The scale does not take into account layout, presentation or 
the education and reading habits of the readers and their 
familiarity with the subject. It is, however, a simple method 
for examining the level of difficulty of language structure. 
The Scale of Human Interest is based on the number of personal 
words and sentences in set sample passages. Again no account 
is taken of presentation, layout, nor of colour and illustra- 
tion. 
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that form could not be understood by many people and would not 
appeal to most. Differences were, however, noted in the reada- 
bility of the three publications. The style of 'Working for 
Prosperity',(1)the 'popular' form of 'The National Plan', was 
classed as "standard" - equivalent to a 'digest' magazine. 'The 
National Plan'(2)itself was 'difficult' to read for any literate 
person and was the equivalent of an academic journal, while the 
readability of "Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy in 1968 
and 1969 "(3)was categorised as "very difficult ", being of the 
standard of a scientific magazine. Despite slight differences 
among the three publications in terms of Flesch's Human Interest 
Scale all fell into the same category - "dull ", the lowest 
possible rating on the scale. 
The results of these tests on the government publications do 
not seem to be liable to increase the motivation of the private 
citizen to read this type of literature. While it would appear 
to be a problem even to motivate people to listen to or read 
about national issues it seems even more difficult to persuade 
than simply to inform. (4) 
(1) Working for Prosperity : The National Plan in Brief, H.M.S.0., 
London,1965. 
(2) The National Plan, Cmnd.2 764, H.i 'I.S.O. , London,1965 
(3) Productivit Prices and Incomes Polic in 1.68 and 1.6 
Cmnd.3 90, H.M.S.0., London,19:. 
(4) See Joseph Trenaman and Denis McQuail, Television and the 
Political Image, Niethven, London ,1961, p.165. 
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If, however, a person's support for the prices and incomes 
policy can be increased simply by presenting information about 
the policy to him, then the Government could do more to facilitate 
the implementation of the policy. This could be done by seeing 
that the managers who implement the policy are more aware of the 
reasons for its introduction. 
How could this be done? Certainly the mass media are likely 
channels of communication. A considerable difference in support 
for the policy was noted among the managers who kept informed 
through the mass media and those who did not pay attention to in- 
formation passed on by these means. Clearly, the Government would 
have to find a way of presenting its message through the mass 
media in a more easily understood manner than in the past in order 
to catch the interest of the recipient. To ensure that managers 
are informed it would appear that the Government could not afford 
simply to leave the managers' level of comprehension to the mass 
media but would have to use the more direct method of ensuring 
managers vital to the implementation of the policy were fully 
supplied with information. As managers who did receive informa- 
tion on the policy at work were more inclined to support the 
policy than those who did not receive any such literature it would 
seem that more could be profitably done by the Government in this 
area. It would also seem that the problem of presenting the 
issues in a meaningful and interesting way to encourage the manager 
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to read any literature given to him would have to be resolved at 
the same time to increase the chances of the manager being willing 
to raise the level of his own knowledge about the issue of the 
moment. 
It could be, however, that if the Government were to increase 
their output of information about the incomes policy to industry, 
much of this should be aimed at the older and more senior managers 
who were less enthusiastic about planning of incomes than other 
managers. Just under half of the 'top' managers preferred guide- 
lines to free collective bargaining, while two -thirds of the 
middle managers had this preference. The younger managers were 
also more in favour of guidelines than the senior men.(1) Indeed, 
the under thirty age group divided three to one in favour of 
guidelines and the 31 -40 year olds split two to one while the over 
fifties are almost equally divided between free collective bar- 
gaining and guidelines for income increases laid down by the 
Government. A possible explanation for the young managers more 
ready acceptance of guidelines may come from a study on price 
(1) Experience in business life seems to have had little to do 
with the outcome as neither experience in pay negotiations, 
pay disputes nor the militancy of the trades unions in the 
managers' own firms had any clear relation with the pre- 
ference for guidelines or free collective bargaining. 
Table 5.3 
Distribution of answers of 152 respondents to the 
question: "Why do you prefer some planning of in- 
comes with guidelines laid down by the Government: "(1) 






Collective bargaining is a free for 
all /is unfair /leads to inflation; the 
past history of collective bargaining 
shows it fails 96 35.6 
The Government can see the whole situ- 
ation unlike the parties to a collect- 
ive agreement; only the Government can 
stop unreasonable demands /too much 
pressure being used 32 11.9 
People are ignorant and have to be 
educated; people are selfish /greedy 16 5.9 
Other answers 5 1.9 
No answer given 7 2.6 
(1) 4 of the 152 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 156 entries in the table. 
93 
images.(1) A younger person would accept a price for a certain 
commodity which his elders would consider exorbitant due to their 
first experience of the price of that commodity in their youth. 
In the same way it could be argued that the recent experience of 
growing state intervention in the labour market did not affect 
the younger man as he was more used to it than his seniors who 
could remember a more laissez -faire attitude being taken by the 
governments of their youth. 
Did the respondents preferring guidelines feel that the inter- 
vention of the Government in the labour sector was necessary to 
preserve the national interest and to remove an out -moded system 
or did the managers prefer guidelines to free collective bargain- 
ing for some other reason? The evidence suggests that the re- 
spondents' preference for guidelines appeared to be essentially 
due to a lack of faith in collective bargaining (Table 5.3). 
(1) See Hilde Behrend, Price Images. Inflation and National In- 
comes Policy. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol.XIII, 
No.3, November 1966, p.279. 
See also Dr. K.P. Kelvin 'What Sort of Incomes Policy' New 
Society, No.236, 6th April 1967, p.492 who shows that the 
younger members of his sample felt less inclined to believe 
that an incomes policy would mean too much Government inter- 
ference in everyday life. 
"Do you think an incomes policy is likely to mean too much 
government interference in everyday life ?" 
Age Group 
21 -34 35 -54 55+ 
Yes (too much government inter- 
ference with everyday life) 48% 62% 52% 
No (not too much government inter- 
ference with everyday life) 43% 27% 32% 
Don't know 9% 10% 16% 
Table 5.4 
Distribution of answers of 108 respondents to 
the question: "Why do you prefer a return to 
free collective bargaininE ? "(1) 





Guidelines appear to be a form of 
dictatorship /are unfair; controls 
are disliked; guidelines are diffi- 
cult to lay down 52 19.3 
Bargains should be struck by market 
forces; free enterprise is the best 
method; free enterprise /market forces 
have worked well in the past 38 14.1 
Other answers 11 4.1 
No answer given 8 3.0 
(1) 1 of the 108 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 109 entries in the table. 
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Almost two -thirds of the 152 managers who preferred guidelines 
gave as their reason a feeling that the system of collective bar- 
gaining was unsatisfactory. Most of the other respondents stated 
that guidelines enabled interests other than just those of the 
parties involved in the negotiations to be considered and felt 
that the consideration of purely narrow interests in free coll- 
ective bargaining was one of the system's main shortcomings. 
This rejection of free collective bargaining by about half 
of the total sample did not seem to be based on experience of 
bitter wrangles with trade unionists or employees in pay disputes 
as no relation was found between experiences of this sort and the 
opposition to free collective bargaining. 
Turning to the 108 respondents who preferred free collective 
bargaining about half had this preference because they found 
faults with the idea of guidelines laid down by the Government 
(Table 5.4). In addition, several others preferred the collective 
bargaining system for the freedom it afforded them and felt that 
it had worked satisfactorily in the past. Since so many managers 
who preferred guidelines gave as the reason for their choice a 
rejection of collective bargaining and most of those who pre- 
ferred collective bargaining seemingly did so because of their 
antipathy towards guidelines, perhaps neither alternative was 
believed to be satisfactory by management as a whole. A general 
feeling of unease with existing patterns of wage determination 
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seemed to exist. Perhaps managers believed that free collective 
bargaining does not consider wide enough issues but guidelines 
bring the state too far into the labour market. 
Did the managers feel that a modification to the former 
system of collective bargaining could overcome the problems of an 
entirely free system of collective bargaining and fears of en- 
croaching state control? To discover the respondents' feelings 
on this question they were all asked: 
"Do you think that there is some way in which 
the national interest can be considered ex- 
plicitly in the formulation of a collective 
bargaining agreement ?" 
On this issue the opinions of the managers were almost equally 
divided - 47.8% felt that the national interest could be con- 
sidered in a collective bargaining agreement but an almost similar 
percentage (45.9$) did not consider this proposition feasible. 
Respondents who had experience of pay negotiations were more con- 
vinced that such a modification to the collective bargaining 
system could work than those who were not involved in negotiations 
at all. Just over half (51.3 %) of those directly or indirectly 
involved in pay negotiations felt that the national interest 
could be considered in collective bargains compared with 39.5% 
of those who were not involved in pay negotiations. Managers' 
other experiences in the industrial relations sphere such as the 
Table 5.5 
Distribution of answers of 129 respondents to 
the question: "How can the national interest 
be considered explicitly in the formulation of 
a collective bargaining agreement between 
management and trade unions ? "(1) 






Both sides of industry need to co- 
operate to increase productivity/ 
for the national interest 53 19.6 
C.B.I. /ivianagement and T.U.C. /Trade 
Unions or neutral bodies at national 
level must make sure the bargaining 
is in the national interest; bargain- 
ing should be conducted at the 
national level with the national 
interest being kept in mind 48 17.8 
Other answers 13 4.8 
No answer given 19 7.0 
(1) 4 of the 129 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 133 items in the table. 
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level of militancy of the trade union in the firm and the 
occurrence of pay disputes made no apparent difference to the 
managers' assessments of the viability of the suggested change 
in collective bargaining.(1) 
To discover how the respondents believed the system of 
collective bargaining could be altered in order that the national 
interest could be considered the 129 managers who believed that 
this could be done were asked to suggest the modification to be 
made. Just under one -sixth of these 129 managers could not think 
of a way to accomplish this (Table 5.5). The remainder of these 
respondents were divided almost equally between two viewpoints. 
Some of the respondents who believed that the national interest 
could be considered by management and trade unions felt that the 
answer lay in both sides of industry 'co- operating to assist the 
country' or by working together to increase productivity. Others 
felt that the national interest should be determined and the agree- 
ment assessed at the national level - in most cases, respondents 
suggested, by a body outside the industry in which the agreement 
had been concluded. 
Among the 124 managers who had opposed the proposition that 
pay negotiations should be conducted on this wider basis one pre- 
(1) The older managers were slightly more convinced than the 
younger managers that the national interest could be con- 
sidered in a collective bargaining agreement but no difference 
was noted in any other feature of the managers' backgrounds. 
Table 5.6 
Distribution of answers of 124 respondents to 
the question: ' "Why do you think the national 
interest cannot be considered explicitly in 
the formulation of a collective bargaining 
aLreement "(1) 





Collective bargaining has never worked; 
management and trade unions only con- 
sider their own interests; distrust ex- 
ists between management and trade 
unions 103 38.1 
The Government can best decide the 
national interest 11 4.1 
Other answers 4 1.5 
No answer given 7 2.6 
(1) 1 of the 124 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 125 entries in the table. 
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valent attitude emerged. These respondents were in the main 
opposed to collective bargaining altogether. When asked why they 
had felt that collective bargaining could not consider the 
national interest, no less than four out of every five of these 
124 managers mentioned some serious flaw in the system of coll- 
ective bargaining (Table 5.6). The blame for this was fairly 
evenly split, both management and trade unions were indicted due 
to the respondents' impressions that the parties to an agreement 
are only willing to consider their own interests.(/) A few other 
managers believed that only the Government could consider the 
national interest and accordingly no modification of collective 
bargaining between two parties would work. 
To sum up, it would appear that the debate over the forms 
the bargaining system should take is far from over. Managers 
seem to be divided over the issue.(2) Many managers did seem to 
prefer a change from the system of collective bargaining as it 
(1) No relation was found between a manager's willingness to con- 
demn just the Trade Unions and his experience in pay negotia- 
tions, pay disputes and the militancy (or otherwise) of the 
union in the manager's own firm. 
(2) Only 38.8% of those preferring guidelines to free collective 
bargaining felt that the suggested modification to collective 
bargaining would work while three -fifths of those who pre- 
ferred free collective bargaining were of this opinion. 
It is interesting to note that one -third (32.4 %) of those pre- 
ferring free collective bargaining felt that collective bar- 
gaining could not consider the national interest yet still 
preferred the system of free bargaining to guidelines laid 
down by the Government. 
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valent attitude emerged. These respondents were in the main 
opposed to collective bargaining altogether. When asked why they 
had felt that collective bargaining could not consider the 
national interest, no less than four out of every five of these 
124 managers mentioned some serious flaw in the system of coll- 
ective bargaining (Table 5.6). The blame for this was fairly 
evenly split, both management and trade unions were indicted due 
to the respondents' impressions that the parties to an agreement 
are only willing to consider their own interests.(1) A few other 
managers believed that only the Government could consider the 
national interest and accordingly no modification of collective 
bargaining between two parties would work. 
To sum up, it would appear that the debate over the forms 
the bargaining system should take is far from over. Managers 
seem to be divided over the issue.(2) Many managers did seem to 
prefer a change from the system of collective bargaining as it 
(1) No relation was found between a manager's willingness to con- 
demn just the Trade Unions and his experience in pay negotia- 
tions, pay disputes and the militancy (or otherwise) of the 
union in the manager's own firm. 
(2) Only 38.8% of those preferring guidelines to free collective 
bargaining felt that the suggested modification to collective 
bargaining would work while three -fifths of those who pre- 
ferred free collective bargaining were of this opinion. 
It is interesting to note that one -third (32.4%) of those pre- 
ferring free collective bargaining felt that collective bar- 
gaining could not consider the national interest yet still 
preferred the system of free bargaining to guidelines laid 
down by the Government. 
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used to be before the emergence of the incomes policies. The 
degree of change is the problem.() A suggestion that there should 
be a bargaining process somewhere between these two methods of 
wage determination with the parties to a collective agreement 
paying attention to the national interest, only succeeded in 
dividing the managers into two almost equal camps, one convinced 
that the proposition would not work and the other believing that 
the national interest could be considered by the bargaining parties. 
Even within the latter group agreement was not reached about the 
method to be used to ensure the national interest was considered 
in any bargaining process. While no overall consensus of opinion 
emerged a certain polarisation of viewpoints did seem to appear. 
Many managers seemed to believe that the Government should watch 
over the bargaining system while other respondents preferred 
autonomy in collective bargaining through fear of a surfeit of 
government interference in the labour market. In view of the 
dubiety over the role of the Government in the labour sector of 
the economy it was decided to ascertain how far the respondents 
as a whole felt changes to a system of 'free' collective bargain- 
ing should go. Did the managers, for example, believe that the 
Government should use powers of compulsion to ensure its policy 
was implemented or did they think a voluntary policy could be 
successful? 
(1) See D.J. Robertson, The Economics of Wages, MacMillan, London, 
1961, pp.229 -230 for a short discussion of the problems of 
changing the system of bargaining. 
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Before the managers' views on the desirability of compulsory 
powers and the role of the prices and incomes policy in the 
future are discussed, however, it would appear to be relevant to 
see the respondents' frame of reference for their thoughts about 
these issues. Accordingly, Chapter 6 is concerned with the 
managers' views on the effect of the policy up to June 1968 and 
their opinions of the form of the prices and incomes policy in 
the future are discussed in Chapter 7. 
Table 6.1 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents 
to the question: "Do you feel that the Gov- 
ernment's prices and incomes policy has 
been successful to date or not ?" 






Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt the policy had been unsuccessful 150 55.6 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt the policy had been partially un- 
successful 4 1.5 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt the policy had been successful 27 10.0 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt the policy had been partially 
successful 68 25.2 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
did not know whether or not the policy 
had been successful 21 7.7 
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C'rIAPTER 6 
RESPONDENTS' OPINIO1`1S ABOUT THE SUCCESS AND BENEFITS 
OF THE PRICES AND INCOMES POLICY 
The Managers' Assessment of the Success of the Policy. 
If the prices and incomes policy was achieving its aims it 
could be expected that increased support for this measure might 
accrue among managers. Conversely, if the policy appeared to be 
failing to meet its objectives, then it could be assumed that 
some of its supporters would no longer give it the same strength 
of backing as they had in former times. 
In view of the essential nature of the support of managers 
in the operation of the policy it would appear to be disturbing 
for the Government that, in response to the question: "Do you 
feel that the Government's prices and incomes policy has been 
successful to date or not? ";1)57.1% of the sample felt that the 
policy had been unsuccessful and of these, merely a few thought 
that the policy had been unsuccessful in only part of its applica- 
tion (Table 6.1). 
Indeed, only 10.0% of the managers said that the policy had 
been successful though many more stated that some of the policy's 
objectives had been achieved. 
(1) The interviews were conducted between February and May 1968. 
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It could well be that a manager's preference for an incomes 
policy as opposed to a preference for collective bargaining led 
him to regard the effect of the policy more favourably. Certainly, 
far more managers who preferred guidelines laid down by the 
Government to free collective bargaining felt that the policy had 
been successful than those who chose the alternative.(1) 
Another factor apparently influencing answers to the Question 
was that the respondents differed considerably in their beliefs 
of what constituted a 'successful policy'. Some managers seemed 
content that the policy made some people moderate their demands 
while others saw the mere fact of prices and incomes rising as 
evidence of the failure of the policy.(2) 
While many different explanations were given for the view of 
the 95 respondents that the policy had been wholly or partially 
successful, two reasons predominated. Several of the respondents 
(19.9% of the total sample) believed that the use of the policy 
had kept down prices or incomes or both. Not one manager 
mentioned that the country's long term trading position had 
(1) 44.1% of those who preferred guidelines thought that the 
policy had been successful or partially successful while only 
23.1% of those who preferred free collective bargaining had 
the same opinion. 
(2) H.A. Turner, The Progress and Poverty of Incomes Policy, 
Progress, Vol.52, No.292, 2/1967, p.35, states that the object 
of the policy is not to stop prices rising but just to stop 
them rising so fast that they disrupt the balance of payments 
and force the Government to hold back the economy on that 
account. 
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been affected in any way. A few other managers indicated that 
the policy had had an educational effect in enabling certain 
members of the public to see the economic problems facing Britain 
and encouraging these citizens to adopt a more moderate attitude 
towards their demands for income increases. 
The opinion held by 38.9% of the total sample that prices 
and incomes had risen either independently or together was the 
most frequent explanation for the view of the 154+ managers who 
considered that the policy had been wholly or partially un- 
successful. (1 ) 
In view of this explanation it is perhaps not surprising to 
note that 17.8% of the respondents believed that the reason for 
the policy's failure was that the Government could not control 
movements in prices and incomes. 
The Respondents' Views on the Effect of the Policy on the Wages, 
Prices and Production of their Firms 
(i) Wages 
'Why had prices and incomes risen? The interviewing had 
taken place during the period of the 'nil norm', the Government 
having stated that over the twelve month period beginning 1st July 
1967, no -one could be entitled even to a minimum increase in pay.(2) 
(1) See Appendix 28 for distribution of answers to the question: 
"Why do you feel that the Government's prices and incomes 
policy has been unsuccessful /partially unsuccessful ?" 
(2) See Prices and Incomes Policy after 30th June 1967, Cmnd.3235, 
H.ifi. S.O. , London y1967, p.5. 
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Had the respondents' firms done all they could to keep incomes 
down? In answer to the question: "Do you know if your firm has 
granted any wage claims since devaluation ? ", the distribution of 
answers was as follows : - 
Wage increases have been given since 
devaluation 35.6% 
Wage increases have not been given 
since devaluation 59.6jó 
Respondents did not know whether or 
not wage increases had been given 
since devaluation 4.8ó 
Not all the wage increases, however, were paid in defiance of the 
incomes policy. Many of the pay increases would normally have 
met with the approval of the N.B.P.I., having been consistent with 
the criteria for income increases in force at the time. Not 
enough was discovered about some of the other pay increases to 
enable comment to be made about the validity of the pay claims. 
Eighteen managers, however, stated that their firms had given pay 
increases to compensate for a rise in the cost of living.(1) These 
firms would appear to have been acting with disregard to a 
specific instruction in the latest White Paper which stated that 
individual increases should not include any element relating to 
the cost of living.(2) 
(1) It was decided not to use the number of firms as a measure of 
support for or opposition to the policy as certain managers 
in some firms seemed not to know about wage increases or even 
tried to conceal them. Others may have felt wages had in- 
creased whereas in fact they had not. By using proportions 
of respondents as a measure it is hoped that any discrepancies 
will balance out but the evidence must only be interpreted in 
the light of this restriction. 
(2) See Cmnd.3235, p.7, and Cmnd.3590, p.9. 
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As far as could be seen most firms seemed to be obeying the 
policy. This, however, could not be interpreted as a sign that 
the incomes policy had had a radical impact on the firms. Only 
30.4% of the managers said, in reply to a question about their 
firms' general attitudes towards wage increases, that the policy 
would have a lasting effect on their firms' wage policies. This 
would seem to indicate that firms were not paying a great deal of 
attention to any long term lessons which might have been learned 
from the incomes criteria but rather that they were seeing the 
policy as more of a temporary measure.(1) 
Of the 82 respondents who stated that the prices and incomes 
policy had affected their firms' outlook on wage determination, a 
few could not even state what this effect had been.(2) The other 
respondents did not reveal much evidence of drastic reforms in 
their firms' system of determinating wages being initiated due to 
the policy. Some indicated that their firms seemed to be adhering 
to the Government's aims or showed caution in granting pay in- 
creases but gave no other sign of a major change in policy. Others 
seemed to feel that the effect of the policy was merely to keep 
the employees' incomes at their existing level in contradistinc- 
tion to the firm developing some system of wage planning. Indeed, 
(1) 10.7% of the managers did not know what kind of effect the 
policy had had on their firm's wage policy. 
(2) See Appendix 29 for the distribution of answers to the question: 
"What effect has the Government's prices and incomes policy had 
on the firm's thinking and planning of wages ?" 
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only the firms of eighteen of the respondents seemed to have 
introduced any positive scheme of relating pay to productivity.(1) 
(ii) Prices and Production 
To ascertain whether the respondents believed that price 
and wage increases were directly related in their firms, all the 
managers were asked what effect they thought the last pay award had 
had on their firms' profits. Two- fifths of the sample (39.3%) be- 
lieved that profits had decreased and a slightly lower proportion 
(36.7 %) were of the opinion that the pay increase had had no 
effect upon profits. Only twenty managers thought that profits 
had risen. The reasons for the wage increase having differing 
effects gave an insight into how the firms were trying to cope 
with increased wage costs. 
Several answers revealed that some managements had a good 
grasp of what is essential for the country if Britain is to 
slough off the burden of her weak economic position. Prices, for 
example were not always increased to cover any increased wage pay - 
ment; 26.3`/0 of the sample stated that their firm's profits had 
fallen because their prices had not been increased, two -fifths of 
these explaining that strong competition had held prices down. 
While these answers appeared to be encouraging to anyone concerned 
(1) Some firms, of course, may already have used criteria similar 
to those advocated by the incomes policy. 
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with the menace of inflation, 14.4% of the respondents admitted 
that price increases enabled their firms to meet a pay award 
without affecting profits in any way.(1) 
Increased productivity was stated by 12.6% of the managers 
to have resulted in higher profits or to have enabled the firm's 
profits to remain constant despite the pay increase. Yet an al- 
most similar proportion (11.5vó) stated that the lack of increased 
productivity after the pay award was responsible for a drop in 
the level of profits. 
The responses, therefore, were in part encouraging and in part 
disappointing to those looking for evidence of increased efficiency 
in industry. On the one hand the existence of increasing pro- 
ductivity and price competition gave an indication that the basis 
for a possible economic revival may be in existence. On the other 
hand there was only slightly less evidence among the managers' 
firms of productivity not increasing and a continued existence of 
cost -push inflation as prices were increased to enable profit 
margins to be maintained. 
Managers' Views on what Industry can do to improve Britain's 
Economic Position 
While many of the respondents' firms had not apparently ful- 
(1) Only one of the respondents who stated that his firm's pro- 
fits had increased after the last pay increase said that this 
had been due to increased prices. 
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filled all of the aims of the prices and incomes policy in the 
past, this did not imply that all managers felt that their firms 
could do nothing more to help the nation. 
In answer to the question: "Can your firm do anything to 
improve the economic situation ? ", 78.5% of the respondents felt 
that there was something their firm could do to assist the 
country in its economic plight. Only one manager in every five 
believed that there was nothing his firm could do. Almost two - 
fifths (39.3 %) of the total sample believed that their firms could 
raise their level of productivity.(1) In addition, 30.4% of all 
respondents stated that they felt their firms could increase ex- 
ports. 
Taking into consideration that a few managers were of the 
opinion that their firms could cut or retain prices at their 
present level and a few others felt that their companies could 
contribute to the drive to cut imports, the answers seemed to 
indicate that a great proportion of the managers felt that their 
firms could assist the country to meet the economic objectives 
laid down by the Government. 
(1) W. Bernard Thulin, Productivity Guidelines Won't Work, Harvard 
Business Review, Vol.40, November /December 1962, pp.70 -78, 
presents an argument, however, that productivity guidelines 
for wage increases will not prevent inflation. 
W.R.C. Keeler, The Relationship of Plant Productivity Agree- 
ments to Incomes Policy, British Journal of Industrial Rela- 
tions, Vol.V, No.1, March 1967, p.42, expresses a similar 
opinion. 
108 
The answers only showed what the managers thought their 
firms could do to improve the nation's economic situation and did 
not state a belief that their firms would undertake the policies 
mentioned. Most of the total sample (70.7%), however, thought 
that their firms would attempt to conduct their business in a way 
which would help the economic position of the country. 36.7% of 
the respondents were of the opinion that their firms would in- 
crease productivity, 28.5/ felt that their firms would attempt to 
increase exports and a few others (4.1%) thought that their firms 
would refrain from increasing prices. 
In all, the overall response seems to be indicative of a more 
enlightened view by management than has been evident in British 
industry to date. Whether or not the firms did implement the 
courses of action suggested by the managers is not known. 
Turning to the 54 managers who felt that their firms could 
do nothing to help the nation's economic position, several ex- 
plained that they considered their firms were not of a sufficient 
size to be able to make a significant contribution towards solving 
the country's economic problems. Others stated that their firms 
were already efficient or working as hard as they could. (1) iviost 
(1) "It is probably true that the chief impediment to a faster 
growth of the British economy is that we do not want it enough. 
Both management and labour and, more widely, people in general, 
do not attach such a priority to material progress as might 
lead them to great enough efforts to achieve the economic re- 
sults for example of the United States, or Western Germany, or 
the Soviet countries." P.E.P., Growth in the British Economy, 
Allen and Unwin, London,1960, p.YI. 
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of the remainder of these respondents felt that, as their firms 
did not export, there was little that they could lit to help th 
nation. 
Many of these answers seemed to indicate either self s ti- 
sfaction or a failure to understand the good titat increased 
efficiency and both increased exportng and reducd 
could do for the country. A check on t.he 
of the policy confirmed that few of the really umderstood the 
economic problems facing the nation .1i100 
Only 11.1A of these :_ahaers had an a iS 
the incomes policy itself. 
ve or nmch abov average 
cc=ensicn alsessmeat rating while the conpr ibenVitigal Of 35'4.20 
of this ,,71"C";.: was below or much below average. 
Should all Firms be bonnl by the fric s and Iacoaes Iclicvl 
In answer to th question: *While the country las a prices 
and incomes policy, do you think it ought tt, to all firms 
r should exempt?", few managers suges1 taL. liras 
should be exed from the prices and incomes policy' im.orI)er to 
follow any cours to improve their cm or the aatlive§ elavaamIc 
positi*n. On the contrary, the vast atejorit7 of the re 
felt that all films -Ibvtloot 1 oaTawit 1tyr the policyro imals47 
because of a feeling to,lt the policy =all& mot he gemerallg 
acceptabie if a few nor= WI re amtgitliga its =we. W Uy vi,a it 
felt thz,st th @ p@s4wdeate own filaina fratigat thaw Mae/lad al 
ovAnercia1 disadvantage to others aot limicardlhyr the pr halt al= 
^t, 010 patilt-' tali 4, 
Table 6.2 
Distribution of answers of 238 respondents to 
the question: "Why do you think the prices and 
incomes policy should apply to all firms ? "(1) 






To make it fair /equal for all; there 
cannot be rules for one group and not 
for the other 61 22.6 
The policy will not work /will dis- 
integrate if there are exemptions 41 17.2 
Respondents /Government could not find 
any valid reasons for exemptions 40 14.0 
We are all in this together; this is a 
national problem 37 13.7 
If there are exemptions ill- feeling 
will exist 19 7.0 
People will try to get past the ex- 
emptions /move to other firms /slip 
through the loopholes 16 5.9 
Those who are exempt will benefit 
over others 11 4.1 
No answer given 14 5.2 
(1) 1 manager mentioned two items separately and these have been 
recorded as separate items. There are, therefore, 239 entries 
in the table. 
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it was believed that the interests of the nation would not be 
considered by those exempted from any restraints (Table 6.2). 
The 27 managers who believed that some firms should be freed 
from any restrictions of the prices and incomes policy suggested 
mainly two types of firms for this exemption - firms in the ex- 
port field and small concerns. 
Respondents' Views on the Benefits and Disadvantages of the 
Incomes Policy for the Firms and the ï-ianager 
While most managers felt that all firms should be bound by 
the prices and incomes policy many of them did not consider this 
to be a great hardship for their firms. 57.8% of the respondents 
believed that the prices and incomes policy was useful to their 
companies although 31.4% did say that the policy gave no advantage 
to their firms. 
About one quarter of all respondents (26.3%) believed that 
the policy assisted their firms by laying down pre -requisites be- 
fore pay increases could be granted.(1) In addition, 17.4% of the 
respondents thought that their firms' prices were kept down by 
means of the policy and other managers stated that the policy had 
a beneficial effect on their firms' productivity, profits and 
costs of the factors of production. Thus the policy seems to have 
(1) See Appendix 30 for the distribution of answers to the question: 
"What advantages, if any, are there for your firm in the Gov- 
ernment's pursuance of a prices and incomes policy ?" 
Table 6.3 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
questions: (a) "How do you think a successful prices 
and incomes policy would affect your work as a 
manager ?" and (b) "How do you think a successful 
prices and incomes policy would affect you as a 
private citizen ?" 






(a) As a Manager 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt that his work would be made easier 136 50.4 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt that his work would not be affected 66 24.4 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt that his work would be made more 
difficult 29 10.7 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
did not know what effect the policy 
would have 39 14.4 
(b) As a Private Citizen 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt that he would be better off 141 52.2 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt ghat he would not be affected 71 26.3 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
felt that he would be worse off 24 8.9 
Answers indicating that the respondent 
did not know what effect the policy 
would have 34 12.6 
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been found useful by a good proportion of the managers. 
Furthermore, exactly half of the respondents believed that 
the policy resulted in no disadvantages to the firm. Any dis- 
advantages which were mentioned were normally concerned with the 
incomes side of the policy such as the problem of rewarding men 
for good service or the dangers of dissatisfaction or even labour 
turnover among the labour force when claims for increased pay were 
rejected. Only a few complaints were concerned with the restraints 
on price increases.(1) 
In addition to many managers saying that the policy did not 
hinder the firm in any way and several believing it to be a posi- 
tive advantage, it seemed that a manager's job could be facilitated 
by the policy. Half of the sample believed that their work would 
be made easier if the Government's prices and incomes policy were 
to be successful. Only about one manager in every ten thought 
that the policy would make his job more difficult (Table 6.3). 
Not only did half of the managers believe that the policy would 
assist their work but slightly more felt that they would be 
better off as a private citizen if the prices and incomes policy 
were to succeed. Again, only a few (8.9 %) felt that it would be 
to their disadvantage if the policy were to achieve its objectives. 
(1) See Appendix 31 for distribution of answers to the question: 
"What disadvantages, if any, are there for your firm in the 
Government's pursuance of a prices and incomes policy ?" 
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To summarise, the overall impression created by the evidence 
in this chapter is mixed. As far as the managers were concerned 
the policy would appear to have been considered by them to be of 
benefit both to themselves and to the firm. Yet most of the 
managers felt that the prices and incomes policy was largely un- 
successful and respondents mentioned instances of prices rising, 
productivity not increasing and a few cases of incomes being in- 
creased for reasons not approved by the Government. On the credit 
side, instances of prices being retained at their existing levels 
and productivity increases were recorded. Further encouraging 
signs for Britain's economic future were the realisation of what 
firms could do to assist the nation and an indication that in 
most cases the respondents believed that their firms would 
attempt to play their part in solving some of the country's economic 
problems. 
Table 7.1 
Summary of the distribution of answers of 
224 respondents to the question: "Why do 
you think a prices and incomes policy can- 
not be successful on a voluntary basis: "(1) 
Summary of 






Answers indicating that people's self- 
ishness, ignorance, varying ideas of 
values and lack of confidence in the 
voluntary principle will prevent the 
policy being successful on a voluntary 
basis 122 45.2 
Answers indicating that people's un- 
willingness to co- operate or to accept 
the policy will prevent the policy 
successful on a voluntary basis 91 33.7 
Answers indicating that inequities in 
the relative position of price and in- 
come levels will prevent the policy 
being successful on a voluntary basis 14 5.2 
No answer given 4 1.5 
(1) 7 of the 224 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 231 entries in the table. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON COMPULSORY POWERS AND 
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERitimEi,TT IN PRICE AND IN- 
COME DETERi4INi',.TION 
Res op ndents' Views on a voluntary or a compulsory Prices and 
Incomes Policy 
Since July 1966, despite the proposal by the Trades Union 
Congress to organise its own voluntary incomes policy, the Gov- 
ernment has considered statutory powers to be necessary to attain 
the prices and incomes policy's objectives. 
Could the prices and incomes policy be successful on a basis 
of voluntary restraint by management and trade unions? The 
finding of this survey was that the vast majority (83.0;x) of the 
managers felt that the policy could not be successful on a vol- 
untary basis. Only a small minority (16.3 %) disagreed with this 
viewpoint, stating that a voluntary policy could succeed if a 
more selfless and co- operative attitude was adopted by management, 
other employees and the trade unions. 
On the other hand,almost all of the explanations for the 
224 managers' belief that a voluntary policy could not succeed 
concerned either people's unwillingness to co- operate with the 
policy, their selfish motives or ignorance (Table 7.1). Most of 
the few remaining answers indicated that some people would not 
accept the policy unless certain conditions were met beforehand, 
such as the rise in prices being arrested or inequities in the 
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level of certain incomes being resolved.(1) 
Did the respondents who' felt a voluntary policy could not 
be successful believe that compulsory powers were necessary to 
achieve the policy's objectives? To check this, the managers were 
asked: 
"In general, do you think it is essential for 
the Government to have compulsory powers for 
a prices and incomes policy to operate success- 
fully?" 
Once again the managers overwhelmingly expressed their lack of 
confidence in any policy of a voluntary nature. The vast majority 
(80.7;x) of the sample felt compulsory powers were necessary for 
the policy to operate successfully,(2)while only 17.8% of the 
managers held the opposite viewpoint.(3) 
The findings would appear to be encouraging for the members 
of the Government who may be concerned about the acceptability of 
powers to enforce the policy. However, they should not be inter- 
(1) See Appendix 32 for the distribution of answers to the question: 
"Why do you think a prices and incomes policy cannot be 
successful on a voluntary basis ?" 
(2) Most managers (85.0 %) who believed that compulsory powers were 
essential for the prices and incomes policy also said that the 
policy would not work on a voluntary basis. On the other hand 
26 managers revealed inconsistencies in their answers as not 
only did they feel compulsory powers were essential if the 
policy were to work successfully but also they felt a policy 
on a voluntary basis could be successful. 
(3) See Appendix 33 for the distribution of answers to the question: 
"Why do you think it is essential for the Government to have 
compulsory powers for the prices and incomes policy ?" 
The 48 managers who said that controls were not essential 
stated simply that controls were disliked and a free bargaining 
system to determine prices and incomes was preferred. 
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preted as meaning that managers on the whole approved of legisla- 
tive powers of enforcement. Indeed, just over half of the sample 
(52.6 %) disapproved of the Government having compulsory powers 
for a prices and incomes policy,(1)and only 44.8% of the respond- 
ents approved of these powers. 
The difference between managers feeling that compulsory 
powers are necessary and approving of these powers is clearly 
shown below. 
Table 7.2 
Comparison of answers to the questions: 
(a) "Do you think compulsory powers are 
essential for the policy to operate success- 
fully?" and (b) "Do you approve of com- 
pulsory powers ?" 






Respondents who said that compulsory 
powers were essential for a prices 
and incomes policy to operate success- 
fully 218 80.7 
Respondents who said that compulsory 
powers were not essential for a prices 
and incomes policy to operate success- 
fully 48 17.8 
Respondents who approved of compulsory 
powers 121 44.8 
Respondents who disapproved of com- 
pulsory powers 142 52.6 
(1) For a comparison with a nationally representative sample, see 
Hilde Behrend et al., Incomes Policy and the Individual, 
Oliver & Boyd, Bdinburgh,1967, p.23, who found that 37.3% of 
the sample approved of compulsory powers over pay after July 
1967 and 69.11 approved of government powers to control prices 
after July 1967. 
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The issue of compulsory powers would appear to be connected 
with a manager's preference for either an incomes policy or a 
system of free collective bargaining as only 24.1;; of the managers 
who expressed a preference for free collective bargaining approved 
of the use of compulsory powers compared to 58.6% of those who 
preferred Government guidelines. 
The level of knowledge about the incomes policy shown by the 
manager did not affect his approval of compulsory powers as the 
views for or against the powers were divided in similar proportions 
in most of the comprehension assessment rating groups. 
One factor which could affect a manager's attitude towards 
compulsory powers appeared to be the individual manager's exper- 
ience in the industrial relations field. Of those who described 
the trade unions in their firm as 'militant', 58.5% approved of 
the Government having compulsory powers - a figure fifteen per- 
centage points higher than that of the group of managers who de- 
scribed the union concerned with their firms' employees as being 
'fair' or 'doing little'. Another indication that a manager's 
bitter experience in industrial relations might be linked with 
his approval of compulsory powers was given by the fact that 
50.9% of those who had direct or indirect experience of pay dis- 
putes approved of compulsory powers, while only 41.7% of those 
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who had no involvement in pay disputes held the same view.(1) 
Many of the explanations for approval of the compulsory 
powers seemed to indicate a belief that people would put their 
own interests before those of the nation if compulsory powers 
did not exist.(2) About half of the 121 managers who approved of 
the use of compulsory powers believed that the policy would not 
succeed unless a guiding hand controlled its implementation. Most 
of the remaining explanations were concerned with the human 
frailties of greed, selfishness or unwillingness to co- operate 
with the policy, and expressed approval of powers to prevent un- 
fair advantage being taken by any section of the community. 
On the other hand the vast majority of the 142 managers who 
disapproved of enforcement of the policy did so because they felt 
that compulsion was undesirable or that free enterprise was pre - 
ferable.(3) Only a few gave different reasons for their answers, 
explanations indicating that the policy would fail because the 
Government was using the wrong type of approach to solve the 
(1) Unfortunate experiences in industrial relations would seem to 
have some effect on the managers' views on compulsory powers. 
Similar results were observed when analysing the answers to 
the question on whether compulsory powers were essential for 
the prices and incomes policy. 
90.2% of the managers who described the unions concerned with 
their firms' employees as 'militant' felt that compulsory 
powers were essential whereas only 78.4°á of those describing 
the unions involved with their employees as 'fair' or 'doing 
little' had the same opinion. Similarly 82.3% of those in- 
volved directly or indirectly in pay disputes felt compulsory 
powers were essential, a figure almost seven percentage points 
higher than those with no involvement in pay disputes. 
(2) See Appendix 34 for the distribution of the respondents' 
reasons for their approval of compulsory powers. 
(3) See Appendix 35 for the distribution of the respondents' 
explanations of why they disapproved of compulsory powers. 
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country's economic problems. 
The Managers' Ideas on Sanctions or Incentives 
Could the respondents suggest a way in which the Government 
could reduce opposition to the policy and make the policy more 
successful without forcing people to obey it? To make the re- 
spondents lace the type of problem encountered by the Government 
in implementing the prices and incomes policy, they were asked: 
"What, if anything, do you see as the chief 
obstacle to the effective working of the 
Government's prices and incomes policy ? "(1) 
Four obstacles in the way of the policy's success were 
mentioned. No less than 50.4% of the sample felt that unwilling- 
ness to co- operate with the policy would be the big stumbling 
block to the success of an incomes policy, and 35.2% of the re- 
spondents believed that selfishness and greed would play a large 
part in inducing people to frustrate the Government's intention. 
Much smaller groups of managers believed either that both in- 
equalities in the level of incomes paid to certain occupations 
and the differing effects of price rises on certain individuals 
would prevent the policy from working effectively or that the 
major obstacle to success would be the inability of the Government 
to produce an effective policy. 
(1) See appendix 36 for the distribution of answers to this 
question. 
Table 7.3 
Distribution of answers of 256 respondents 
to the question: "What could be done to 
prevent the obstacle you named from ob- 
structing the effective working of the in- 
comes policy ? "(1) 






Better or more forceful control ought 
to be applied to enable the incomes 
policy to succeed 84 31.1 
A change in the attitudes towards the 
policy or an increase of knowledge 
about the policy is necessary to en- 
able it to succeed 50 18.5 
Changes in industrial practices of 
labour relations and payment methods 
are necessary before the policy could 
be successful 32 11.8 
Nothing can be done to enable the 
policy to work effectively 23 8.5 
Other answers 43 15.9 
No answer given 44 16.3 
(1) 20 of the 256 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 276 entries in the table. (14 managers mentioned 
no obstacle to the effective working of the incomes policy 
and consequently these managers were not asked this question) 
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To discover whether the managers had their own answer to 
people's reluctance to obey the policy the 256 respondents, who 
had mentioned an obstacle to the effective working of the prices 
and incomes policy, were asked: 
"What could be done to prevent this 
happening ?" 
In reply, 31.1% of the total sample felt that the Government 
should tighten up the policy, make the policy more severe or 
control the existing policy more firmly. 18.5% of the managers 
opposed this view, considering that the answer to the problem lay 
more in presenting the economic difficulties facing the country 
to the general public and fostering more public spirit to achieve 
a higher level of self - sacrifice and co- operation with the policy 
(Table 7.3). These two ideas are almost diametrically opposed to 
each other, showing the wide divergence of opinion existing on 
the question of how to achieve the economic objectives of the 
Government. On the one hand there is the more authoritarian 
system of imposing the Government's will from the top and, on the 
other, the perhaps more enduring method of the decision to co- 
operate being fostered at the grass roots, a method long advocated 
by several management theorists.(1) 
(1) See, for example, James D. kooney, The Principles of Organisa- 
tion, Harper and Brothers, New York,1939, p.181, OR 
Mary P. Follett, The Giving of Orders, in Freedom and Co- 
ordination, Management Publications Trust Ltd., London,191+9, 
pp.16 -33, OR 
Luther Gulick, Notes on the Theory of Organisation,in L. Gulick 
and L. Urwick, Papers on the Science of Administration, Insti- 
tute of Public Administration, New York,1937, p.6. 
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A small group of managers had an entirely different approach. 
These respondents felt that the answers to the country's problems 
lay in improving industrial practice both in the sphere of ind- 
ustrial relations and in the methods of wage payment. Changes 
seem to be coming in both of these closely linked fields. The 
N.B.P.I., for example, has given repeated reminders that pay 
awards should invariably be linked with some increase in pro- 
ductivity. In addition, the Government seems determined to 
initiate changes in the system of industrial relations by imp- 
lementing some of the proposals of the White Paper(1)published 
after the Donovan Report on Trade Unions and Employers' 
Associations.(2) 
Not all managers were able to suggest ways of overcoming 
obstacles to the policy's success. One quarter of the total 
sample were unable to suggest answers to the problems which, 
presumably, they expect the Government might have to face 
eventually if it hopes its incomes policy will succeed. Some 
even felt that nothing could be done. For example: 
"Nothing - you can't stop some trade unions 
being militant" 
"In cases where large quantities are involved, 
it's easy but with small quantities it's diffi- 
cult. You can't catch the newsagent if he puts 
his prices up" 
(1) See In Place of Strife - A Policy for Industrial Relations, 
Cmnd.388 , H.iví.S.O., London,1969. 
(2) Re ort of the Ro al Commission on Trade Unions and Emlo ers' 
Associations, 19. -19 .: Cmnd.3 23, H.Id.8.0. , London,19 9 
Table 7.4 
Summary of distribution of answers of 270 re- 
spondents to the question: "Given that most 
firms co- operate, what do you think should be 
done about any firm or the managers of the 
firm, if the firm deliberately disobeyed any 
Government order forbidding the firm to pay a 
wage increase ? "(1) 
Summary of 
Classification of Answers 
No. of 
Replies 
Answers indicating that the firm should 
be fined 
Answers indicating that no action should 
be taken 
Vague answers indicating that the Gov- 
ernment should 'take action' or 'pro- 
secute' 
Answers indicating that the Government 
should take direct action against the 
firm such as holding back grants, tax 
allowances or should even close the 
firm 
Answers indicating that the firm's 
management or directors should be 
fined or imprisoned 
Answers in which the respondent said he 
















(1) 14 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 284 entries in the table. 
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"Nothing - you'd have to control everything, 
even the movement of labour" 
From the answers given in Table 7.3, it can be seen that all 
managers did not entirely agree with the use of compulsion to 
attain the Government's ends. How then did the respondents feel 
the Government should deal with any firms who refused to obey the 
policy? To discover what the managers believed should be done, 
all of them were asked: 
"Given that most firms co- operate, what do 
you think should be done about any firm or 
the managers of the firm if the firm de- 
liberately disobeyed any Government order 
forbidding the firm to pay a wage increase ? "(1) 
In reply to this question, 43.7% of the total sample felt that 
the firm should be fined, about half of them stating that the fine 
should be severe (Table 7.4). Other respondents felt that the 
Government should penalise the firm by stopping Government con- 
tracts or taking over the firm.(2) Only 16 managers felt that a 
company's officials should be punished, ten of them mentioning 
that the recalcitrant executives should be imprisoned. 
Not all the managers, however, approved of penalties being 
imposed on firms or their managers. 18.9% of them felt no action 
(1) See Appendix 37 for the distribution of answers to this 
question. 
(2) Another remedy is suggested by John Corina, The Development 
of Incomes Policy, Institute of Personnel Management, London, 
1966, p.47, who suggests the use of a payroll tax as a 
sanction against recalcitrant firms. 
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should be taken if a Government order wad disobeyed. The same 
percentage of respondents found the problem very difficult and 
were unable to say what should be done. 
The impression was created during the interviews that some 
of the managers may not have liked the idea of the policy affecting 
their firms and this might have influenced their answers to the 
above question. How then would they react if the policy affected 
them personally? To discover the managers' views about this, 
they were asked: 
"What would be your reaction if the Government 
attempted to stop a pay increase being given 
to you by the firm ?" 
The following distribution of answers was given: 
Managers who would approve of a re- 
straint on their own pay increase 
Managers who would disapprove of a 
restraint on their own pay increase 
Managers who indicated that they would 
attempt to avoid the restraint on 
their own pay increase 
51.9% 
40.0% 
While a majority of the managers indicated that they would 
accept their pay increase being stopped by the Government, several 
of them qualified their acceptance of the restraint by indicating 
that they would be content only if prices did not rise or if the 
restraint was applied to everyone or felt to be in the national 
interest. 
Those who disapproved of any control being imposed on a pay 
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increase given to them by the firm were on the whole more out- 
spoken. i4any of them expressed extreme disapproval of any move 
the Government might make to stop their pay increase. Eleven 
managers even went so far as to suggest that they would get an 
increase in pay no matter what the Government did, For example: 
"I wouldn't accept it - there are always loop- 
holes if you're on the management side" 
"I wouldn't put myself in that position - there 
are one thousand ways round it" 
"I'd just look for another job and get my in- 
creases that way" 
This type of statement was, however, generally made by managers 
in small firms. 
The Type of Prices and Incomes Policy the Respondents would like 
to see in the Future 
Turning from the issues of compulsory powers and sanctions, 
the managers' views were sought on the future role of the Gov- 
ernment in the determination of prices and incomes. 
In reply to the question: "How would you like to see the 
prices and incomes policy used in the future ? ", the distribution 
of the managers' replies to a choice of three answers was as 
follows: 
A permanent mechanism for determining 
movements in prices and incomes 
A temporary measure to be used at 
times of economic crisis 





It can be seen from these answers that a great proportion of the 
managers appeared to think that there was a definite use for a 
prices and incomes policy in the future. This would seem to be 
an indication that there might not be a great deal of opposition 
from management to a prolonging of the policy until Britain re- 
covered from her economic ills and possibly not too much opposi- 
tion to a continuation of the policy beyond that time.(1) 
After being asked the question on the type of prices and 
incomes policy they would like to see in the future, the respond- 
ents were handed two cards on which were printed a limited choice 
of answers and were asked: 
(a) "How do you feel about the role of the 
Government and its policy on prices ? "(2) 
(b) "How do you feel about the role of the 
Government and its policy on incomes ?" 
The distribution of answers to these two questions was as follows: 
(1) Once again an indication was given that a good understanding 
of Britain's economic problems and the incomes policy itself 
leads to support for such a measure. See Appendix 38 which 
shows that more of those with a higher than average level of 
comprehension of the policy than those with a lower level of 
comprehension favoured the idea of the prices and incomes 
policy being a permanent feature of British economic life. 
(2) A few managers gave two conditional answers. For this reason, 




The Government needs to take more 
control 44.4 30.4 
The Government needs to take the 
same control as at present 21.1 31.9 
The Government needs less control 13.3 14.1 
The Government needs to have no 
control 22.2 24.1 
The figures showed that the respondents' views differed on the 
use of controls on prices and incomes in the future. Many more 
respondents believed that the existing controls on prices should 
be made more severe than thought that restraints on income in- 
creases should be tightened. Even so, both in the case of prices 
and of incomes over three managers in every five said that the 
Government's controls should be increased or left at their ex- 
isting level. 
The respondents with opposing views on controls - on the one 
hand those preferring controls to stay at their existing level or 
to be increased and, on the other, those who would like the 
powers to be removed - were largely consistent in their views on 
price and income controls. The vast majority (88.7`') of those who 
felt that price controls should be increased or left at the same 
level as before had similar views with regard to income controls 
and 73.3% of those who believed that price controls should be 
abolished said that there should be no controls on incomes. 
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The reasons for the managers' views on restraints on price 
and income increases revealed once again the polarisation of 
opinion on the Government's role in price determination and wage 
bargaining. 
While a variety of explanations were given for their views 
many respondents (25.2% of the total sample) declared that con- 
trols on prides should remain at their existing level or should 
be increased because the cost of living was rising.(1) The other 
explanations seemed to indicate either a belief that unless con- 
trols do exist prices would rise or a feeling that the existing 
controls would suffice but would have to be used more frequently. 
Similar explanations were given for the respondents' pre- 
ferences for the controls on incomes being either increased or re- 
tained at their existing level, the main one, given by 26.7% of 
the sample, being that these controls were necessary if the 
policy were to succeed. Only six managers stated that wages were 
rising - a marked contrast to one quarter of all respondents 
feeling that prices were being raised.(2) 
(1) These managers were not alone in their view that price con- 
trols were not as successful as they could have been. 
Aubrey Jones, in an interview in The Sunday Telegraph, March 
16th, 1969, stated that he felt prices had been the neglected 
part of the prices and incomes policy. 
(2) Figures from Employment and Productivity Gazettes reveal that 
prices (index of retail prices) rose by 5.3% from July 1967 
to July 1968 while average earnings (index of average earnings 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One prevalent reason was found among the many explanations 
given by the 96 respondents for their views that price controls 
should be reduced or abolished. No less than 24.4% of the total 
sample declared that controls were disliked or that free enter- 
prise was a better system. This reason was identical to that 
given most frequently in explanation of the view of 103 managers 
that the Government should have reduced or have no control over 
incomes. In this case 21.8% of the total sample said the con- 
trols were unpopular or that market forces were preferred to 
Government "interference ". 
When the managers were asked the questions on prices and 
incomes controls it was stressed that the managers' views should 
be given in the light of how they forsaw the future. Thus, when 
the answers to the questions on prices and incomes controls are 
compared to the respondents' opinions of the future role of the 
prices and incomes policy an idea is obtained of the managers' 
views on possible future developments in the utilisation of such 
a policy. The result of the comparison is shown in Table 7.5. 
The general impression given by the table is that the 
majority of the respondents did seem to approve of a policy at 
least as severe as that in existence at the time of interviewing. 
62.2% of all the respondents preferred a permanent or temporary 
policy with increased or the same controls as were in force 
during the first half of 1968 applied to price increases. A 
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similar proportion (58.9% of the total sample) preferred a per- 
manent or temporary policy and said that controls on incomes 
should be tightened or retained at their existing level.(1) 
Respondents' Opinions on the Possibility of a different Way of 
administering the Prices and Incomes Policy 
In the context of the type of prices and incomes policy the 
managers would prefer in the future, it appeared to be relevant 
to discover whether managers would prefer some body other than 
the Government to control the policy. Accordingly the managers 
were asked: 
"Are there any bodies other than the Government 
who you feel could be capable of controlling a 
prices and incomes policy ? "(2) 
Opinions were divided on this question; 49.6; of the respondents 
believed that no organisations other than the Government were 
capable of controlling a prices and incomes policy, while 47.4; 
stated that another body could take over the Government's admini- 
(1) 7.8% of the total sample who said that this policy should 
never be used were also of the opinion that price and income 
controls should be abolished. 
Also, from Table 7.5 it can be calculated that 41.5° of all 
respondents favoured a temporary or permanent prices and in- 
comes policy with increased controls on prices. 28.1% of the 
sample favoured a temporary or permanent prices and incomes 
policy with increased controls on incomes. 
(2) See Appendix 39 for the organisation which the respondents 
felt could be capable of controlling a prices and incomes 
policy. 
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stration of the policy.(1) 
Just under half of the 128 managers who felt that another 
organisation could organise the operation of such a policy 
suggested that this body should be a trade union - employer combine. 
Most of these managers felt that the combination should be at 
national level and consist of a committee of trade union and emp- 
loyers' association leaders. A few others, however, believed 
that each industry's prices and incomes should be controlled by 
employers and trade union leaders connected with the individual 
industry. The only other organisations suggested by more than 
just a handful of respondents as being capable of operating the 
policy were the Trade Unions or the Employers Federations acting 
independently of each other.(2) 
(1) An interesting aspect of these answers was that 43.3% of 
those who preferred guidelines felt that another body could 
be capable of controlling an incomes policy as well as over 
half (52.8`'0) of those who preferred free collective bargain- 
ing. This could possibly give an indication that the latter 
group's objection to an incomes policy could be the fact that 
the Government is in control of it and thus, if another body 
administered the policy, the opposition might possibly be 
lessened. 
(2) Many (29.6% of the total sample) of the 128 managers who felt 
that some other body could fulfil the Government's present 
function in supervising the prices and incomes policy said 
that they would prefer the policy to be controlled by this 
organisation rather than the Government. This meant that 
10.7 of the sample, while favouring a permanent prices and 
incomes policy, would prefer that this policy was organised by 
a body other than the Government and 14.1% of the sample who 
preferred a temporary policy would like to see an organisation 
outwith the Government control the policy. 
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The issue of the ideal administration for the prices and in- 
comes policy certainly seemed to cause a diversity of opinion. A 
more specific question produced no greater consensus. In reply 
to the question: "How do you feel about the idea that a tri- 
partite council composed of T.U.C. members, C.B.I. members and 
neutral members (eg. academics or judges) should take over the 
responsibility for an incomes policy rather than the Government ? ", 
just over half (55.1%) of the managers said that they approved of 
this suggestion and 43.3% of the respondents opposed it.(1) 
To sum up the findings of this chapter, it could be seen 
that there was a difference of opinion among the respondents 
about the Government's role in determining price and income in- 
creases and the future of the prices and incomes policy. 
The respondents did not, in general, regard the compulsory 
provisions in the Prices and Incomes Acts as an unnecessary 
tyranny. The vast majority of the sample felt that statutory 
powers were necessary though just over half of the managers did 
not approve of compulsory powers being held by the Government to 
enforce the prices and incomes policy. 
On the whole, respondents' views regarding the forseeable 
future of the policy, favoured a policy at least as tough as the 
one existing at the time of interviewing (February - May 1968). 
(1) See Appendix 40 for the respondents' reasons for disapproving 
of the tripartite body. 
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Their views differed, however, on the issues of whether the 
prices and incomes bolicy should be a permanent or temporary 
feature of British economic life and whether the Government or 
some other organisation should administer the policy. 
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CHAPTER 8 
RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON THE COST OF LIVING AND COMPARABILITY 
AS DETERMINANTS OF INCOMES 
As a further insight into the respondents' acceptance of the 
incomes policy their views were sought on the Government's re- 
quests that less regard should be paid to the criteria of the 
cost of living and general comparability to determine income in- 
creases. 
Mana ers' Views on the Relation of the Cost of Livin o the 
Level of a Person's Income 
The White Papers, in laying down the criteria for exceptional 
pay increases for the period during which the interviewing took 
place, stated that individual pay rises should not include any 
element relating to the cost of living.(1) This was not a new 
idea; writers for many years have been stressing the futility of 
giving a wage increase to compensate for a rise in the cost of 
living.(2) Their warnings, however, did not apparently hold much 
significance for the respondents since the majority (69.3 %) felt 
that incomes should be increased if the cost of living were to rise.(3) 
(1) See Cmnd.3235, p.7, and Crnnd.3590, p.9. 
(2) See, for example, John Maynard Keynes, How to Pay for the War, 
Macmillan, London, 1940, pp.6 -7, and Henry Smith, Problems of 
Planning Incomes, Lloyds Bank Review, No.79, January 1966, 
p.32., 
(3) 30.4% of the managers said that incomes should not be related 
to the cost of living. 
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It was the managers in the smaller firms who were more in 
favour of a pay increase if the cost of living were to rise. 
74.3% of the respondents employed by small and smaller medium 
firms were in favour of such a pay increase compared with 61.2% 
of those in large and larger medium sized firms. 
There also was an age difference; 75.2% of those below 40 
years of age supported the idea of pay increasing to compensate 
for a rise in prices compared with 63.9% of the over forties. 
These results might possibly have been due to the managers 
in smaller firms receiving lower incomes than their counterparts 
in large firms and the younger managers receiving a lower level 
of remuneration than their seniors. Those with a higher propensity 
to consume most of their income (usually those with lower rather 
than higher incomes) could reasonably be expected to feel the re- 
duction in their real incomes more than those with higher salaries.(1) 
As regards comprehension there was an inverse relationship, 
namely the less a manager understood about the prices and incomes 
policy the more likely he was to feel that an increase in pay 
should be awarded if the cost of living were to rise. 87.0% of 
those with a below or much below average comprehension assessment 
rating approved of such a pay increase compared with a much lower 
percentage (58.5 %) of those with an above or much above average 
(1) No information on the managers' salaries was obtained. 
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comprehension assessment rating. 
Of the 187 managers who believed that a pay rise should be 
given in response to an increase in the cost of living, 147 
respondents (54.4% of the total sample) held this opinion because 
they felt that no -one's standard of living should be allowed to 
fall. Thus it would appear that not only is there, a feeling 
that a monetary wage rate cannot be cut(1)but also many managers 
appear to believe the real wage must remain inviolate. 
This did not mean that all of the 187 managers who approved 
of a pay rise being given if prices were to rise were entirely 
oblivious of the problems such a pay increase could create. In- 
deed, on being asked why the Government disapproved of the cost 
of living being used as a criterion for pay increases, 92 of them 
(34.1vó of the total sample) mentioned that such increases could 
be inflationary or affect the balance of payments adversely. 
Of the 82 managers who opposed the idea of pay rises being 
related to cost of living increases the majority appeared to have 
reached their opinion because of the inflationary tendencies of 
such pay increases, several of them adding that income rises 
should be determined by productivity alone. 
(1) See, for example, Julian Symons, The General Strike, Cresset 
Press, London, 1957, p.9, and, as applied to piece rate 
systems, Norman C. Hunt, Methods of Wage Payment in British 
Industry, Pitman, London, 1951, p.43. 
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Thus, although most of the sample of managers believed pay 
increases should be given to compensate for rises in prices a 
majority of the respondents (59.3) could at least understand the 
damaging effect such increases could have on inflation, on the 
balance of payments or on the country's economic prospects. 
Managers' Views on the Criterion of Comparability for Determining 
Pay Increases 
In addition to disapproving of pay increases being given to 
offset rises in the cost of living, the Government also stated 
that "less regard should be paid to such factors as general com- 
parisons with incomes in other employment0(1) This statement 
appeared to be acceptable to the majority of the managers; 59.3% 
of the sample agreed with the Government's view while 34.8% 
opposed any restraint on the use of general comparability to de- 
termine pay increases. The Government's statement would, however, 
appear to be confusing since the "seriously out of line with the 
level of remuneration for similar work" criterion for exceptional 
pay increases suggested that comparisons should not be ignored 
altogether. h later White Paper did attempt, rather unsuccessfully, 
to clarify the situation by pointing out that "the criterion 
justifying increases on grounds of comparability needs to be 
applied selectively, and must not be used to spread pay increases 
(1) Cmnd.3235, p.6. 
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into areas of employment where the original justification does 
not apply ".(1) 
It would appear that the question of the legitimacy of the 
use of comparisons in any given situation would have to be left 
for the N.ri.P.I. to decide. Indeed, the Government's statements 
on comparability appeared to have confused several of the re- 
spondents.(2) 
This confusion was not so apparent among the 160 managers 
who agreed with the Government's directive on general comparability. 
These managers gave three main explanations for their view.(3) 
Several respondents felt that a man's worth should be assessed 
purely on his own merits or his level of productivity. Other 
respondents were concerned not so much with the individual worker's 
achievements but with the 'right' of each trade, industry or firm 
to determine its own wage structure on the basis of its results 
and indicated that comparisons should not be drawn outwith the 
boundaries of the industry or firm. A few more managers even 
said that valid comparisons could not be made due to the problems 
(1) Cmnd. 3590, p.9. 
(2) An indication of this could be the fact that support for the 
Government's statement was inversely related to the respond- 
ents' understanding of the policy; 59.4'0 of those with a 
below or much below average comprehension assessment rating 
supported the statement compared with 52.3 of those with an 
above or much above comprehension assessment rating. 
(3) See Appendix 41 for the distribution of answers to the 
question: "Why do you approve of the Government's statement 
on comparisons of incomes ?" 
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of selecting the proper factors for comparison. 
Many of the 94 managers who disapproved of the Government's 
opposition to the general use of the criterion of comparability 
appeared to have been confused by the apparent ambiguity of the 
Government's position. Most of those who did give an explanation 
for their view either said that the Government was not allowing 
equal remuneration to be given for equal work by forbidding the 
use of comparisons or that it was essential for managers to com- 
pare the wages offered by their firms to those of rival organisa- 
tions in order to compete for labour. In both of these cases the 
comparison could possibly come under the "seriously out of line" 
criterion and the pay increase could be granted. 
To see if the managers realised why the Government dis- 
approved of the use of general comparisons with incomes in other 
employments, they were all asked: 
"Why,do you think,does the Government 
object to this (general comparability) 
as a criterion for income increases ? "(1) 
Many managers could give no reason for the Government's objection 
but 25.2% of the respondents stated that such a criterion could 
lead to an inflationary spiral of wage claims. A few other 
managers were more specific and gave examples of how this spiral 
could arise - either by the wage increase involving no rise in 
(1) See Appehdix 42 for the distribution of answers to this 
question. 
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productivity or by improper comparisons being made by relatively 
lower paid groups resulting in pressure from the originally more 
highly paid sections to have the narrowed differentials restored 
to their former level. 
In all, 40.7 of the sample stated that comparability could 
be the cause of inflationary tendencies in the economy.(1) Thus 
it would appear that the contribution to inflation made by com- 
parisons of incomes was not so readily obvious to the managers as 
the effect on prices of pay increases being linked to the cost 
of living. 
(1) Compare Aubrey Jones quoted in Robert B. »icKersie, The British 
Board for Prices and Incomes, Industrial Relations, Vol.6, 
No.3, May 1967, p.275 as saying that there was much evidence 
comparisons were extensively used when they were neither a 
measure of fairness nor of the market - this led to infla- 
tionary tendencies. See also J.M. Jackson, Wages : Just 
Reward or Efficient Allocator, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol.V, No.3, November 1967, p.378, who shows the 
circular process which can arise due to the use of comparisons 
as a criterion for pay increases. 
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CHAPTER 9 
RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON THE REMUNERATION OF LOWER 
PAID WORKERS 
A part of the incomes policy which appealed to the T.U.C. 
was the aim of improving the relative position of the lower paid 
workers.(1) To judge whether the respondents also thought priority 
should be given to the lower paid workers, the managers were 
asked: 
"According to the Government the lower paid 
workers have a strong case for consideration 
for a pay increase. Do you agree ?" 
75.2% of the respondents thought that the lower paid workers 
should receive consideration for a pay increase, and only a 
minority (20.4;0) of the respondents disagreed. 
Many of the managers who said that the lower paid did have a 
strong case for a pay increase held this view because of the diffi- 
culties they believed the lower paid had to face. 28.1; of the 
total sample mentioned the problems encountered by a person whose 
low income was barely sufficient for existence. Another diffi- 
culty was suggested by 2O.0%á of the respondents who thought that 
the lower paid had trouble in coping with the rising cost of living.(2) 
(1) See Cmnd.3235, p.6 and Cmnd.359O, pp.8-9. 
(2) See Appendix 43 for the distribution of answers to the question: 
"Why do you think the lower paid workers have a strong case for 
consideration for a pay increase ?" 
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Other managers (11.9%0) had an entirely different reason for 
their concern about low pay, stating that advantage could be 
taken of welfare benefits if wages were below the level of such 
benefits since the relatively high level of social security and 
unemployment benefits was a disincentive to work hard. (1 ) 
The managers who opposed any priority being given to the 
lower paid workers appeared to believe that this group did not 
deserve to receive more than they did at present. Some respond- 
ents considered that the lower paid would be uneconomic to employ 
if they received more remuneration. Other managers were con- 
cerned about differential problems and believed that the lower 
paid received a sufficiently high income in relation to workers 
with more ability, and if the former received an increase in pay, 
then the repercussions would be felt throughout the nation's wage 
structure. 
So far, while the managers had spoken freely about lower 
paid employees they had not defined what they meant by a low paid 
worker. It transpired that the respondents had differing ideas 
(1) Some of the respondents wanted welfare benefits to be 
abolished to prevent certain workers 'being pampered'. 
Wilfred Brown, Piecework Abandoned, Heinemann, London, 1962, 
pp.98 -99, would disagree with the idea that 'without the 
healthy struggle for the amenities of life our people will 
lose economic virility' and points out that no medical evi- 
dence exists that anxiety or fear is good for the health or 
























































































































































































































































about the level of income of such a worker. An illustration of 
this is given in Table 9.1 which shows the distribution of the 
notions of 139 respondents of low pay in terms of a basic weekly 
income.(1) The range of answers was from £4 per week to £21 per 
week(2)but these were isolated figures in the 'tail' of the 
distribution. Using the lower quartile (£11 : 3 : 7.) and the 
upper quartile (£14 : 4 : 10.) as measures of dispersion, it can 
be seen that the interval between these points is only about Q. 
The median is £12 : 3 : 9. and the arithmetic mean is £12 : 19 : 2. 
It is interesting to note that there appeared to be no single 
model value of the managers' notions of low pay; the respondents' 
assessments were clustered around two figures - £12 and £15 per 
week. 
The managers were also asked how they would define a low paid 
worker in terms of occupation. Their answers are shown in Table 
(1) The 255 managers who gave their ideas of low pay mentioned the 
low income in four different ways - basic rate (54.50), basic 
rate less tax (5.92), gross earnings (29.0,) and total 
earnings less tax (10.6 %), showing that most of the managers 
thought of a wage in terms of a basic rate for the week. To 
avoid making dubious assumptions about tax allowances and 
overtime or bonus payments no attempt has been made to present 
the 255 managers' notions of low pay on a common basis. 
Instead, Table 9.1 shows only the distribution of the answers 
of the 139 respondents who gave a figure for low pay in terms 
of basic rate. 
(2) The standard deviation was £2.13. 
Table 9.2 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents 
to the question: "How would you define a 
low paid worker in terms of occupation ? "(1) 






Unskilled workers /labourers 95 35.2 
Transport workers, eg. railway men, 
bus crews, transport workers in general 48 17.8 
Council workers, eg. dustmen, roadmen, 
street sweepers 42 15.6 
Farm workers /agricultural labourers 40 14.8 
Shop workers 15 5.6 
Nurses 12 4.4 
Clerical workers 10 3.7 
Other answers 40 14.8 
No answer given 35 13.0 
(1) 67 managers gave two occupations and these have been 
recorded as separate answers. There ares therefore, 
337 entries in the table. 
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9.2. It can be seen that the group most frequently mentioned was 
that of labourers and unskilled workers. Next came three other 
occupations: transport workers, council workers and agricultural 
labourers.(1) Lack of skill appeared to be considered a barrier 
to receiving a high rate of pay for, when the managers were 
asked to name their employees who received a low remuneration, 
52.2vó of the respondents mentioned unskilled manual workers. The 
only other group to be named (by only 11 respondents) was that of 
clerical workers.(2) 
Managers' views about low paid workers are of interest in the 
light of the T.U.C.'s hopes for a national minimum wage of £15 to 
be achieved over a number of years. Clegg(3)rejected this figure 
as being too high and liable to cause increases in both wage -costs 
and prices which would benefit no -one and suggested that a minimum 
of £10 : 10 : -. or £11 should not be unmanageable. 
To obtain the respondents' views on this subject they were 
invited to suggest a figure for a national minimum wage in terms 
of "take- home" pay. The wage to be given was to be the net income 
of a single man working a 40 hour week. 
(1) See Judith Marquand, Which are the Lower Paid Workers ?, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.V, No.3, November 
1967, pp359 -374, who describes the industries employing many 
low paid workers. 
(2) Only 31.5% of the respondents felt that their low paid emp- 
loyees deserved a pay increase. 
(3) Hugh Clegg, The Case for a National Minimum Wage, The Times, 


















































































































































































































































































































































The distribution of the answers of the 233 respondents who 
mentioned a level for a national minimum wage appears in Table 
9.3. A wide dispersion of answers was given, the range being 
from £8 to £25 per week, but the lower and upper quartile of the 
distribution were separated by only just over £1 - £11 : 11 : 8. 
to £12 : 17 : 5.(1) The median was £12 : 7 : 6. and the arithmetic 
mean was £12 : 18 : 2. In comparison with the respondents' idea 
of low pay the gross level of a "take- home" pay of £12 : 18 : 2. 
would be a wage of slightly over £15 : 10 : -. - a figure 
£2 : 10 : -. higher than the arithmetic mean of the managers' 
estimates of the income of a low paid worker. 
Unlike the managers' notions of low pay their assessments of 
a national minimum wage revealed a distinct model value - £13. 
Indeed, half of the respondents who suggested a level for a 
national minimum wage chose this figure, showing that there does 
appear to be a certain consensus among the managers about a 
possible level for such a wage. It is interesting to note that, 
in terms of gross pay, a minimum wage of £13 net would be slightly 
above the figure of £15 suggested by the T.U.C.(2) 
(1) The standard deviation was £1.8. 
(2) 61.9% of the total sample said that their notion of a minimum 
wage was equivalent to the income necessary to enable people 
to live at the basic subsistence level. This would appear to 
give an indication that the managers in general believe that 
£13 per week net is the wage needed by the average family to 
live without further monetary assistance. 
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Although most of the managers were prepared to mention a 
level of pay suitable for a minimum wage only just over half of 
the sample (55.9) actually approved of the adoption of a policy 
to lay down minimum standards of remuneration. These 151 managers 
gave several different reasons for their opinion. (1) Some felt 
that it was preferable for the country to have people working 
than living on unemployment or other social benefits and a 
minimum wage above the level of welfare payments would be an in- 
centive for these people to work. Other respondents felt that a 
minimum wage would give people a decent standard of living to 
allow for the basic necessities of life. 
A third reason given in favour of a national minimum wage 
was that of social justice. Several managers stated that it 
would be fairer to all if such a wage were to be introduced. 
Other respondents had a more specific objection to injustices 
possible under the present system of wage payments and feared that 
advantage would constantly be taken of some poorly organised 
groups by unscrupulous employers who paid extremely low wages 
to their employees. 
Two main reasons pervaded the arguments of the 106 managers 
opposed to the idea of a national minimum wage. Several of this 
group believed that wages should not be determined by needs but 
(1) See Appendix 4- for the distribution of answers to the 
question: "Why do you think that there ought to be a national 
minimum wage?" 
Table 9.4 
Distribution of answers of 188 respondents 
to the question: " hat problems do you 
think a national minimum wage would cause ? "(1) 






Higher paid groups do not want 
differentials to be narrowed and will 
demand pay increases 70 25.9 
It will be difficult to compute the 
rate to make it fair to all 31 11.5 
Prices /cost of living will rise 22 8.1 
People will take advantage and not 
work hard; the worthless will still 
have to be paid the national minimum 
rate 18 6.7 
It will make certain industries /firms 
uneconomic; put certain industries/ 
firms out of business 11 4.1 
Other answers 23 8.5 
No answer given 33 12.2 
(1) 20 of the 188 managers gave two separate answers and these 
have been recorded as separate items. There are, therefore, 
208 entries in the table. 
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by the worth of the individual to the firm, many adding that the 
worthless and those 'working without enthusiasm' would still 
have to be paid at any minimum rate which might be fixed in the 
future. The major objection of other managers to a national 
minimum wage was that agreement could never be reached on the 
factors needed to determine the level of such a wage let alone 
the interpretation of these factors. 
These were not the only respondents who foresaw difficulties 
if a national minimum wage were to be introduced. Indeed, in 
answer to the question: "Do you think a national minimum wage 
will cause any particularly tricky problems ? ", 69.6 of the 
managers answered affirmatively. 34.0; of the total sample shared 
the same doubts as Clegg in expecting wages and prices to rise, 
many of them explaining that such a policy would narrow differen- 
tials and this would be resisted by the higher paid workers 
(Table 9.4). Other managers felt that it would be difficult to 
compute an equitable minimum wage. 
These difficulties will certainly have to be overcome if the 
Government is going to lay down a national minimum wage. Yet will 
the Government ever introduce a standard minimum level of payment? 
While many respondents appear to be concerned with ensuring that 
everyone has a 'reasonable standard of living' the inflationary 
tendencies of a minimum wage would not be acceptable to many others 
nor presumably to the Government. It would appear that no simple 
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solution exists to the problem of low payment. What appears to 
be necessary is to determine where real need exists. This would 
involve an analysis of pay structures to discover which groups 
receive low earnings and not simply low basic rates of pay. 
(1) 
From this basis a pragmatic approach with gradual increases for 
those with low total incomes would appear to lessen the infla- 
tionary dangers of a doctrinaire approach to the problem of low 
incomes. This policy, however, would take time to introduce and 
would presumably have to be worked out carefully in conjunction 
with the T.U.C. and C.B.I. in order to make it acceptable to 
most sections of the community. 
(1) See Allan Flanders, Collective Bargaining : Prescription for 
Change, Faber and Faber, London, 1967, pp.54 --55. 
Table 10.1 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
questions: (a) "Who do you think most deserve a 
pay rise within the country as a whole ?" (1) and 
(b) "Who do you think most deserve a pay rise 
within the firm ? "(2) 








Lower paid, people with less than £15 
per week 72 26.7 
The most productive people 29 10.7 
Nurses 28 10.4 
Skilled /semi- skilled men 18 6.7 
Transport workers (including railway- 
men, bus crews) 16 5.9 
Labourers /unskilled workers 14 5.2 
Managers /executives 14 5.2 
Teachers 13 4.8 
Agricultural workers /farm labourers 12 4.4 
Doctors (all kinds) 10 3.7 
Old age pensioners 10 3.7 
No -one 6 2.2 
Policemen 5 1.9 
Other answers 33 12.2 
No answer given 37 13.7 
(b) Within the firm 
No -one 110 40.7 
Productive workers 24 8.9 
Labourers /unskilled workers 24 8.9 
Skilled /semi -skilled workers 19 7.0 
Foremen 17 6.3 
Clerical staff 16 5.9 
Middle /top management 14 5.2 
Managers (unspecified) 14 5.2 
Everyone 13 4.8 
The lower paid groups 10 3.7 
Other answers 14 5.2 
No answer given 8 3.0 
(1) There were many answers which mentioned two or more groups. 
In all, there are 317 entries in the table. 
(2) 13 of the 270 managers mentioned two groups and these have 
been recorded as separate items. There are, therefore, 283 
entries in the table. 
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CHAPTER 10 
RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ON PRIORITIES FOR PAY INCREASES 
Who most deserves a Pay Increase? 
To ascertain whether the remuneration of any occupation was 
seen by the managers to be inequitable, the respondents were 
asked the following question :(1) 
"Who do you think most deserves a 
pay increase ?" 
The question was put to the managers in two contexts; (a) 
within the country as a whole and (b) within the respondent's own 
firm. 
It can be seen from Table 10.1 that little unanimity existed 
among the managers in assessing the merits of various groups with- 
in the country as a whole for a pay increase. No group was con- 
sidered by a large number of managers to deserve priority for a 
pay increase. The group most frequently mentioned by the managers 
was that of the lower paid workers. Nevertheless this group was 
only considered as candidates for an early pay rise by about one 
quarter of the respondents. Other managers, however, did mention 
groups which appeared to be among those receiving low incomes, 
for example, old age pensioners, agricultural workers and employees 
(1) To avoid the answers being influenced by reminding the re- 
spondents of low paid workers, the questions on this topic 
were asked before the question on low paid workers. 
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of transport undertakings. 
Among named occupations only small groups existed, the largest 
of which being the nursing profession. Other answers tended to 
emphasise the industrial flavour of the sample - people who 
worked efficiently and groups of workers with differing levels 
of skill were all mentioned by the respondents. These replies, 
which could have been expected to be based on the respondents' 
industrial experiences, were rather different from the results 
of a similar question put to a national sample of the general 
public.(1) Doctors, for example, were mentioned as most deserving 
a pay increase by 17.8; of the general public, while merely 3.7% 
of the managers held this view. 
This could be due to the managers holding the medical pro- 
fession less in awe than the general public or, more probably, due 
to the doctors' pay claim being prominent at the time of the 
national survey.(2) Quite possibly, many of the answers given by 
the managers were due to publicity being given to the claims of 
certain sections of the community resulting in stereotyped atti- 
tudes being created. For instance, the two groups mentioned most 
frequently were the lower paid and the productive workers. Both 
(1) See Hilde Behrend et al, Incomes Policy and the Individual, 
Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1967, p.42. 
(2) See Harriet Lynch, Doctors' Pay and the Public, New Society, 
25th August 1966, pp.301 -302. 
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of these groups would be likely to receive priority among pay 
claims considered by the N.B.P.I. as the Government and the T.U.C. 
had stressed the desirability of encouraging settlements which 
promoted productivity or improved the position of the low paid 
workers.(1) 
The support given to low paid groups by the respondents 
serves to show the frame of reference of many managers in answering 
the question. Many respondents considered need and the desira- 
bility of ensuring that everyone had a minimum standard of living 
as a main consideration in selecting the group they felt most 
deserved a pay increase. Others seemed to consider not so much 
the basic cost of existence but more a fair reward for effort, 
skill, training or responsibility, - For example, the nursing, 
teaching and medical professions which apparently were deemed to 
be underpaid in relation to other occupations. The respondents 
mentioning these occupations seemed to feel that a fair 
differential did not exist and this should be remedied. 
In answer to the question: "Who do you think most deserves 
a pay rise within the firm ? ", the respondents would appear to have 
been using fair differentials as their main frame of reference. 
Only a few of the respondents thought that a group with a low 
standard of living should be among the first in their firm to re- 
(1)See Cmnd.3235, p.6. 
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ceive a pay increase. 
The most interesting aspect of the answers to this question 
was that, once again, no group was mentioned by many managers 
(Table 10.1). The answer predominating above all others was that 
given by 40.7; of the respondents who said that no -one within 
their firm deserved a pay increase. The other answers ranged 
across the whole gamut of basic industrial occupations. 
The difference between the managers' answers to the questions 
concerning the country at large and their own firms raises an 
interesting point. In a hypothetical situation where the re- 
spondents were asked to decide who should receive the highest 
priority for pay increases they chose the low paid workers as 
being the most worthy recipients of such an increase. Within 
their own firms only a few managers thought that the low paid 
workers should have a pay increase before other groups and a 
large proportion of the respondents declared that no -one most de- 
served a pay increase. 
This could be due to few managers believing that their firms 
paid low wages and most managers thinking that other firms were 
those who gave a low level of remuneration to their employees. 
On the other hand it could be that a reticence to increase costs 
led the managers to believe that their firms' wage structures were 
at present quite satisfactory.(1) 
(1) See Chapter 9 in which only 31.5% of the respondents stated 
that the low paid employees in their firms should have a pay 
increase. 
Table 10.2 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
questions: (a) "Who do you think least deserve a 
pay rise within the country as a whole'?" (1) and 
(b) "Who do you think least deserve a pay rise 
within the firm ? "(2) 
Within the country as a whole - 





M.Ps, politicians 53 19.6 
Civil Servants 32 11.9 
Unproductive,idlers, unemployed 21 7.8 
Highly paid; those with adequate 
salaries; rich 17 6.3 
No -one 17 6.3 
Car assembly workers 14 5.2 
Entertainers 12 4.4 
Semi- skilled /skilled workers 9 3.3 
Dockers 7 2.6 
Other answers 52 19.3 
No answer given (including don't know) 59 21.9 
(b) Within the firm 
No -one 171 63.3 
Skilled; semi - skilled workers 27 10.0 
Slackers, idlers, unproductive 13 4.8 
Labourers; unskilled workers 11 4.1 
Other answers 27 10.0 
No answer given (including don't know) 22 8.1 
(1) There were many answers mentioning two or more groups. In 
all, there are 293 entries in the table. 
(2) 1 manager mentioned two groups and these have been treated 
as separate items. There are, therefore, 271 entries in the 
table. 
151 
Who least deserves a Pay Increase? 
Next, the respondents were asked: 
"Who do you think least deserves a 
pay increase within the country as 
a whole?" 
Again, a variety of answers was received. Only one group 
stood out above the others - that mentioned by 19.6% of the re- 
spondents who felt Members of Parliament were the last people to 
whom a pay increase should be given (Table 10.2). 
This result was similar to that of a national survey on the 
opinions of the general public conducted by Behrend et al.(1) 
during the period 28th November 1966 to 9th January 1967 in which 
22.3% of the respondents believed politicians should be at the 
end of the queue for pay increases. It was felt at that time 
that the opposition to politicians having a pay increase stemmed 
from the impact of the salary increase given to M.P.'s in 1964. 
The explanations for the managers' views seemed to bear out the 
assumptions made by Behrend et al. a year previously as several 
of those who felt politicians least deserved a pay increase did 
so because they considered that M.P.'s were overpaid or had had 
a large income increase - even although three years had elapsed 
between the time of the increase and the interviewing of the 
(1) Hilde Behrend et al., Incomes Policy and the Individual, 
Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1967, p.43. 
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managers.(1) In addition to politicians, others employed in 
governing the country, ie. Civil Servants, were considered to 
deserve a pay increase least of all, apparently due to a feeling 
that many of this group were not contributing much to the 
nation's economic progress. 
People who were labelled 'unproductive' were also, in many 
managers' opinions, low on the list of priorities for a pay in- 
crease. Some managers did not just use the generic term 'un- 
productive' but were more specific and identified occupations 
which they considered contributed little to the country's out- 
put either because of the nature of the job (entertainers) or 
due to recent troubles in the industries concerned (car assembly 
workers and dockers).(2) 
Turning to the respondents' replies to the question: "Who 
do you think least deserves a pay increase within the firm ? ", 
a reluctance to discriminate among their firms' employees was 
apparent. 63.37' of the respondents said that no -one within their 
firm should be bottom of the list for a pay increase (Table 10.2). 
Only a few managers gave a different answer, mentioning that 
their skilled or semi- skilled employees should be last to receive 
a pay rise. 
(1) After giving their answers to the question: "Who do you think 
most /least deserves a pay increase ? ", the managers were asked 
to give the reasons for their answers. Chapter 11 considers 
these explanations more fully. 
(2) There had been disputes in the car industry at various times 
in 1967, and an unofficial dock strike in London towards the 
end of 1967 had lasted for eight weeks. 
Table 10.3 
Accuracy of respondents' notions of incomes of groups 
they thought most/least deserved pay increases (a) 
within the country as a wholes (b) within their firms 
Accuracy of Respond- 
ents' notions of 
incomes 
(a) 
Within the country 
as a whole 
(Percentage of 1)+6 
answers) 
(b) 
Within the respond- 
ents' firms 
(Percentage of 75 
answers) 
Error within 10% 31.5 61.3 
Error within 11-25g 26.7 18.7 
Error more than - 25iß 29.4 5.3 
Respondent could not 
or did not give an 
estimate of the occu- 
pation's income 12.3 14.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
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The Accuracy of the kanagers' Notions of Incomes 
It would appear to be important to know whether the managers' 
views on who did or who did not deserve a pay increase were based 
on accurate or inaccurate knowledge of the actual incomes of the 
groups mentioned. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain in- 
formation on levels of pay. In only 146 cases could the managers' 
notions of pay of groups outwith their firms be checked against 
factual information(1)and in merely 75 cases could the remuneration 




The results do suggest, however, that managers have a far 
better knowledge of incomes of occupations within their firms than 
of the remuneration of occupations not connected with their daily 
work (Table 10.3). liianagers were twice as accurate in assessing 
incomes of employees within their firms to within 107; of their 
(1) The occupations mentioned in these 146 cases were those with 
published salary scales. See Appendix 45 for the income of 
the groups mentioned by the respondents. 
(2) This low figure was due partly to so many of the managers 
stating that no -one within their firm most or least deserved 
a pay increase and because none of the managers who dealt 
with their firms' wages were asked to assess the income of a 
group of their firms' employees. It was assumed that those 
who dealt with wages would have a far better knowledge of the 
pay of their companies' employees than most managers. 
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actual remuneration than they were in judging the pay of occupa- 
tions in the country as a whole.(1) At the other end of the scale 
few of the managers made an error of more than 25 per cent in 
their assessment of the pay of employees of their own firms while 
29.4% of the respondents' notions of remuneration of occupations 
outwith their firms showed an inaccuracy of this magnitude. 
The conclusion that managers knew less about the pay of 
people outwith their firms than they did about the incomes of 
their own firms' employees is not surprising. The remuneration 
of the latter would concern the managers in their day to day re- 
lations with their staff and by their proximity to any grievances 
about pay the managers' knowledge of the wage structure of their 
own firms could be expected to be reasonably good. On the other 
hand, the occupations mentioned by the respondents as most or 
least deserving a pay increase within the country as a whole were 
unlikely to be connected to the firm in any way. Information on 
these occupations would only be available from time to time in 
the mass media or would only be obtained from conversation with 
those with knowledge of the occupation concerned.(2) The managers' 
(1) If a range of salaries existed for the group, the respondent 
was asked to state the mid -point of the range. This notion 
of income was compared with the actual mid -point of the range. 
(2) Even if people have intimate knowledge of changes in pay they 
cannot always report these changes accurately. It would appear 
that some people even have difficulty in reporting changes in 
their own pay. See, for example, Einar Harding and Gerald L. 
Hershey, Accuracy of Employee Reports on Changes of Pay 
Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol.44, No.4, August 1960, 
pp.269 -275. 
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lack of knowledge of a person's income, however, did not prevent 
many respondents making a judgement about the desirability of 
awarding him a pay increase. 
This might have been due to the individual respondent having 
an 'image' of the incomes of certain occupations. The median of 
the respondents' notions of a Member of Parliament's income, 
which could be taken as the managers' collective 'image' of an 
M.P.'s pay was £3,250 - the actual level of remuneration paid to 
these politicians. While it could not be said that the 'image' 
the respondents in general had of the pay of this profession was 
a true one due to the dispersion of answers, (1 )39.6;0 of their 
answers were within 10% of an Ji.P.'s actual salary. 
The same could not be said about the respondents' 'image' of 
the income of a newly qualified nurse. The median of the managers' 
notions of the income of this profession lay well below the mid- 
point of the actual range of salaries.(2) The respondents who 
mentioned nurses said that they deserved a pay rise, yet how big 
an increase did they believe nurses deserved? A 35% pay increase 
is today considered to be almost unimaginable, yet this would 
merely bring the median of the managers' notions of the level of 
a newly qualified nurse's pay up to the middle of the grade's 
(1) The range of answers was from £1,200 to £8,000. 
(2) The range of answers was from £250 to £875. 
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range of remuneration today. (1 ) 
The managers did not always assess the income of a group 
they thought most deserved a pay increase below its actual level. 
It was hypothesised that the respondents' notions of incomes of 
groups they felt most deserved a pay increase would be lower 
than the group's actual level of income and that their notions of 
incomes of groups they felt least deserved a pay increase would 
be higher than the group's actual level of income. No evidence 
was found to support this hypothesis. Managers did not con- 
sistently assess a group's income at a level lower than its 
actual pay to emphasise their views that the group deserved a 
pay increase nor did they always judge incomes of groups which 
they felt least deserved a pay increase to be at a higher level 
than in practice. From the evidence of this survey it appeared 
that the managers quite simply had little knowledge of the in- 
comes of the groups they mentioned. 
It would seem, however, that not only lack of knowledge 
entered into the managers' notions of the income of any occupa- 
tion - factors of a more emotional nature appeared to be present. 
For example, one respondent's notion of the pay of a Member of 
Parliament was £1,200 per annum and another believed it to be 
(1) Only 14.3% of the respondents' notions of the pay of a newly 
qualified nurse were within 10% of the mid -point of the 
grade's income range. 
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£8,000, yet, despite this difference, both respondents believed 
that politicians should be the last people to receive a pay increase. 
Thus it would appear that not only were the managers' judge- 
ments of the merits of certain groups for a pay increase based on 
little knowledge but also on their attitudes towards the group. 
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CHAPTER 11 
RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON THE DET'.Stt-iINATION OF INCOiiES 
Criteria used by the -kianagers to judge the merits of a Pay Claim 
As soon as the managers decided upon the occupations they 
thought most or least deserved a pay increase they were asked the 
reason for their particular choice. 
On examination of their explanations (Table 11.1), it appears 
that the respondents used basically the same frames of reference 
to judge the merits of groups both within the country as a whole 
and within their firms. The co- efficient of concordance of all 
four columns in Table 11.1 was as high as 0.86.(1) Yet, within 
this general consistency differences did exist. 
The respondents appeared to emphasise different criteria in 
the contexts of the firm and of the country as a whole. This can 
be seen by comparing the frequency of the managers' utilisation of 
(1) The rank correlation of the criteria used by the respondents 
to judge who most deserved a pay increase within the country 
as a whole and within the firm (columns A and B of Table 11.1) 
was 0.83. The rank correlation of the criteria used by the 
respondents to judge who least deserved a pay increase within 
the country as a whole and within the firm (columns C and D 
of Table 11.1) was 0.79. 
Table 11.1 
Respondents' reasons for deciding certain groups 





Percentage of Answers Given 
(a (b) 
Most Deserved a 
Pay Increase 
(c) (d) 

























The existing level of a 
person's pay is unfair 
(pay is too high; pay is 
too low) (1) 
Pay is unfairly related 
to productivity 
Pay is unfair compared 
with that of other occu- 
pations 
Pay is unfairly related 
to the necessity of the 
job 
Pay is unfairly related 
to skill involved in the 
job 
Pay does not allow the 
group to manage if the 
cost of living rises; 
pay easily allows one 
to manage if the cost 
of living rises 
Pay is unfairly related 
to responsibility in- 


































(1) This criterion is extremely vague - pay can only be relative- 
ly high or low. Probes will have to be used in future re- 
search to discover the frame of reference used to decide 
whether an income is high or low. 
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each criterion in these two contexts - firstly in assessing who 
most deserved a pay rise and secondly in judging who least de- 
served an increase in remuneration.(1) 
It can be seen from Table 11.1 that the guidelines of the 
lev.l of a group's productivity and comparisons with other emp- 
loyments were used more frequently in percentage terms in the 
context of the firm than within the country as a whole. Conversely, 
the criterion of 'the necessity of a person's job' appears to be 
used less frequently within the firm than in the context of the 
national economy. 
Thus it would appear that more objective or tangible criteria 
in the form of productivity and comparability were used more often 
by the managers as measuring rods for income determination within 
the context of the firm than in the national situation. Conversely, 
the less quantitative yardstick of 'the necessity of a person's 
occupation was used more frequently in assessing the pay claims 
of groups unrelated to the firm than in judging the claims of the 
managers' own employees. 
Livernash(3)would appear to have noticed similar tendencies 
(1) That is by comparing column A in Table 11.1 with column B and 
column C with column D. 
(2) None of the managers defined the criterion of 'the necessity 
of a person's occupation'. 
(3) E. Robert Livernash, The Internal Wage Structure, in George W. 
Taylor and Frank C. Pierson, editors, New Concepts in Wage 
Determination, iyicGraw -Hill, New York,1957, p.152. 
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when }gay claims were proposed: 
"Close association of employees on cluster - 
type jobs creates an environment that forces 
close comparison of jobs and allows a type 
of direct comparison more meaningful than 
where jobs are less closely integrated." 
Obviously managers would be more intimately acquainted with 
the job content of occupations within their own firms than with 
the requirements of jobs in the country as a whole. This, it would 
appear, enabled the respondents to give more specific explanations 
about their choice of the groups most or least deserving a pay in- 
crease in the context of their own firms than in the case of 
occupations unrelated to the type of work undertaken in their 
firms. 
Managers' Views on Income Determination 
What people regard as a 'fair' pay increase for an occupa- 
tion will, to a great extent, depend upon its existing level of 
income. Indeed, it has been seen that some managers considered 
that merely mentioning that a group's income was high or low was 
sufficient to explain whether the group should or should not have 
a pay increase. In an attempt to discover how the managers be- 
lieved this existing rate of pay was determined, they were asked: 
"Which factors do you feel determine the level 
of a man's income today?" 
Table 11.2 
Distribution of answers to the questions:(1) 
(a) "Which factors do you feel determine the 
level of a man's income today ? "; 
(b) "Which criteria would you like to see de- 
termine the level of a man's income ? "; 
(c) "From yourexperience in industry, for what 
sort of reason do most people accept that it 
is fair that other people are paid more than 


















(Percentage of Total Sample) 
The existing level of 
a person's pay (high 
or low) 
Productivity 
Comparison with other 
occupations 
Necessity of a person's 
job 
Skill involved in a 
person's job 
Cost of living 
Responsibility in- 
volved in a job 
Supply and demand 
Bargaining power of 
the trade union 



























(1) -Piany managers mentioned more than one factor and these were 
recorded as separate items. The managers who gave no answer 
to a question have been omitted from the relevant part of the 
table. 
(2) 13.0; of the respondents in answer to this question said, 
that no reasons were acceptable to most people if others were 
paid more than they were. 
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Column A in Table 11.2 shows that a variety of answers was given 
to this question. The skill involved in a person's job, followed 
closely by the bargaining power of the trade unions were considered 
by the respondents to be the two main determinants of incomes. 
Perhaps, not unexpectedly, the latter factor was emphasised more 
by the managers who negotiated with what they described as 'mili- 
tant' trade unions rather than by those who had harmonious rela- 
tions with the unions involved in their firms.(1) 
Less frequently mentioned than these two factors of skill and 
productivity were four others - supply and demand, the industry in 
which a person worked, the cost of living, and productivity. It 
is interesting to note that, in the managers' views, productivity 
was surpassed in importance in determining incomes by the effect 
of the cost of living. If Robinson is correct in his assertion 
that a trade union's success is measured in part by its ability to 
'beat the index' (cost of living),(2)then it would appear that 
some unions, according to the respondents, have fulfilled part of 
the criterion of achievement. 
(1) Almost twice as many of those who described the unions in 
their firms as 'militant' felt that the bargaining power of 
the unions was important in determining incomes (41.5 %) than 
those who felt the unions 'did little' or were 'fair' (21.0%). 
(2) Derek Robinson, Wage Differentials over Time, Bulletin of 
Oxford University Institute of Statistics, Vol.23, No.i+, 
November 1961, p.367. 
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The respondents did not necessarily approve of all of these 
factors. Indeed, column B of Table 11.2 shows that productivity 
and skill come to the fore when the managers were asked which 
criteria they would like to see determine a man's remuneration. 
The Government would most certainly not object to pay being 
determined by the individual's level of productivity and degree 
of skill but would these guidelines be appreciated elsewhere in 
industry? To obtain the respondents' views on this issue, they 
were asked: 
"From your experience in industry, for what 
sort of reason do most people accept that it 
is fair that other people are paid more than 
they are ? "(1) 
Only three answers - skill, responsibility and productivity - 
stood out above the others. Skill, which was mentioned by twice 
as many managers as the other two factors, was considered by 101 
managers to be acceptable to most people as a reason for others 
receiving higher incomes, mainly because the difference between 
various levels of expertise was easily seen and as a higher level 
of skill was more valuable to the firm the reason for a pay 
differential was obvious. The managers believed that productivity 
was acceptable to most people largely for the same reasons as 
greater skill was recognised as a valid reason for a pay differential. 
An entirely different explanation, however, was given by the 
(1) See column C in Table 11.2 for the distribution of answers to 
this question. 
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managers who felt most people would accept the level of responsi- 
bility involved in a job as the criterion to determine its re- 
muneration; these respondents stated that many people shirked 
responsibility and accordingly were quite amenable to others who 
held posts which carried a heavy load of responsibility receiving 
a higher income. 
These findings could be of value if the incomes policy were 
to be entrusted with an additional objective. So far, the income 
policy's primary function has been to assist in improving the 
balance of payments and in curbing inflation. The policy could 
also be used, however, as an arbiter of social justice to determine 
incomes in a more equitable fashion than the system of collective 
bargaining. In this way it might be possible to reduce industrial 
strife over inequities in the pay structure both at plant and at 
national level. 
If the policy were to be given this second basic aim then the 
criteria of skill, responsibility and productivity could possibly 
be used to form the basis of the system to determine 'fair' pay 
differentials. But would this process of income determination be 
generally accepted? Indeed, would it ever be possible to de- 
termine a just wage? These questions are examined in Chapter 12. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THEORETICIANS SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INCOES POLICY 
It has been said that there are two major approaches to an 
incomes policy. One is the 'fireman's approach'; the attempt 
to influence developments of incomes in such a way that they shall 
not endanger a reasonable stability in the general level of prices. 
The other approach, the 'architect's approach', is based on the 
desire to improve living standards within the less favoured 
groups of society and to influence the distribution of incomes 
in general.(1) The use of both approaches would appear to be more 
likely to reduce industrial disputes than simply using the 
policy to contain price and income increases which could possibly 
cause resentment due to its more negative tendencies. Indeed, 
Faxén even states that if attention is paid to the 'fireman's 
approach' alone then an incomes policy could be pursued for two 
or three years at most.(2) 
The respondents in this survey have given support to both 
approaches. Their views on the economic objectives of an incomes 
policy have been discussed earlier(3)and their sympathy for the 
(1) See Hermod Skánland, Incomes Policy : Norwegian Experience, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.II, No.3, 
November 1964, p.309. 
(2) Karl Olof Faxon Incomes Policy in Sweden : Problems and De- 
velopments, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.II, 
No.3, November 1964, p.340. 
(3) See Chapters 5 -8. 
165 
plight of the lower paid worker combined with their willingness 
to allot priorities for pay increases suggest that there is a 
considerable degree of support among the respondents for the 
'architect's approach' to the policy.(1) 
For an incomes policy to consider social justice it would 
have to be concerned, Williams would suggest, with the establish- 
ment of principles of remuneration on which wages might be so 
based as to commend them to current conceptions of justice and 
equity.(2) 
These guidelines could be given by Fogarty's 'theory of the 
just wage' which he feels has been produced over centuries and 
which has four principles.(3) 
i) pay equal to the value of work - equal and maximum 
pay for equal ability; 
ii) the maintenance of status; 
iii) respect for the common good; 
iv) avoidance of compensation between conditions. 
In similar vein, Runciman(4)feels that three criteria are 
(1) See Chapters 9 and 10. 
(2) Gertrude Williams, The liyth of Fair Wages, Economic Journal, 
No.264, Vol.LXVI, December 1956, p.621. 
(3) Michael Fogarty, The Just Wage, Chapman, London, 1 961, p.11. 
(4) W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, 
Routledge and Megan Paul, London, 196-67-17.-76T:--------  , p.2 1. 
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necessary to ensure justice, these being need, merit and con- 
tribution to the common good. If these two definitions of a 
fair wage are accepted (though Williams would probably object 
to need and merit being considered together)(1)then measures of 
'value of work', 'merit' and 'contribution to the common good' 
are necessary. 
Jacques(2)does attempt to find a measure for factors such 
as these. He feels that a man cannot be rewarded equitably by 
productivity, efficiency, the strength of his trade union or 
the capacity of his industry to pay. Instead, he believes in an 
objective measure, the time span of discretion, based on the re- 
sponsibility involved in a job and has expanded this concept into 
a national scheme.(3) 
Whether responsibility is the correct criterion to measure 
the value or contribution of a man's work is debatable. What 
has to be found is a measure judged fair not necessarily because 
it is based on exact measurement but because it is accepted as 
being fair by all the parties concerned.(4) 
(1) Gertrude Williams, op.cit., p.631. 
(2) Elliot Jacques, An Objective Approach to Pay Differentials, 
The New Scientist, July 3rd 1958. 
See also Elliot Jacques, Equitable Payment, Heinemann, London, 
1961, and Elliot Jacques, iiieasurement of Responsibility, 
Tavistock Publications, London, 1956. 
(3) See Elliot Jacques, National Incomes Policy. A Democratic 
Plan, King -Hall Services, London, 1965. 
(4) See Hilde Behrend, A Fair Day's Pay, Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol.VIII, No.2, June 1961, who gives an 
example of this in the setting of factory production standards. 
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If a more stable national incomes structure is to be ob- 
tained a definition of a fair wage would have to be found and 
jobs moved into grades or clusters so that only meaningful 
differentials remained.(1) Sherif and Sherif(2)state that place- 
ment of the sanie stimulus by two different individuals will 
correspond closely if they are using the same reference frames 
or anchorage points; it would differ if the stimulus is judged 
in terms of different anchorages. Thus, if people assess the 
worth of each occupation by using the same reference frames a 
far greater possibility would exist that agreement on a fair pay 
for any occupation could be reached. But what would these frames 
of reference be? What would appear to be necessary is the dis- 
covery of criteria,firstly acceptable to most people as determin- 
ants of incomes so that strife over basic pay levels could be re- 
duced and secondly, economically viable so that the economic 
aims of the incomes policy would not have to be abandoned. In 
this way a wage could be considered to be 'fair' both morally 
and economically.(3) 
(1) Compare John Corina, The Development of Incomes Policy, 
Institute of Personnel Management, London, 1966, pp.3 + -35. 
(2) M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psycholo y, 
revised edition, Harper and Row, New York, 1956, pp.64 -6yß. 
(3) Compare Heinz Markmann, Incomes Policy in Germany : A Trade 
Union View, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.II, 
No.3, , November 196 +, p.328, who states that 'justice' in 
distribution policy may perhaps be defined as the equal 
participation, secured in the long run, of all social groups 
in the national product provided that there is no reduction 
in the efficiency of the economy and that no -one feels that 
one group has suffered compared with another. 
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In this survey the managers stated a preference for the 
criteria of productivity and skill to determine incomes and con- 
sidered that these two guidelines and the criterion of responsi- 
bility were acceptable to most people as a reason for others re- 
ceiving higher incomes.(1) Do the theorists of wage determination 
analyse the situation in the same manner? 
The belief that skill is a vital factor in determining 
income differentials has long been propounded in literature on 
remuneration. Adam Smith mentions the training aspect of a 
skilled man's working life among the five 'principal circum- 
stances' he considers while examining the merits of certain 
occupations. He does this by comparing a skilled man to an 
expensive machine on which the investment cost has to be re- 
couped and a profit made. 
"A man educated at the expense of much labour 
and time to any of those employments which re- 
quire extraordinary dexterity and skill, may 
be compared to one of those_:expensive machines. 
The work which he learns to perform, it must 
be expected, over and above the usual wages of 
common labour, will replace to him the whole 
expense of his education, with at least the 
ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. 
It must do this, too, in a reasonable time, 
regard being had to the very uncertain duration 
of human life, in the same manner as to the more 
certain duration of the machine. "(2) 
(1) See Chapter 11. 
(2) Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, Everyman edition, Dent, London, 1910, 
Vol.1, p.90. 
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Rothschild(1)and Salkever(2)also emphasise the need to 
reward an employee for the time spent in training and so do 
Ostry et al.(3)who maintain that skill differences are taken as 
the main justification in determining a worker's wage in Britain. 
Therefore there seems to be a considerable degree of support 
for skill being one of the major criteria for assessing the value 
of a person's worth. 
But how can managerial skills which involve responsibility 
be evaluated? Jacques, as already mentioned, attempts to give a 
measure for responsibility and many job evaluation schemes also 
seek to give a score to the responsibility involved in a job.(4) 
Others, however, use separate job evaluation schemes for shop 
floor workers and for management,basing the former's evaluation 
on skill and the latter's on responsibility.(5) Livernash;6)while 
feeling skill is the basic differentiating factor, admits that it 
may be debated whether skill or responsibility is the primary 
(1) K.W. Rothschild, The Theory of Wages, Blackwell, Oxford, 1954, 
pp.71 -72. 
(2) Louis R. Salkever, Toward a Theory of Wage Structure, Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, Vol.6, No.3, April 1953, p.307. 
(3) Sylvia Wiseman Ostry, H.D.J. Cole and K.G.J.C. Knowles, Wage 
Differentials in a Large Steel Firm, Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Statistics, Vol.20, No.3, August 1958. 
(4) See Anne`G. Shaw, The PurJose and Practice of Motion Stud , 
Harlequin Press, London, 19 2, p.1 9. 
(5) For an example, see J.J. Gracie, A Fair Day's Pay, Management 
Publications Trust, 1949, pp.58 -76. 
(6) H. Robert Livernash, The Internal Wage Structure, in George 
W. Taylor and Frank C. Pierson, editors, New Concepts in Wage 
Determination, McGraw -Hill, New York, 1957, p.152. 
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factor in differentiating wages in certain industries. Robertson 
feels that the difference between a skilled worker making re- 
sponsible decisions and a staff employee with a heavy load of 
responsibility is only one of degree. Thus, if an acceptable 
yardstick to determine incomes is sought, it would appear that 
some relation between the level of responsibility and the degree 
of skill must be found. 
The use of another criterion, that of productivity, is en- 
couraged by the Government and the incomes policy at present 
allows productivity bargains to be an exception to the ceiling 
of 3z1; for pay increases.(2) Economists, of course, stress the 
importance of productivity and most appear to agree that from 
the point of view of demand, marginal productivity is the chief 
factor in settling relative wage patterns.(3) 
The use of productivity as the sole yardstick for income 
determination is highly problematic.() Productivity payments do 
not correct existing inequities in the pay structure. Thus, if 
a person believes that his level of income is inequitable, he may 
(1 ) 
(1) D.J. Robertson, Factory Wage Structures and National Agree- 
ments, Cambridge University Press, 1960, p.158. 
(2) See Cmnd.3590, p.3. 
(3) See D.J. Robertson, The Determinants of Wage Structure, 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol.VII, No.1, February 
1960, p.3. 
(4) Difficulties of measuring productivity will be ignored for the 
purposes of this discussion. 
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well feel resentful of the fact that he has to work harder or 
more efficiently to secure an increase in pay. Instead, he 
probably would claim a pay increase on grounds other than pro- 
ductivity such as skill or responsibility. Nor can the criteria 
of skill or responsibility be the sole guidelines since the 
market value of the individual's contribution can scarcely be 
ignored. Clearly, as Gracie,(1)Behrend(2)and Marriott(3)state, 
there are two measurements of incomes -you have to pay a man 
according to the nature of the job, for example, for the level 
of skill or responsibility involved, and quite separately for 
the amount of effort he puts into the job. 
Thus it appears that the view of the respondents in this 
inquiry that skill, responsibility and productivity could be made 
to provide acceptable guidelines to assess the 'value of work' or 
(1) J.J. Gracie, A Fair Day's Pay, Management Publications Trust, 
1949, p.58. 
(2) Hilde Behrend, The Effort Bargain, Industrial and Labor Re- 
lations Review, Vol.10, No.4, July 1957. 
(3) R. Marriott, Incentive Payment Systems, 2nd Edition, Staples 
Press, London, 1961, p.127, quotes C.M. Baumback, Incentive 
Wage Problems in Collective Bargaining and in Arbitration, 
Bureau of Labor and Management, Research Series, No.14, 
College of Commerce, State University of Iowa, 1956, as 
saying that "another important prerequisite for the successful 
operation of a wage incentive program in any plant is internal 
consistency in the base wage structure. If base wage rates 
are out of balance, the imbalance in workers' earnings in the 
various job classifications will only be increased by a wage 
incentive systej. even if the production standards themselves 
are equitably set or 'in balance' Before any wage 
incentive system is installed, existing inequities in hourly 
base wage rates should be eliminated by sound job evaluation." 
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'merit' coincides with the views of many writers on this topic. 
Such guidelines could possibly be used to achieve at least a 
temporary consensus on the determination of a just wage and 
could accommodate both economic and social objectives of an 
incomes policy. 
Yet how could the concept of the just wage be fitted 
systematically into the existing processes of wage determination? 
Routh(1)points out that the outstanding characteristic of 
the national pay structure is the rigidity of its relationships, 
which would suggest that comparisons are continually being used. 
Ross;2)too, asserts that comparison is a powerful active force in 
wage determination and quotes Bernstein's(3)research on published 
wage -arbitration cases in support of this. An O.E.E.C. report (4) 
also declares that comparisons are important in maintaining 
differentials:(5) 
(1) Guy Routh, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906 -60, 
N.I.E.S.R., Economic and Social Studies XXIV, Cambridge 
University Press, 1965, p.147. 
(2) Arthur A. Ross, The External Wage Structure, in George W. 
Taylor and Frank C. Pierson, editors, New Concepts in Wage 
Determination, McGraw -Hill, New York, 1957, p.190. 
(3) Irving Bernstein, Arbitration of Wages, Berkeley, California; 
University of California Press, 1954, pp.28 -29, found that 
cost of living, wage comparisons and ability to pay account 
for 85 per cent of 1,027 citations by unions, employers and 
arbitrators. 
(4) William Feltner et al., The Problem of Rising Prices, 0.E.E.C., 
1961, p.53. 
(5) For a more detailed account of how comparisons of incomes are 
made, see Martin Patchen, The Choice of Wage Comparisons, 
Prentice -Hall, New Jersey, 1961, and D. Katz, Satisfaction and 
Deprivation in Industrial Life, in A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin and 
A. Ross, editors, Industrial Conflict, McGraw -Hill, New York, 
1954, who discusses some of the determinants of a worker's 
level of aspiration with respect to wages. 
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"The tendency for uniformity in negotiated 
increases clearly reflects the strength of 
the psychological, social and political 
forces making for the maintenance of ex- 
isting wage differentials." 
Could then a national wage structure be created by a more 
systematic use of comparisons? Clegg(1)gives an insight into 
the difficulties of such an operation and Flanders(2)warns that 
comparisons have been an important factor in causing inflation. 
Yet Flanders does not believe that the influence of comparisons 
should be eliminated as this would be tantamount to denying any 
role for social justice in wage settlements. 
If it is true that an incomes policy must contain some 
aspect of social justice to survive, then it seems that the 
policy would have to accommodate the forces of comparability. To 
do this, national rules to govern the uses of comparability would 
have to be drafted. 
Creating a national wage structure with 'fair' differentials(3) 
would, however, be a long term process of determining and changing 
(1) H.A. Clegg, The Scope of Fair Wage Comparisons, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol.IX, No.3, July 1961. 
(2) Allan Flanders, Collective Bargaining 
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Prescription for Change, 
Faber and Faber, London, 1967, pp. 6 . 
(3) See P. Ford The Economics of Collective Bargaining, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1958, pp.96 -104, for an interesting discussion of the 
question of 'fair differentials'. 
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existing standards of fairness. Flanders(1)believes that there 
are two starting points: 
"First, there are certain manifest inequities 
which everyone knows to be indefensible; they 
have to be corrected. Second, the use of com- 
parison has to be excluded in those cases 
where in justice it cannot be held to apply; 
this means, for example, ruling out wage in- 
creases comparable to those gained under a 
productivity agreement where no productivity 
return is forthcoming." 
From this beginning, Flanders suggests that agreed policies 
and practical rules could be evolved to determine the job content 
factors to be compared. The evolution of a system to overhaul 
the national wage structure by using comparability could possibly 
follow either of two courses. One method would be to carry out 
a national job evaluation on the basis of criteria such as skill, 
responsibility and effort, thus establishing a scale of wage 
differentials.(2) Although this method might employ criteria 
which might in themselves be generally acceptable, the weights 
assigned to almost mutually inconvertable factors such as skill, 
responsibility and effort might lead to widespread disagreement 
with the resulting formula. 
(1) Flanders, op.cit., p.57. 
(2) See John Corina, The Development of Incomes Policy, Institute 
of Personnel Management, London, 1966, pp.32 -33, who discusses 
the prospect of job evaluation being used to create a national 
wage structure. For an example of a job evaluation system 
helping to create stability in an industry's pay structure, 
see Jack Stieber, Occupational Wage Differentials in the 
Basic Steel Industry, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol.12, No.2, January 1959. 
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An alternative to a scheme involving techniques of work 
study or job evaluation would be a less sophisticated approach 
using possibly similar criteria but in which no precise measure- 
ment of job factors is needed and where the differentials between 
different jobs are assessed by general judgment. There appears 
to be support for the idea that such a method could prove to be 
successful. For instance, Dunlop(1)and Livernash(2)mention 'the 
job cluster' which they feel is a stable group of job classifica- 
tions or work assignments within a firm which are so linked to- 
gether by skill, location, custom or other technical factors 
that they have common wage -making characteristics. Livernash 
points out,(3)however, that "the relative compensation among 
broad groups is less rigorously determined by job- content com- 
parison but depends more upon general judgment as to the 
appropriate relationship ". Slichter et al.(4)feel that stability 
could be achieved where the unions objected to the use of job 
evaluation by use of "labour grade job classification" consisting 
of a few grades of jobs into which all occupations are classified 
without the use of a formal job evaluation system. 
(1) John T. Dunlop, The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory, in 
George W. Taylor and Frank C. Pierson, editors, New Concepts 
in Wage Determination, McGraw -Hill, New York, 1957, p.129. 
(2) E. Robert Livernash, The Internal Wage Structure, in George 
W. Taylor and Frank C. Pierson, editors, New Concepts in Wage 
Determination, McGraw -Hill, New York, 1957, p.14+8. 
(3) Ibid., p.1;77 
(4+) S.H. Slichter, J.J. Healy and E.R. Livernash, The Impact of 
Collective Bargaining on !-Management, The Brookings Institution, 
Washington D.C., 1960, p.561. 
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The Guillebaud Report(1)on Railway Pay considers that a 
small difference in pay is negligible and only a differential 
of 5 per cent is meaningful. Clegg, a member of the Committee, 
agrees with this and feels that human judgment could be relied 
upon to judge between the characteristics of two jobs and award 
5 per cent differentials where these jobs are 'out of line' or 
10 per cent where they are 'badly out of line'.() Sales and 
Davies(3)show that people are willing to forgo small differen- 
tials when they describe how 6,500 'different' jobs were reduced 
to 13 grades. Fogarty,(4)tco, feels that a simple structure is 
better than a subtle one even if it is less r_.recise. 
"If there is doubt about a differential it 
is better to do without it The 
burden of proof is always on those who pro- 
pose to depart from equal pay, and it is 
not expected that this will be easy to dis- 
charge." 
While some of these writers are referring to the wage 
structure of the firm and others are speaking of industrial and 
national pay structures, they seem to be coming to a basically 
similar conclusion; namely that a simple judgmental approach 
(1) Report of Railway Pay Committee of IncauirL, Special Joint 
Committee on ikiachinery of Negotiation for Railway Staff, 
London, 1960. 
(2) H.A. Clegg, The Scope of Fair Wage Comparisons, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol.IX, No.3, July 1961. 
(3) W.H. Sales and J.S. Davies, Introducing a New 'Jage Structure 
into Coal dining, Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of 
Statistics, Vol.XIX, No.3, August 1957. 
(4) l,uchael Fogarty, The Just Wage, Chapman, London, 1961, p.14. 
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for rationalising wage relativities based on crudely defined 
guidelines and creating only meaningful differentials is often 
more viable than the more complex approaches such as job evalua- 
tion. But even the simpler job grading scheme has its limita- 
tions and raises many questions that would still have to be 
solved. 
For instance, how would a scheme of job grading be imple- 
mented? would certain groups accept a cut in pay or no increase 
for years if it was generally felt that they were overpaid? How 
would the scheme fit in with the pressures of the labour market 
and free collective bargaining? In addition to problems of 
implementation, to reach agreement, many inconsistencies and 
arguments on the constituent parts of fairness will have to be 
resolved. Furthermore, if a consensus on such a policy is ob- 
tained the agreement reached would have to be reviewed periodically 
to adjust to changing circumstances (including the discovery of 
'errors' of judgment in the original gradings).(1) 
(1) Compare Karl Olaf Faxén, Incomes Policy in Sweden : Problems 
and Developments, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol.II, No.3, November 1961+, who discusses the problems 
associated with the formulation of 'equal pay for equal work' 
in terms of a job evaluation system which means a setting of 
wage rates which is adapted to the type of work and 
differences in performance, so that it corresponds to a 
stable long -term equilibrium in wage relativities within and 
between companies and branches of industries. 
178 
The major problems are, however, more fundamental. Two 
basic difficulties have to be overcome; firstly, the problem of 
obtaining general acceptance that this type of wage determination 
on a national scale is a desirable and achievable objective and 
secondly, the difficulty of reconciling the goals of social 
justice with those of fighting inflation which, to date, have 
been the major aims of Britain's incomes policy. 
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CHAPTER 13 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A government can have one of two basic attitudes towards 
a nation's processes of income determination; on the one hand 
it can adopt a laissez -faire policy and on the other it can 
pursue some form of incomes policy. 
Due to the problems engendered by inflation post -war 
governments have, from time to time, exercised some form of con- 
trol over incomes. In 1962 a new approach was made by the Con- 
servative Government which itself assumed responsibility for 
laying down criteria for income increases and instituted a 
special body (N.I.C.) to watch over their observance. The in- 
coming Labour Administration continued this process and intro- 
duced a new body (N.B.P.I.) with extended powers to watch over 
the guidelines for incomes (1965). 
The incomes policy attempts to uphold wider values than 
those defended by employers and trade unionists whose pre -war 
experiences of economic and social hardship have led to the 
championing of narrow interests leading to a neglect of certain 
elements of national welfare. In so doing, it seeks to adjust 
the old institutions of collective bargaining to the responsi- 
bilities of planning so that prices can be made more stable, 
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incomes more equitable, high employment and growth ensured and 
the balance of payments improved. To do this means changing 
the existing attitudes of employers and trade uaionists. The 
present incomes policy is but a step in a gradual process of re- 
education and experimentation leading, it is hoped, to a creation 
of order in collective bargaining. 
It was to examine the present attitude of managers towards 
the incomes policy that this research was commenced. By inter- 
viewing 270 senior managers in 85 firms in Central Scotland, an 
attempt was made to discover the extent of the managers' under- 
standing of the prices and incomes policy and furthermore their 
views on the aims and operation of the policy in relating prices 
and incomes to the economic and social objectives formulated by 
the Government. To do this, the study examined the respondents' 
views on numerous features of the policy in the hope of obtain- 
ing insights and discovering areas for future research. 
The main findings and conclusions of the report are pre- 
sented below. 
The ihianagers' Comprehension of the Prices and Incomes Policy 
and Britain's Economic Problems 
The most striking feature of the evidence in this section 
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of the study was that a large proportion of the managers inter- 
viewed had little knowledge of the wider aspects of the Govern - 
ment's economic policy. Despite the importance of the role of 
the manager in implementing the prices and incomes policy, 51% 
of the respondents had only a vague understanding or no compre- 
hension at all of its objectives. Even inflation, a topic fre- 
quently discussed in the mass media, was not well understood by 
many respondents, 64 of them having but a poor comprehension 
of the phenomenon. The managers' knowledge of one of the most 
traumatic events of recent British economic history, the de- 
valuation of 1967, was even worse - 78% of their explanations 
of the purpose of devaluation were either vague or meaningless. 
In view of these results it was, perhaps, not surprising 
to discover that the managers' knowledge of the more specific 
provisions of the prices and incomes policy - the criteria for 
pay increases, the machinery of the policy and the Government's 
reserve powers - similarly was low. 
Some of the managers, of course, had a better understanding 
of the prices and incomes policy than others. To discover whether 
any particular type of manager was better informed than any 
other an index of the level of individual manager's comprehension 
of the policy was constructed. Using this index it was dis- 
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covered that four factors appeared to be related to comprehension 
of the policy; the managers employed in larger firms, those with 
a more intensive education, those who received more information 
about the policy and those who were involved in pay negotiations 
were more likely to have a greater understanding of the policy 
than others. These findings underline the importance of manage - 
ment education and do seem to suggest that more interesting and 
meaningful information about the policy should be distributed 
to managers in the smaller firms who at present appear to know 
considerably less about economic policy than their colleagues in 
the larger firms. This, it would appear, might well raise the 
existing level of managers' knowledge about the prices and in- 
comes policy. 
Views on the Policy's Economic Aims and on its Operation 
The majority of the managers felt that the prices and in- 
comes policy could be a useful instrument of economic policy; 
60% believed that such a policy could tackle Britain's economic 
difficulties and approximately the same number thought that the 
answer to inflation could be found in the prices and incomes 
policy. Slightly fewer managers thought that they would prefer 
a system of planning incomes to free collective bargaining. 
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In each of the above cases more support for the prices and 
incomes policy appeared to come from the managers with greater 
knowledge of the policy than from other respondents. This 
suggests that closing the communication gap between the Govern- 
ment and management is very important if increased support for 
the policy is desired. Unlike many other Government policies 
the prices and incomes policy, in trying to control innumerable 
transactions and agreements, depends to a large extent upon its 
acceptance by the public at large. The co- operation of managers 
is even more important than that of the general public as they 
alone often have to make decisions concerning price and income 
increases. It would appear important, therefore, that the 
Government should convince substantially more than the 60% of the 
managers who at present support the policy that it can help the 
nation to attain its economic objectives. 
At present, a certain conflict of opinions about the extent 
of the Government's involvement in the processes of collective 
bargaining appears to exist. i,iany managers seem to believe that 
the Government should watch over the bargaining system while 
others prefer autonomy in pay negotiations through fear of a 
surfeit of government interferences in the labour market. To 
increase the prospects of the policy's success this opposition 
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would have to be reduced. Even if, as 81% of the respondents 
believed, a policy backed by legislation was considered to be 
essential, the Government's need for the support of management 
would not be diminished. In this case, unless the policy had 
sufficient support, the problem of enforcing any sanctions would 
be virtually insurmountable. 
An indication was given for the belief that support for 
the policy could be increased. For, although 57? of the managers 
considered that the prices and incomes policy had been unsuccess- 
ful, half of the respondents felt that in their role as private 
citizens they would be better off and a similar percentage be- 
lieved that their job as a manager would be easier if the policy 
were to be successful. Only about 10iß of the respondents in 
each case believed that a successful policy would be disadvan- 
tageous to them. 
Looking ahead it was seen that only a few of the respond- 
ents (12 %) believed that an incomes policy ought never to be 
used. The great majority of the managers appeared to think that 
there was a definite place for a prices and incomes policy in 
the future; LI-8c felt that the policy should only be used at 
times of economic crisis but 39 even seemed to prefer it to 
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be a permanent mechanism to determine movements in prices and 
incomes. It did appear, however, that many of the managers 
envisaged different controls in the future; 44% thought con- 
trols on prices should be increased and 30% said restraints on 
incomes should be tightened. The greater support for more severe 
controls on prices could be a measure of the manager's frustra- 
tion in his role as a consumer caused by the rise in the cost 
of living.(1) On the other hand, the lesser support for increased 
controls on incomes, the disapproval of 44 ¡ó of the managers of 
restraints on their own incomes, and the support of 69% for 
pay increases being related to the cost of living could all be 
symptomatic of the lack of understanding of inflation existing 
among the managers. 
Opinions on Incomes and Social Justice 
Social justice in the national pay structure has two main 
aspects. On the one hand, it is concerned with improving the 
(1) Productivity Prices and Incomes : A General Review 1268, 
N.E.D.O., London, 1969, states that retail prices rose by 
about 5k% in the 12 months from the last quarter in 1967 to 
the last quarter of 1968. During the same period the report 
states that earnings (according to the D.E.P.'s monthly 
survey) rose by 8% in this period though, according to 
national income estimates, wages and salaries per head rose 
by about 64% in the saine period. 
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position of those in need and, on the other, it is involved in 
ensuring that the remuneration for any job is determined 
equitably. 
Since most respondents seemed willing to give priority 
for pay increases to certain groups or occupations it would 
seem that there would be little objection to the incomes policy 
differentiating between groups. As the respondents frequently 
mentioned the lower paid occupations as those deserving pay 
increases and 75% supported the Government's view that these 
groups merit priority for pay increases, it would seem that the 
incomes policy's objective of furthering social justice by 
improving the position of the lower paid would be supported by 
the managers in general. Indeed, 56% of them approved of a 
national minimum wage. 
Other groups mentioned by the managers as those deserving 
priority for pay increases were those where the case for an in- 
crease involved the question of fair differentials for training 
and responsibility. 1,1oreover, the managers' views that skill, 
responsibility and productivity would be generally accepted as 
equitable bases for determining incomes might be an indication 
that an extension of fair comparisons based on some form of job 
content analysis to determine a 'just wage' might not be impossible, 
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albeit extremely difficult, in the future. 
Closing the Communication Gap 
Britain's economic recovery lies in the hands of both the 
Government and industry. In realising that Britain's prosperity 
could be assured only by higher production and competitive ex- 
ports, the Government introduced their prices and incomes policy 
in an attempt to control inflation and encourage productivity. 
Yet, without the support of industry this policy would be in- 
effective. 
Frequently this report has shown that many managers do 
not fully appreciate the Government's intentions in introducing 
the policy yet there seems to be an underlying support for the 
policy, coming mainly from those with more knowledge of prices 
and incomes policy and of the economic situation. It would 
appear that the Government could profitably conduct research 
to discover which aspects of the policy are regarded favourably 
and which are opposed, who are the supporters and opponents of 
the policy, where the gap in communication lies and by which 
means it can be closed. Aubrey Jones himself expressed similar 
views when he stated that one of the objectives of the prices 
and incomes policy was: 
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....to ensure that citizens and Government 
are less out of tune with each other in the 
sense that if citizens reacted against 
action by a Government out of a feeling of 
inequity, either that inequity is put right 
or its rationale is clarified so that it is 
more easily tolerated. "(1 ) 
This feeling of inequity must first be identified and 
located. Only then can the Government take remedial action, 
such as making alterations to the ?policy to remove the injustice 
or increasing the flow of meaningful information to explain 
their viewpoint to the relevant sectors of the community such 
as the managers in smaller firms who received less information 
than managers in larger firms and were less in favour of the 
prices and incomes policy. By means such as these a basis 
could be laid for a deeper understanding between management and 
the Government. From the findings of this survey, the narrowing 
of the communication gap at present existing between the Govern- 
ment and many of those implementing its policy could lead to a 
greater willingness to co- operate;2)thereby increasing the pro- 
(1) Aubrey Jones, Prices and Incomes Policy, Economic Journal, 
No.312, Vol.LXXVIII, December 1968, p.804. 
(2) See also Hilde Behrend, Ann Knowles and Jean Davies, Have 
you heard the Phrase 'Productivity Bargain'? Findings from 
two National Sample Surveys, article to be published in The 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, November 1969, who 
show that those with more understanding of productivity 
bargains are more willing to agree to changes in their work 
in return for extra money. 
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spects of the attainment of the Government's social and economic 
objectives. 
At present the means the Government will use to attempt 
to achieve these goals are unclear and the future of the prices 
and incomes policy appears to be uncertain. (1) This is a time 
in which many economic policies(2)and their inter- relation- 
ships(3)are being questioned. In the short term the prices and 
incomes policy may not have realised many early expectations 
of success but the policy's answer to the problem of economic 
growth without inflation lies more in the long tern in creating 
a consensus on social valuations and in educating the community 
to look beyond their own sectional interests, rather than in 
short tern prices and incomes restraint. In the short term, 
(1) See David Watt, How Voluntary an Incomes Policy, Financial 
Times, June 6th 1969, p.19, who suggests that the Govern- 
ments control over the policy is going to be abandoned in 
November 1969. 
(2) See Aubrey Jones, op.cit., pp.800 -803. 
(3) See British Industry 'v'eek, July 4th 1969, p.1, and The 
Financial Times, July 16th 1969, p.16. 
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the policy will occasionally involve two steps forward and one 
back,(1)the judgment on its success can only be made in the 
years to come. 
(1) See John Carina, The Development of Incomes Policy, 
Institute of Personnel i4.anagement, London, 1966, p.54. 
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APPENDIX 1 
FIRST REQUEST FOR CO- OPERATION SENT TO THE 
GENERAL MANAGER OF THE SELECTED FIRM 
Dear Sir, 
I am writing in connection with a survey I am undertaking for 
a Ph.D. thesis entitled 'Management and Incomes Policy'. 
This survey is an éxtension of research conducted under the 
direction of Dr. H. Behrend, a senior lecturer in this department. 
Dr. Behrend's previous research into the general public's opinions 
on inflation and incomes policy has already received wide attention 
from academics and some members of the National Board for Prices 
and Incomes including Mr. Aubrey Jones. As we felt that manage- 
ment have, to a large extent, to bear the brunt of implementing an 
incomes policy we decided to try to obtain their views and opinions 
on such a policy. We hope that from our findings we will be able 
to show how management regard incomes policy. 
I would be most grateful if you could help us with this re- 
search by allowing me to come and visit your firm within the next 
five weeks to interview possibly six senior managers for about 45 
minutes each, using a simple yet comprehensive questionnaire, to 
obtain their views and suggestions about incomes policy. The 
information and opinions given will, of course, be treated strictly 
anonymously and managers and firms will not be identified in any 
report. 
Your firm was one of eighty in Fife, the Lothians, Edinburgh 
and Glasgow picked out for this survey by a random sampling tech- 
nique designed to enable us to obtain the views of the managers of 
larger (100 + employees) and smaller (11 - 99 employees) firms. 
I hope I can count on your co- operation in the survey to enable us 
to present a representative section of executives' opinions on one 
of the major problems the country is facing today. 
Hoping to hear from you, 
Yours sincerely, 
DAVID P. TWEEDIE 
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APPENDIX 2 
SECOND REQUEST FOR CO- OPERATION SENT TO THE 
GENERAL MANAGER OF THE SELECTED FIRM 
Dear Sir, 
I wrote to you a few weeks ago in connection with a survey 
entitled 'Management & Incomes Policy'. In this letter I asked 
if it would be possible for me to visit the firm and interview 
possibly six /three of your senior managers. Each interview takes 
about 45 minutes and involves the use of a simple yet comprehens- 
ive questionnaire. 
I realise that you must be extremely busy and I appreciate 
how difficult it must be for managers to see me. most of the 
firms in the sample are going to help us and I wondered if you 
could find the time to allow me to visit you in the next few 
weeks to enable me to complete the survey. 
Hoping to hear from you, 
Yours sincerely, 
DAVID P. TWEEDIE 
1 9 '3 
APPENDIX 3 
INDUSTRIES SELECTED FOR SURVEY 
NUMBER OF FIRMS VISITED IIf EACH iviINIMUIvl LIST HEADING 
(Orders and Minimum List Headings 
taken from the Standard Industrial 










III Food, Drink and Tobacco 
213 Biscuits 1 
215 Milk Products 2 
216 Sugar 2 
217 Cocoa, Chocolate and 
Sugar Confectionery 2 




IV Chemicals and Allied 
Industries 
272 Pharmaceutical and Toilet 
Preparations - 
275 Vegetable and Animal Oils, 
Fats, Soaps and Deterg- 
ents 2 
277 Polishes, Gelatine, Ad- 
hesives, etc. - 
IX Metal Goods not Elsewhere 
Specified 
396 Jewellery, Plate and Re- 
fining of Precious Metals - 
X Textiles 
419 Carpets 1 
XII Clothing and Footwear 
442 Men's and Boys' Tailored 
Outerwear 2 
445 Dresses, Lingerie, Infant 







Hats, Caps and Millinery 




Printing, Publishing of 
Newspapers & Periodicals 
Other Manufacturing Indus- 
tries 
















Coke Ovens and Manufactured 
Fuel 
Mineral Oil Refining 
Chemicals and Dyes 
Explosives and Fireworks 
Paint and Printing Ink 
Synthetic Resins and 
Plastic Materials 2 
V Metal Manufacture 
311 Iron and Steel (General) 2 
312 Steel Tubes 1 
313 Iron Castings, etc. 2 
VI Engineering and Electrical 
Goods 
331 Agricultural Machinery 
(except tractors) 1 
332 Metal Working Machine Tools 3 
334 Industrial Engines 
335 Textile Machinery and 
Accessories 2 
338 Office Machinery 
342 Ordnance and Small Arms apt 
352 Watdhes and Clocks 
362 Insulated Wires and 
Cables 





























Locomotives and Railway 
Track Equipment 
Railway Carrigges, Wagons 
and Trams 
Metal Goods not Elsewhere 
Specified 
Tools and Implements 
Textiles 
Production of Man -Made 
Fibres 
Spinning & Doubling of 
Cotton, Flax & leían -Made 
Fibres 
Weaving of Cotton, Linen 
and Man -Made Fibres 
Woollen and Worsted 
Jute 
Textile Finishing 
Bricks, Pottery, Glass, 
Cement, etc. 




Timber Furniture etc. 
Wooden Containers & Baskets 
Paper, Printing & Publishi 
Cardboard Boxes, Cartons 
and Fibre -Board Packing 
Cases 




















EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 
Percentage of Total Employees Employed in Minimum List Heading 489, 
"Other Printing, Publishing, Bookbinding, Engraving etc:".: 
Great Britain, June 1967 
Total Employees in "Other Printing, 
Publishing, Bookbinding, Engraving, 
etc." 259,700 
Total Employees in all industries and 22,828,000 - 
services 
Percentage of Total Employees Employed in Minimum List Heading 489, 
"Other Printing, Publishing, Bookbinding, Engraving etc." : 
Edinburgh and Glasgow, June 1967. 
Edinburgh(1) 
Total Employees in "Other Printing, 
Publishing, Bookbinding, Engraving, 
etc." 4 8 - 2.2% 
Total Employees in all industries and 222,545 
services 
Glasgow(2) 
Total Employees in "Other Printing, 
Publishing, Bookbinding, Engraving, 
etc." 8 41- - 1.6% 
Total Employees in all industries and 508,561 
services 
(1) Includes Edinburgh, Leith and Portobello Employment Exchange 
Areas. 
(2) Includes Glasgow Central, Glasgow South Side, Bridgeton, Govan, 
Hillington, Kinning Park, Maryhill, Parkhead, Partick and 
Springburn Employment Exchange Areas. 
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Percentage of Total Employees Employed in Manufacturing Industries 
(Orders III -XVI) : Edinburgh and Glasgow, June 1967 
Edinburgh 
Total Employees in manufacturing 
industries 
Total Employees in all industries 222,545 
and services 
Glasgow 
Total Employees in manufacturing 
industries 






Industries Employed in Percentage of Employees in Manufacturing 






Total Employees in "Paper Printing 
and Publishing" 






Total Employees in "Paper Printing 
and Publishing" 
Total Employees in manufacturing 
industries 
Source : Department of Employment and Productivity. 
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Number of Interviews in Each 
Firm 
1 2 3 Total 
Large (1000+ 
persons) 5 1 - - - 1 3 24 
Medium (250 -999 
persons) 15 - 2 - 1 1 11 79 
Medien (100 -249 
persons) 16 4 3 2 2 - 5 54 
Small (11 -99 
persons)* 49 9 16 24 113 
Total 85 14 21 26 3 2 19 270 
* At a maximum three interviews only were 
conducted in small firms. 
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APFEìvDIX 6 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE USED NOR THE SURVEY 
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
DEPARTmE vT ON BUSINESS STUDIES 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
As you may know I am particularly interested in prices 
and incomes policy, and I would like to hear how you 
feel about the policy; 
1(a) Is this a topic you discuss here quite a bit or not? 
YES /NO 
(b) If prices and incomes policy is discussed 
On any particular occasions? 
2. Do you follow prices and incomes policy in discussions or 
articles in the mass media (T.V., radio, newspapers, 
magazines) or not? 
YES /NO 
3(a) Have you been given any official pamphlets on the Govern- 
ment's prices and incomes policy at work, or not? 
YES /NO 
(b) If yes, can you remember from whom? (Give card No.1) 
(i) T.U.C. handouts 
(ii)C.B.I. 
(iii)Any other employers federation (which) 
(iv) Your own management 
(v) Trade Union handout (which union) 
(vi) Ministry of Labour 
(vii) Department of Economic Affairs 
(viii) Board of Trade 
(ix) Other 
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(c) On the whole, did you get the impression this literature 
was in favour of the policy or against it? 
FOR /AGAINST 
4(a) In the light of what you have read or heard; what would 
you say are the objectives of the Government's prices and 
incomes policy? 
(If informant answers 'to stop prices and incomes 
rising' ask what is the purpose of stopping prices 
and incomes rising) 
(b) What machinery or organisations exist to carry the Govern- 
ment's prices and incomes policy into effect? 
5(a) Who or what do you think has been mainly responsible for 
our economic difficulties which have led the Government to 
the idea of prices and incomes planning? 
(If the respondent answers 'inflation'skip to Q.6) 
(b) Do you think a prices and incomes policy can tackle these 
economic problems? 
YES /NO (Note additional comments) 
(c) If no, How could these economic difficulties be tackled? 
6. One of the (other) objectives of prices and incomes policy 
(as you have said) is to combat inflation. What does the 
term inflation mean to you? 
7(a) Do you think that there is too much fuss about inflation or 
is it important to stop it? 
IMPORTANT 
TOO MUCH FUSS 
OTHER 
(b) If important, do you think a prices and incomes policy is 
the way to tackle inflation? 
YES /NO (Note additional comments) 
(c) If no, in what way do you think inflation should be tackled? 
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8(a) Where does devaluation come in all this - what good can it 
do Britain? 
(b) Do you know if your firm has granted any wage claims since 
devaluation? 
YES /NO 
(c) If yes, on what grounds? 
9(a) Have the Government's prices and incomes policies had any 
lasting effect on this firm's thinking and planning of wages? 
YES /NO /D. K. 
(b) If yes, what effect? 
(c) How easy or difficult has it been to implement the Govern- 
ment's prices and incomes policy? 
(d) Is it becoming more difficult to co- operate with the Govern- 
ment in its prices and incomes policy? 
YES /NO 
(e) If yes, in what way? 
1.0(a) Do you think that a prices and incomes policy can be 
successful on a voluntary basis? 
YES /NO /D.K. 
(b) If yes, how can it be made to work voluntarily? 
(c) If no, why do you think it cannot be successful on a 
voluntary basis? 
11(a) In general, do you think it is essential for the Government 
to have compulsory powers for a prices and incomes policy 
to operate successfully? 
YES /NO /D. K. 
(b) If yes, why? 
(c) If no, why not? 
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12(a) In general, do you approve or disapprove if the Government 
has compulsory powers for a prices and incomes policy? 
APPROVE /DISAPPROVE /D.K. 
(b) If approve, why? 
(c) If disapprove, why? 
13(a) Does the Government still hold reserve powers or is the 
present policy purely voluntary? 
RESERVE POWERS/PURELY VOLUNTARY/D.K. 
(b) If reserve powers, what are they? 
(If respondent replies 'don't know' to ß.13(a) 
explain that the Act is a bit confusing and the 
question was asked to see how many people had 
understood it) 
14. What would be your reaction if the Government attempted to 
stop a pay increase being given to you by the firm? 
15(a) Given that most firms co- operate, what do you think should 
be done about any firm or the managers of the firm if the 
firm deliberately disobeyed any Government order forbidding 
the firm to pay a wage increase? 
(b) If respondent replies 'nothing' ask: what do you think the 
other firms who obeyed the policy would do about -this? 
(c) For all informants: Do you know of any penalties which the 
Government can legally impose if a firm defies an order to 
stop a wage increase? 
16(a) Are there any bodies other than the Government who you 
feel could be capable of controlling a prices and Incomes 
policy? 
YES /NO /D. K. 
(b) If yes, whom? (If 'NO /D.K.' skip to Q.16(d) 
(c) Would you prefer that this body takes over-the responsibility 
for the implementation of the prices and incomes policy 
rather than the Government? 
YES /NO /D.K. (Note additional 
comments) 
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(d) For all informants: How do you feel about the idea that a 
tripartite council composed of T.U.C. members, C.B.I. members 
and neutral members (academics or judges) should take over 
responsibility for an incomes policy rather than the 
Government - Do you approve or disapprove? 
APPROVE/DISAPPROVE/D.K. 
(e) If disapprove, why? 
If approve ask Q.16(f), if disapprove ask Q.17 
(f) Would it be essential for this body to have compulsory 
powers, backed by the Government if necessary, to enforce 
its decisions? 
YïS/NO/D.K. 
(g) If yes, why? 
(h) If no, why not? 
(i) For all informants answering Q.16(f): Would you approve of 
disapprove of such a body getting compulsory powers? 
APPROVE /DISAPPROVE /D. K. 
If we could now turn to the question of wage increases; 
17. Who do you think most deserves a pay rise 
(a) Within the country as a whole? 
(b) Why? 
(c) How much do they earn now? 
(d) Within the firm? 
(e) Why? 
(f) How much do you think 
Income per annum 
(middle of range) 
they earn now? (Average income per 
annum. 
Check with Wages De- 
partment) 
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18. Who do you think least deserves a pay increase 
(a) Within the country as a whole? 
(b) Why? 
(c) How much do they earn now? 
(d) Within the firm? 
Income per annum 
(kiddie of range) 
(e) Why? 
(f) How much do you think they earn now? (Average income per 
annum. 
Check with Wages De- 
partment) 
19. The Government has 
increases over the 
(a) Which criteria are 
increases? 
laid down a number of criteria for pay 
years; 
now accepted by the Government for pay 
(b) Of which type of increases do the Government, on the whole, 
disapprove? 
20(a) Do you think a man's income should rise if the cost of 
living rises? 
YES /NO /D.K. 
(If 'NO' skip to Q.20(e) 
(b) If yes, why? 
(c) Why, do you think, doesn't the Government approve of 
income rising as the cost of living rises? 
(d) If respondent mentions'inflation': Do you think the case 
for an incomes rise outweighs these problems? 
YES/NO/D.K. (Now skip to Q.20(f) 
(e) If no, why not? 
(f) Does your firm take the Retail Price Index into account 
when pay increases are being determined? 
YES /NO /D.K. 
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21(a) How do you feel about the statement in a Government White 
Paper which stated that less regard should be paid to such 
factors as general comparisons with other employments when 
considering pay increases? 
(Show card No.2) 
(i) Very much in agreement with the statement 
(ii) Agree with the statement 
(iii) No feelings either way 
(iv) Disagree with the statement 
(v) Very much in disagreement with the statement 
(b) Why? 
(c) Why, do you think, does the Government object to this as a 
criterion for income increases? 
22(a) According to the Government, the lower paid workers have a 
strong case for consideration for a pay increase. Do you 
agree? 
YES /NO /D. K. 
(b) If yes, why? 
(c) If no, why not? 
(d) How would you define a lower paid worker? (male adult) 
(Note if the informant asks whether or not the 
worker has a f amilj) 
(i) In terms of pay? £ per week 
(Note whether this is basic rate 
basic rate less tax 
basic rate including bonus, 0/T 
basic rate including bonus, 0/T less 
tax) 
(ii) In terms of occupation? 
(e) In your view do the lower paid workers in your organisation 
have a strong case for a consideration for a pay increase? 
YES /NO /D. K. 
(f) Who are the lower paid in your organisation? 
(g) What do they earn? (Check with Wages Department) 
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23(a) If a national minimum wage were to be introduced today, 
what do you think this wage ought to be for a male adult 
working a basic 40 hour week with no overtime or other 
benefits? 
(Note if informant asks if the worker has a family) 
(b) Why did you choose this figure? 
(c) Do you think that there ought to be a national minimum wage? 
YES /NO /D.K. 
(d) If yes,, why? 
(e) If no, why not? 
(f) For all informants: Do you think a national minimum wage 
will cause any particularly tricky problems? 
YES /NO /D. K. 
(g) If yes, what are these problems? 
24. Which factors do you feel determine the level of a man's 
income today? 
25. Which criteria would you like to see determine the level 
of a man's income? 
26(a) From your experience in industry, for what sort of reason 
do most people accept that it is fair that other people are 
paid more than they are? 
(b) Why? 
If we could now return to the question of the prices and 
incomes policy; 
27(a) While the country has a prices and incomes policy, do you 
think it ought to apply to all firms or should some be 
exempt? 
ALL FIRMYMS /SOME EXEMPT /D. K. 
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(b) If all firms, why? 
(Now skip to Q.28(a) 
(c) If some exempt, which type of firm should be exempt? 
(d) Why? 
(e) Do you think your firm should be exempt? 
YES /NO /D. K. 
(f) If yes,, why? 
(g) If no, why not? 
28(a) Can your firm do anything to improve the nation's economic 
situation? 
YES /NO /D. K. 
(If 'NO' skip to Q.28(e) 
(b) If yes, what? 
(c) Is the firm going to do this in the future? 
(d) If no, why not? 
(e) If no, why not? 
29(a) What effect do you think the last pay award had on your 
profits? 
INCREASE /DECREASE /NO EFFECT 
(b) For increase, why? 
(c) For decrease, why? 
(d) For no effect, why? 
(e) In general, do you feel that your firm has to raise its 
prices when it pays a 5% wage increase - or not? 
RAISE PRICES /DOES NOT RAISE PRICES /D.K. 
(note additional comments) 
Additional comments (if any):- 
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30(a) What advantages, if any, are there for your firm in the 
Government's pursuance of a prices and incomes policy? 
(b) What disadvantages, if any, are there for your firm in the 
Government's pursuance of a prices and incomes policy? 
31(a) How do you think a successful prices and incomes policy 
would affect your work as a manager? 
(Show card No. a) (i) It would be easier 
(ii) It would not be affected 
(iii) It would be more difficult 
(iv) I don't know 
(b) How do you think a successful prices and incomes policy 
would affect you as a private citizen? 
(Show card No.4) (i) I should be better off 
(ii) I should not be affected 
(iii) I should be worse off 
(iv) I don't know 
(Explain if asked that 'successful' is defined 
as meeting the Government's own objectives) 
32(a) If there were to be no prices and incomes policy, do you 
think that there is some way in which the national interest 
can be considered explicitly in the formulation of a 
collective bargaining agreement between management and 
trade unions? 
(Show card No.5) 
(b) If yes, how? 
(c) If no, why not? 
YES/A-0/D.K. 
33(a) Which would you rather see: - 
(i) Some planning of incomes with guide lines laid down 
by the Government 
(ii) A return to free collective bargaining 
(b) If guide lines, why? 
(c) If free collective bargaining, why? 
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34. How would you like prices and incomes policy to be used 
in the future: - 
(Show card No.6) 
(i) A permanent mechanism for determining movements in 
prices and incomes 
(ii) A temporary measure to be used at times. of economic 
crisis 
(iii) A policy which ought never to be used. 
35(a) Do you feel that the Government's prices and incomes 
policy has been successful to date, or not? 
SUCCESSF UL /UN UCCES3FUL /D. K. 
(b) If successful, why? 
(c) If unsuccessful, why not? 
36(a) How do you feel about the role of the Government and its 
policy on prices? 
(i) The Government needs to take more control over prices 
(ii) The Government needs to take the same control over 
prices as it has at present 
(iii) The Government needs to take less control over prices 
(iv) The Government needs to have no control over prices 
(v) Don't know 
(b) If (i), why? 
(c) If (ii), why? 
(d) If (iii), why? 
(e) If (iv), why? 
37(a) How do you feel about the role of the Government and its 
policy on incomes. 
(i) The Government needs to take more control over incomes 
(ii) The Government needs to take the same control over 
incomes as it has at present 
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(iii) The Government needs to take less control over incomes 
(iv) The Government needs to have no control over incomes 
(v) Don't know 
(b) If (i), why? 
(c) If (ii), why? 
(d) If (iii), why? 
(e) If (iv), why? 
38(a) What, if anything, do you see as the chief obstacle to the 
effective working of the Government's prices and incomes 
policy? 
(b) If somethin, why is this likely to prevent the policy 
working effectively? 
(c) What could be done to prevent this happening? 
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BACKGROUND IN?OaMATION 
The Firm The Manager 




Size of firm Terminal Education 
Large Senior Secondary School 





Under 30 years 
31 - 40 
41 - 50 
51+ 




Continuous flow None 
One off 
Other 
Branches of firm Involvement in pay disputes 
Scotland only Direct 
Britain Indirect 
Abroad No involvement 
None No disputes 
Age of firm Type of Trade Union (Manager's 
Assessment) 
1 - 10 years 
11 - 25 












Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the question: 
"In the light of what you have read or heard, what would 
you say are the objectives of the Government's prices and 
incomes policy ?" 





To hold prices stable as productivity 
catches up or to get workers to produce 
42 15.6 more for higher wages 
To control inflation /the wage -price spiral 37 13.7 
To'balance' the economy and other vague 
statements about the economy 29 10.7 
Respondents 'did not know' or gave no de- 
scription of the objectives of the policy 25 9.3 
Meaningless or incorrect answers 24 8.8 
To stop wages and prices rising (no re- 
lationship expressed) 23 8.5 
To stop prices rising 23 8.5 
To improve the balance of payments 23 8.5 
To maintain our competitiveness abroad or 
20 7.4 
to increase exports by keeping wages/ 
prices at a level which does not price 
our goods out of world markets 
To get the country on its feet /out of the 
mess it is in and similar vague statements 12 4.4 
To stop wages rising 9 3.3 
To maintain our competitiveness abroad or 
7 2.6 
to increase exports by keeping wages/ 
prices at a level which does not price 
our goods out of world markets - by in- 
creasing productivity to keep wages /prices 
down 
To make people work harder /increase pro- 
ductivity 6 2.2 
Ten of the 270 managers asked the question mentioned two items 
separately and these have been recorded as separate items. There 
are, therefore, 280 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 8 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
question: "What does the term inflation mean to you: "(1) 






Money losing value; buying power of the 
pound sterling falling 67 24.8 
Rising prices /cost of living rising 64 23.7 
Wages must be related to increased pro- 
ductivity; to increase the standard of 
living we must increase productivity 58 21.5 
Britain not paying its way; balance of 
payment problems 47 17.4 - 
Something to do with the value of money/ 
quantity of money /high prices or simi- 
larly badly expressed comments about 
relevant variables; measures taken to 
control inflation 27 10.0 
Spiral of increasing wages and prices 17 6.3 
Prices and incomes are out of step with 
production or affect the balance of 
trade; wages are too high for product- 
ion which affects the balance of trade 16 5.9 
No answer given 10 3.7 
Wages, prices and production or quantity 
7 2.6 
of money and production are out of step 
and affect the balance of trade 
(1) 43 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 313 items in the table. 
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APPENDIx 9 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
question: "Where does devaluation come in all this 
- what good can it do Britain ? "(1) 






To reduce export prices /to improve exports 99 36.7 
To improve our competitive position abroaa 
/the balance of payments 31 11.5 
To strengthen the pound sterling; to get 
the currency into equilibrium with others 28 10.4 
To improve our competitive position abroac 
/to improve balance of payments by in- 
creasing exports /reducing export prices 
or decreasing imports /increasing import 
28 10.4 prices 
To increase exports /reduce export prices 
and to decrease imports /increase import 
prices 22 8.1 
Vague answers, eg. to help the economy/ 
country; to pay our way 20 7.4 
No answer given 20 7.4 
Meaningless answers 18 6.7 
To improve our competitive position abroad 
/to improve the balance of payments by in- 
creasing import prices /reducing imports 
and by decreasing export prices /increasing 
10 3.7 exports 
To increase import prices /to reduce 
imports 3 1.1 
(1) 9 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate answers. There are, 
therefore, 279 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 10 
The Criteria laid down by Governments 
over the years since the War 
The use of criteria for income increases really began 
seriously with the Labour Government's White Paper, "Statement 
on Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices "(1)which stated that each 
claim 
and that 
"must be considered on its national merits 
and on the basis of maintaining a former 
relativity between different occupations 
and industries" 
"there is no justification for any general 
increase of individual money incomes 
unless accompanied by a substantial increase 
in production, it would drive up prices and 
charges.(2) 
It is essential, therefore, that there should 
be no further general increase in the level 
of personal incomes without a corresponding 
increase in the volume of production. "(3) 
The Attlee Government was not, however, prepared to interfere 
further than to state these general principles and certainly did 
not intend to make and enforce judgements on its criteria. 
" It is not desirable for the Government 
to interfere directly with the incomes of 
individuals other than by taxation. To go 
further would mean that the Government would 
be forced itself to assess and regulate all 
personal incomes according to some scale 
which would have to be determined. This 
would be an incursion by the Government into 
what has hitherto been regarded as a field 
of free contract between individuals and 
organisations." ( -) 
(1) Statement on Personal Incomes Costs and Prices 
H.M.S.O., London, 19 
(2) Ibid, p.3. 
(3) Ibid, p.2 
(4) Ibid, p.3 
Cmd.7321, 
219 
The general aim in the 1948 White Paper was to stress the 
necessity of wage increases being comparable to production in- 
creases. This was endorsed by the Council on Prices, Productivity 
and Incomes(1)which also stated that there was a need to adjust 
the rise in money incomes to that of productivity. This guide- 
line of the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes was 
followed quickly by the beginnings of the incomes policy as we 
know it today set out in a White Paper issued by the Conservative 
Government in 1962. Besides setting a norm of 2 -22 per annum 
for wage and salary increases, this White Paper(2)gave the criteria 
for payment increases as increased productivity and increases in 
pay to attract labour to certain industries. The White Paper, 
setting out the terms of reference for the National Incomes 
Commission, gave a more detailed description of these criteria(3) 
and stated that the N.I.C., in considering pay claims, was to 
have regard to 
"(a) the desirability of keeping the rate of increase of 
the aggregate of monetary incomes within the long - 
term rate of increase of national production; 
(b) the desirability of paying a fair reward for the 
work concerned; 
(c) the manpower needs of the service, industry or 
employment concerned, taking into account any 
regional or local differences in such needs, and 
the importance of securing the most efficient de- 
ployment and use of national resources including 
manpower 
The first and third criteria above were also mentioned in the 
Wilson Administration's White Paper,'Prices and Incomes Policy' 
(1) Council on Prices Productivity and Incomes, Fourth Report, 
H.M.S.O., London, 19 1, p.27. 
(2) Incomes Folic : The Next Ste ,Cmnd.1626, H.M.S.O., London, 
19 2, p. 
(3) National Incomes Commission, Cmnd.1844, H.M.S.O., London, 
9C] r 
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(April, 1965) which defined the second criteria mentioned above as 
appertaining to lower paid workers and to situations where there 
is a widespread recognition that the pay of a group of workers had 
fallen seriously out of line with workers doing a similar job and 
this situation needed to be improved in the national interest. 
The 1965 White Paper laid down a growth norm of 3 -3ft% per annum 
for incomes though this was to be re- examined from time to time 
in the light of reviews conducted by the National Economic De- 
velopment Council (N.E.D.C.). Increases in wages and salaries 
above the norm were to be confined to cases in which exceptional 
treatment could have been shown to be necessary in the national 
interest. The criteria for exceptional pay increases were as 
follows:- (1) 
i) where the employees concerned, for example by accepting 
more exacting work or a major change in working practices, 
make a direct contribution towards increasing productivity 
in the particular firm or industry ; 
ii) where it is essential in the national interest to secure 
a change in the distribution of manpower (or to prevent 
a change which would otherwise take place) and a pay in- 
crease would be both necessary and effective for this 
purpose; 
iii) where there is general recognition that existing wage and 
salary levels are too low to maintain a reasonable 
standard of living; 
iv) where there is widespread recognition that the pay of a 
certain group of workers has fallen seriously out of line 
with the level of remuneration for similar work and needs 
in the national interest to be improved. 
In July, 1966 in a statement in the House of Commons the Prime 
Minister drew attention to the fact that money incomes had been 
(1) Prices and Incomes Policy., Cmnd.2639, H.M.S.O., London, 1965, 
Pp8 -9 
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rising faster than could be justified by the rate of increasing 
production and called for a standstill on prices and incomes. 
(The standstill, however, did not apply to fixed scales of pay- 
ments, increased remuneration due to promotion, increased ex- 
penses incurred at work by the employee or to increased earnings 
as a result of increased output, eg. piece work, commissions on 
sales, necessary increases in overtime, profit -sharing schemes, 
etc.) A mite Paper issued at this time(1)set the norm for 
income increases from July 1966 to the end of June 1967 at zero. 
Powers lasting for twelve months were taken to prevent specified 
prices or incomes being increased without iviinisterial consent 
during the period of the Prices and Incomes Standstill (20th July 
1966 - 31st December 1966) and the period of Severe Restraint 
(1st January 1967 - 30th June 1967). A White Paper issued just 
before the commencement of the period of Severe Restraint(2)con- 
firmed the zero norm for incomes rises and stated that as in the 
period of Prices and Incomes Standstill the criteria for incomes 
rises set out in Cmnd.2639 would continue to be in abeyance. 
Ceftain increases were to be allowed but in general it was sought 
to keep the rise in money incomes to a minimum. Increased pro- 
ductivity and efficiency were allowed to lead to increased pay 
if the increase served the national interest; pay increases 
justified by family needs were to be confined to the lower paid 
workers only; pay increases to attract manpower were justified 
(1) Prices and Incomes Standstill, Cmnd.3073, H.H.S.O., London, 
1 966. 
(2) Prices and Incomes Standstill: Period of Severe Restraint, 
Cmnd.31 0 , H.M.S.O., London, 19 
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only in exceptional cases and employers were encouraged to use 
their existing manpower more effectively; cases based on 'gross 
anomalies' in pay were granted exemption from the general re- 
striction only after strict examination to ensure that the 
anomalies did exist and were not used as excuses to 'catch up' 
with other groups. 
The next White Paper(1)again stated that there was no justi- 
fication for returning to the norm of 3 -3--°o per annum which pre- 
vailed up to July 1966 and which in practice tended to be regarded 
as the minimum increase which everyone expected to receive. The 
criteria for incomes increases of Cmnd.2639 were once again to be 
applied after a pause of twelve months though the Government 
stressed the productivity and lower paid criteria. 
In April 1968, the Government laid down the criteria for in- 
come increases for the next two years,(2)confirming the criteria 
of the previous White Paper (Cmnd.3235)9 once again stressing the 
productivity and lower paid worker factors. A ceiling for income 
increases of 32ío per annum was laid down though income increases 
for productivity increases, certain lower paid workers' claims 
and increases meeting the other criteria but where the group in- 
volved had not had an increase for more than one year could move 
the ceiling to a higher level. 
(1) Prices and Incomes Polic after 0th June 1.6 , Cmnd.3235, 
H.M. S. 0. , London, 19.7. 
(2) Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy in 1968 and 1969, 
Cmnd.3590, H.M. S.O. , London, 1968. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the question: 
"The Government has laid down a number of criteria for pay 
increases over the years; which criteria are now accepted 
by the Government for pay increases ? "(1 ) 






Increased productivity 146 54.1 
No answer given including 'don't know' 54 20.0 
Two criteria from - increased pro- 
ductivity; to get a beneficial change 
in the distribution of manpower in 
the national interest; existing wage 
and salary levels being too low to 
maintain a reasonable standard of 
living /low paid workers; those who 
have seemingly fallen seriously out 
of line with those in similar work 29 10.7 
Cost of living increases 12 4.4 
3 - 32iß norm 8 3.0 
Lower paid workers /those whose ex- 
isting wage and salary levels are 
too low to maintain a reasonable 
standard of living 8 3.0 
Increased responsibility /promotion or 
merit increases /skill increases 8 3.0 
Other incorrect answers 7 2.6 
To get a beneficial change in the 
distribution of manpower 1 0.4 
Those whose incomes have fallen 
seriously out of line with those 
in similar work 1 0.4 
(1) 4 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate answers. There are, 
therefore, 274 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 12 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to 
the question: "Of which type of increases do 
the Governinent2 on the wholez disapprove?" (1 ) 






No answer given 113 41.9 
Any not related to productivity 58 21.5 
Incorrect answers 49 18.2 
General increases given for none of 
the reasons allowed by the Government 20 7.4 
Pay increases given to correspond to 
changes in the cost of living 19 7.0 
General comparisons with incomes in 
other employments 6 2.2 
Higher paid workers 5 1.9 
Any which are not one of: lower paid 
workers; to secure a favourable dis- 
tribution of manpower; those seriously 
out of line with similar occupations 1 0.4 
General comparisons with incomes in 
other employments and pay increases 
to correspond to changes in the cost 
of living 0 0 
(1) 1 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been classified as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 271 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 13 
The Organisations who carry the prices and 
incomes policy into effect 
The present system for reviewing prices and incomes was laid 
out in a White Paper in February 1965.(1) 
It had been felt essential that, to have an agreed policy for 
prices and incomes, representatives of the Government, Management 
and the Unions were required to ascertain, to interpret and to 
assess the relevant facts about price and income behaviour. To 
associate all three parties with a general review N.E.D.C. was 
invited to undertake to gather the relevant economic information. 
To investigate particular cases of price and income behaviour, 
the Government set up, with the agreement of Management and Unions, 
the National Board for Prices and Incomes working in two separate 
divisions known as the Prices Review Division and the Incomes Re- 
view Division respectively. The Government was able to refer 
cases to these Divisions which were to examine the cases in order 
to advise whether or not the behaviour of prices or of wages, 
salaries or other money incomes was in the national interest as 
defined by the Government after consultation with Management and 
Unions.(2) 
The co- operation of the C.B.T. and T.U.C. was sought in two 
ways. Firstly, the C.B.I. and T.U.C. were asked to play a vital 
(1) Machinery of Prices and Incomes Policy, Cmnd.25 77, H.M.S.O., 
London, 1965. 
(2) Later, detail was provided by the criteria for price and 
incomes increases in Prices and Incomes Policy, Cmnd.2639. 
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part in securing the support of their members for the policy and 
in advising their members on the application of the policy. 
Secondly, the C.B.I. and T.U.C. were invited to co- operate in the 
drawing up of the 'early- warning' system.(1) This system,on one 
side9involved manufacturers notifying the appropriate Government 
Department before increasing the price of one of a selected 
number of goods which were basically important elements in the 
cost of living. On the other side, the C.B.I., the T.U.C., 
Unions not affiliated to the T.U.C., and employers organisations 
not members of the C.B.I. and firms not affiliated to any 
organisation were expected to keep the Government informed about 
developments in incomes matters, such as claims, formal offers, 
references to arbitration and terms of settlement. 
The Government Department concerned, on receipt of this 
information, would consider whether further enquiries were de- 
sirable to judge whether settlement of the claim was consistent 
with the criteria laid down and whether there was a prima facie 
case for reference to the National Board for Prices and Incomes. 
(1) Prices and Incomes Polic : An 'Earl Warnin:' S stem, Gland. 
:0 :, H.M.S.O., London, 19 2 
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APPENDIX 14 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to 
the question: "What machinery or organisations 
exist to carry the Government's prices and in- 
comes policy into effect ? "(1) 






No answer given including 'don't know' 76 28.1 
N.B.P.I. 68 25.2 
The Government /Government Departments 37 13.7 
The Government /Government Departments 
and N.B.P.I. 25 9.3 
The Government /Government Departments/ 
N.B.P.I. and T.U.C. /Trade Unions and 
C.B.I. /Employers' Federations /Employ- 
ers 15 5.6 
N.E.D.C. 14 5.2 
Incorrect answers 12 4.4 
T.U.C. /Trade Unions or C.B.I. /Employ- 
10 3.7 ers' Federations /Employers 
T.U.C. /Trade Unions and C.E.I./ 
Employers' Federation /Employers 9 3.3 
N.B.P.I. and either T.U.C. /Trade 
Unions or C.B.I. /Employers' Federa- 
6 2.2 tions /Employers 
The Government /Government Departments 
and either T.U.C. /Trade Unions or C.B.I./ 
Employers' Federations /Employers 4 1.5 
The Government /Government Departments 
and N.B.P.I. and either T.U.C. /Trade 
Unions or C.B.I. /Employers' Federa- 
4 1.5 tions /Employers 
(1) 10 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 280 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 15 
The Government's Reserve Powers 
The powers available to the Government at the time the inter- 
views were undertaken derived from Part II of the Prices and In- 
comes Act of 1966 as extended by the Prices and Incomes Act of 
1967 and were exercisable in the context of references to the 
National Board for Prices and Incomes. These powers enabled the 
Government to require statutary notification of proposed increases 
in prices and pay and provided that the powers to impose a stand- 
still on increases in prices and charges and on the implementa- 
tion of awards and settlements could be extended, if there was an 
adverse report by the N.B.P.I., for a period not exceeding six 
months from the date of reference to the Board. This meant that 
in cases where statutary notification was required there could be 
a seven month standstill. If an increase or settlement had al- 
ready taken place before it was referred to the N.B.F.I. the 
Government could require that the increase be suspended for 
three months or until the Board's report was published, provided 
the Government acted within three months of the increase being 
made. If the Board's report was adverse then the standstill could 
be extended to a further six months from the date of the Govern- 
ment's first intervention. 
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APPENDIX 16 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
question: "If the Government has reserve powers, 
what are these powers ? "(1) 






Answers revealing the respondent was 
aware the Government had reserve 
powers but had no idea what these 
powers involved 75 27.8 
The Government has not got reserve 
powers 59 21.9 
The Government can delay price or 
income increases /has delaying powers 41 15.2 
Respondent could not say if the 
Government had reserve powers or not 30 11.1 
Vague ideas about 'norms', 'orders' 
and incorrect ideas 27 10.0 
The Government can bring legal action 
if people go against the policy 13 4.8 
The Government can stop /freeze price 
or /and income increases 9 3.3 
The Government can delay increases 
in prices and incomes for up to 7 
months. (6 months delay coded here, 
too) 9 3.3 
Cases of intended price and income 
increases can be referred by the 
Government to N.B.P.I. who can delay 
these increases 6 2.2 
All intended increases in prices and 
incomes must be notified to the 
Government /Government Departments 
who can delay these intended in- 
creases 3 1.1 
(1) 2 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been classified as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 272 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 17 
The Penalties for Disobeying the Policy 
The Prices and Incomes Act, 1966 had laid down, (1)and the 
Act of 1967 confirmed that: 
"(1) It shall be an offence for an employer to implement 
an award or settlement in respect of employment at 
a time when the implementation of the award or settle- 
ment is forbidden under the forgoing provisions of 
this Part of the Act. 
(3) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (i) 
of this section shall be liable - 
(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
one hundred pounds, and 
(b) on conviction on indictment to a fine which, 
if the offender is not a body corporate, shall 
not exceed five hundred pounds." 
There was, however, no limit to fines for bodies corporate 
which included companies but not trade unions. 
(1) Prices and Incomes Act, 1966,_ Part II, Section 16. 
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APYENDIX 18 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to 
the question: "Do you know of any penalties 
which the Government can legally impose if a 
firm defies an order to stop a wage increase ? "(1) 






Respondent did not know about the 
penalties involved 181 67.0 
Fines 39 14.4 
Penalties /legal penalties 13 4.8 
No penalties can be used 10 3.7 
Fines of up to £500, £500 fines 9 3.3 
Imprisonment 8 3.0 
Fines up to £100, £100 fines 6 2.2 
Heavy fines (not stating on whom the 
fines were to be imposed) 4 1.5 
Unlimited penalties (not stating what 
these penalties were) 4 1.5 
(1) 4 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been classified as separate answers. There are, 
therefore, 274 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 19 
The Questions Used in The Comprehension 
Assessment Index 
To obtain a picture of the comparative distributions of 
the seven questions used to discover a manager's comprehension 
assessment index the 'good' and 'adequate' answers given by the 
respondents in Tables 3.1 to 3.7 were grouped together as 'satis- 
factory' answers. The 'vague' and 'poor' answers in the same 
tables were grouped and considered as 'inadequate' answers. 
The results are shown in Table 1. 
It can be seen from the table that four of the seven 
questions had between 22.2% and 36.3% of their answers classed as 
'satisfactory' answers. Three questions had a different distri- 
bution of answers. Almost half of the answers to the question 
on the objectives of the prices and incomes policy were 'satis- 
factory' answers. It was felt, however, that the replies to 
this question, which had been poorly answered by the general 
public, were exceptionally good and should not be devalued by 
giving the answers a lower weighting than the others in the index. 
Two other questions - those on the criteria for income in- 
creases - had their percentage of satisfactory answers well out- 
side the range of the four questions mentioned above. The distri- 
butions of the two questions on the criteria for pay increases, 
however, differed in opposite directions. It was felt that it had 
been relatively easy to obtain a 'satisfactory' answer in Table 3.4 
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merely by mentioning one of four criteria (one of which was pro- 
ductivity). It was also considered far more difficult than in 
the other questions to obtain a good answer to the question on 
criteria condemned by the Government by mentioning the two not- 
so -well -known injunctions of the Government. Consequently, it 
was felt that these two questions would balance each other and 
no adjustment was made in the weighting of the answers. 
Table I 
Distributions of Answers to Questions included 
in the Comprehension Assessment Index (Answers 
divided into Satisfactory (Good and Adequate) 
Answers and Inadequate (Vague and Poor) Answers 
Subject of 
the Question Table 











Policy 3.1 131 139 48.5 
Meaning of In- 
flation 3.2 98 172 36.3 
Devaluation 3.3 60 210 22.2 
Criteria App- 
roved by the 
Government 3.4 185 85 68.5 
Criteria Dis- 
approved by 
the Government 3.5 25 245 9.3 
Machinery of 
Incomes Policy 3.6 63 207 23.3 
Government's 
Reserve 
Powers 3.7 79 191 29.3 




Distribution of the Respondents' Comprehension 
Assessment Indices 








07 0 0 
08 o o 
09 o o 
10 0 o 
11 3 1.1 
12 2 0.7 






17 25 9.3 
18 23 . 
19 31 11.5 
20 34 12.6 
21 26 9.6 
22 22 8.1 
23 18 6.7 
24 20 7.4 5 10 3.7 
26 9 
2.5 
28 5 1.9 
235 
APPENDIX 21 
Relation of Size of Firm to (a) Managers' Involvement 
in Pay Negotiations, (b) Terminal Education, (c) Re- 
ceipt of Information 
(a) Involvement in Pay Negotiations 















loyees) 54.2 37.5 8.3 100.0 24 
Larger Medium 
(250 -999 emp- 
loyees) 43.0 21.5 35.4 100.0 79 
Smaller Medium 
(100 -249 emp- 
loyees) 35.2 25.9 38.9 100.0 54 
Small (11 -99 emp- 
loyees) 53.1 20.4 26.5 100.0 113 










































ees) 16.7 33.3 




ees) 22.1 23.9 31.0 9.7 13.3 100.0 113 
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In mass media 
Did not follow 









employees) 87.5 12.5 100.0 24 
Larger Medium 
(250 -999 emp- 
loyees) 92.4 7.6 100.0 79 
Smaller Medi 0 
(100 -249 emp- 
loyees) 83.3 16.7 100.0 54 
Small (11 -99 
employees) 84.1 15.9 100.0 113 
Received Inform- 
ation aY work 





employees) 54.2 45.8 100.0 24 
Larger Medium 
(250 -999 emp- 
loyees) 39.2 60.8 100.0 79 
Smaller Medi 
(100 -249 emp- 
loyees) 27.8 72.2 100.0 54 
Small (11 -99 
employees) 23.9 76.1 100.0 113 
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APPENDIX 22 
Sources of Information Received at Work by the 
Managers 
(Many of the Managers Received Information from 
several Sources) 
Source of Information 









Ministry of Labour (now Department 
of Employment and Productivity) 31 11.5 
Department of Economic Affairs 36 13.3 
Board of Trade 23 8.5 
Government White Papers 9 3.3 
T.U.C. 2 0.7 
Individual Trade Unions 7 2.6 
C.B.I. 4o 14.8 
Individual Employers' Federations 38 14.1 
Own Firm 13 4.8 
Other 7 2.6 
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APPENDIX 23 
(a) Relation between the Manager's Age and his 
Understanding of Incomes Policy 
Age 
























31 -40 " 































(b) Relation between the Manager's Position in 













































Relation of Receipt of Information to 
a Manager's Terminal Education 
Terminal 
Education 








icy in mass 
media 
Did not follow 
policy in mass 
media 
Junior Second- 
ary School 71.4 28.6 100.0 49 
Senior Second- 
ary School 93.3 6.7 100.0 60 
Technical 
College 86.5 13.5 100.0 89 
Professional 
Qualification 94.1 5.9 100.0 34 









ary School 14.2 85.7 100.0 49 
Senior Second- 
ary School 28.3 71.7 100.0 60 
Technical 
College 32.6 67.4 100.0 89 
Professional 
Qualification 44.1 55.9 100.0 34 
University 47.4 52.6 100.0 38 
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APPENDIX 25 
(a) Relation of Managers' Terminal Education 
to their Involvement in Pay Negotiations 
. 
Involvement in Pay 
Negotiations 
No Total Total 
In- Involve- Percent- No.in 
Terminal Education Direct direct ment age Group 
1 I L 
Junior Secondary 
School 34.7 14.3 51.0 100.0 49 
Senior Secondary 
School 38.3 30.0 31.7 100.0 6o 
Technical College 51.7 22.5 25.8 100.0 89 
Professional 
Qualification 52.9 26.5 20.6 100.0 34 
University 57.9 23.7 18.4 100.0 38 
(b) Relation of Receipt of Information to 















icy in mass 
media 
1 
Did not follow 
policy in mass 
media 
1 
Direct 87.3 12.7 100.0 126 
Indirect 90.5 9.5 100.0 63 








Direct 46.8 53.2 100.0 126 
Indirect 22.2 77.8 100.0 63 
No Involvement 16.0 84.o 100.0 81 
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APPENDIX 26 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to 
the question: "Who or what do you think has 
been mainly responsible for our economic diffi- 
culties which have led the Government to the 
idea of prices and incomes planninf ? "(1) 






Weak government (not necessarily Labour 
Government); past and present govern- 
ments; Labour and Conservative Govern- 
ments; politicians trying to please 
everyone in the past. Lack of govern- 
ment planning in the past 81 30.0 
This Government (Labour); the Labour 
party; lack of confidence in the 
Labour Government 55 20.4 
Trade Unions; Trade Unions being too 
strong /always demanding more pay 42 15.6 
Bad /weak management; inefficient 
management 34 12.6 
People will not work hard enough; 
people are lazy 19 7.0 
Answers concerning the balance of pay- 
ments situation, eg. too little ex- 
porting; too much importing 19 7.0 
Too much Government spending 17 6.3 
Greed; 'Human Nature' implying greed 
or selfishness; lack of interest in 
Britain's economic situation; in- 
difference to the economic situation 15 5.6 
Lack of production; wages rising 
faster than productivity 14 5.2 
The country is spending more than it 
earns 11 4.1 
Other answers 9 3.3 
No answer given 14 5.2 
(1) 60 of the 270 managers mentioned two items 
separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 330 items in the table. 
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APPENDIX 27 
Relation of the Respondent's background factors 
to the respondent's preference for (a) guide- 
lines laid down by the Government or (b) a re- 














Much above average compre- 
hension 55.5 40.7 27 
Above average comprehension 78.9 21.1 38 
Average comprehension 57.4 34.6 136 
Below average comprehension 








Involvement in Pay 
Negotiations 
Direct Involvement 55.6 42.1 126 
Indirect Involvement 54.0 34.9 63 
No Involvement 58.0 30.9 81 
Age 
Under 30 years 67.9 21.4 28 
31 - 40 years 66.1 30.6 62 
41 - 50 years 52.9 35.6 87 
51 years and over 48.4 47.3 93 
Position in Firm 
Top Management 49.4 43.5 170 














Size of Firm 
Large Firms (1000+ employees) 83.3 12.5 24 
Larger Medium Firms (250 -999 
employees) 64.6 29.1 79 
Smaller Medium Firms (100- 
249 employees) 64.8 29.6 54 
Small Firms (11 -99 employees) 39.8 51.3 113 
Terminal Education 
Senior Secondary School 53.3 38.3 60 Junior Secondary School 59.2 30.6 49 
Technical Collegd 52.8 41.6 89 
Professional Qualification 61.8 35.3 34 
University 57.9 34.2 38 
Information Receipt 
Managers followed the policy 
in mass media 58.1 35.5 112 
Managers did not follow the 
policy in mass media 41.7 47.2 158 
Managers received informa- 
tion at work 62.8 31.4 86 
Managers did not receive 
information at work 52.7 39.7 184 
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APPENDIX 28 
Distribution of answers of 154 respondents to the 
question: "Why do you feel that the Government's 
prices and incomes policy has been unsuccessful/ 
partially unsuccessful ? "(1) 






Prices /cost of living has risen 52 19.3 
The Government cannot carry out the 
policy; the Government is too weak to 
carry out the policy 48 17.8 
Prices and incomes have risen 23 8.5 
There has been unrest /discontent about 
the policy; there is not enough support 
for the policy 18 6.7 
Incomes have risen 16 5.9 
Prices have risen faster than incomes 14 5.2 
Productivity has not been high enough 7 2.6 
Other answers 7 2.6 
No answer given 3 1.1 
(1) 34 of the 154 mespondents mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, there - 
fore, 188 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 29 
Distribution of answers of 82 respondents to the 
question: "What effect has the Government's prices 
and incomes policy had on the firm's thinking and 
planninE of wanes r" (1 ) 






The firm is more cautious about wage 
rises; the firm considers the national 
situation; the firm realises the need 
for restraint 26 9.6 
The firm keeps incomes down /does not 
give pay increases. The firm uses the 
policy as an excuse not to give pay 
increases 22 8.1 
The firm only gives a pay increase if 
productivity increases 18 6.7 
Other answers 3 1.1 
No answer given or the manager did 
not know what effect the prices and 
incomes policy had on the firm 14 5.2 
(1) 1 of the 82 managers mentioned two items separately and these 
have been recorded as separate items. There are, therefore, 
83 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 30 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
question: "What advantages, if any, are there for 
your firm inn the Government's pursuance of a prices 
and incomes 2olicy ? "(1) 






None 85 31.4 
It keeps our prices stable /down 47 17.4 
It keeps incomes stable /down 37 13.7 
It keeps our costs stable /down 36 13.3 
It helps in wage negotiations by 
bringing the problems to the employees' 
notice 20 7.4 
It helps in planning /budgeting /quoting 17 6.3 
It only allows wage increases if pro- 
ductivity rises 14 5.2 
It helps to increase profits 11 4.1 
Other answers 12 4.4 
No answer given 29 10.7 
(1) 38 managers mentioned two items separately and these have been 
recorded as separate items. There are, therefore, 308 entries 
in the table. 
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APPENDIX 31 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
question: "What disadvantages, if any, are there 
for your firm in the Government's pursuance of a 
prices and incomes policy ? "(1) 






None 135 50.0 
It does not allow the firm to reward 
good men /initiative 27 10,0 
It does not allow the firm to raise 
prices /to raise prices if costs rise 18 6.7 
It means the firm can lose employees; 
people leave for other jobs 15 5.5 
Trade Unions /employees become dis- 
satisfied 14 5.2 
It affects our freedom; the Government 
is interfering 14 5.2 
Other answers 21 7.7 
No answer given 28 10.4 
(1) 2 managers mentioned two items separately and these have 
been recorded as separate items. There are, therefore, 272 
entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 32 
Distribution of answers of 224 respondents to 
the question: "Why do you think a prices and 
incomes policy cannot be successful on a vol- 
untary basis ? "(1) 





People's selfishness /lack of interest 
in the policy; people not being suff- 
iciently public- spirited; 'Human Nature' 
implying selfishness or greed; interest 
in money implying selfishness or greed; 
dishonesty; permanent dissatisfaction 
implying selfishness or greed (ie. un- 
justified dissatisfaction) 91 33.7 
General or certain unwillingness to 
accept the policy /co- operate with it; 
some people always try to evade the 
policy /put in big pay claims 51 18.9 
Trade Unions' unwillingness to accept 
or support the policy 40 14.8 
People's varying ideas of values; 'the 
human element' implying diversity of 
opinions; people will not agree 13 4.8 
Unwillingness to make the first move/ 
fears of making the first and only 
move /lack of trust in the policy /lack 
of confidence in the voluntary principle 12 4.4 
Prices /cost of living must be controlled 
before people can accept a voluntary in- 
comes policy 10 3.7 





No answer given 
4 1.5 
(1) 7 of the 224 managers mentioned 
two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate 
items. There are, 
therefore, 231 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 33 
Distribution of answers of 218 respondents to 
the question: "Why do you think it is essential 
for the Government to have compulsory powers 
for prices and incomes policy ?" 






Due to the country's poor economic 
situation it is essential for the 
Government to have compulsory powers 
for a prices and incomes policy 78 28.9 
People's selfishness /ignorance /vary- 
ing ideas of values make it essent- 
ial for the Government to have com- 
pulsory powers for a prices and in- 
comes policy 63 23.3 
Trade Unions /people's unwillingness 
to co- operate or to accept the policy 
make it essential for the Government 
to have compulsory powers for a 
prices and incomes policy 58 21.5 
Inequalities in the relative position 
of price and income levels make it 
essential for the Government to have 
compulsory powers for a prices and 
incomes policy 14 5.2 
No answer given 5 1.9 
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APPENDIX 34 
Distribution of answers of 121 respondents to 
the question: "Why do you approve of the Gov- 
ernment having compulsory powers for a prices 
and incomes policy ?" 






The Government has to control us; the 
scheme will only work with the Govern- 
ment in control of it 45 16.7 
Someone has to do it; we need a system; 
there is no other way 16 5.9 
People's selfishness /lack of interest 
in the policy; people not being suff- 
iciently public- spirited; 'Human Nature 
implying selfishness or greed; interest 
in money implying selfishness or greed; 
dishonesty; permanent dissatisfaction 
implying selfishness or greed (ie. un- 
justified dissatisfaction) 15 5.6 
General or certain unwillingness to 
accept the policy /co- operate with it; 
some people always try to evade the 
policy /put in big pay claims 14 5.2 
Ether answers 9 3.3 
No answer given 22 8.1 
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APPENDIX 35 
Distribution of answers of 142 respondents to the 
question: "Why do you disapprove of the Government 
havinZ compulsory powers ? "(1) 






Both sides of industry /one side of 
industry do not like compulsion; 
voluntary means are preferred 84 31.1 
A free enterprise system /market system/ 
capitalist system is best 27 10.0 
Vague answers indicating that with com- 
pulsory powers the policy would not work 9 3.3 
The Government does not understand other 
people's problems 9 3.3 
Compulsory powers lull incentives; in- 
centives are necessary 7 2.6 
We can /ought to help the Government 
without it needing powers 6 2.2 
No answer given 1 0.4 
(1) 1 of the 142 managers mentioned two items 
separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. 
There are, 
therefore, 143 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 36 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to 
the question: "What if anything do you see as 
the chief obstacle to the effective working 
of the Government's prices and incomes policy ? "(1) 






Workers /Trade Unions /T.U.C. will not 
accept the policy /will cause trouble 72 26.7 
People's selfishness /lack of interest 
in the policy; people are not suffi- 
ciently public- spirited; 'Human Nature' 
implying selfishness or greed; dis- 
honesty; permanent dissatisfaction 
implying selfishness or greed (ie. un- 
justified dissatisfaction); interest 
in money implying selfishness or greed 65 24.1 
General or certain unwillingness to 
accept the policy /co- operate with it; 
some people always try to evade the 
policy /put in big pay claims 56 20.7 
Prices /cost of living must be con- 
trolled before the policy can succeed 36 13.3 
The Government's administration of the 
policy is weak /is not forceful enough; 
there is no leadership from the Gov- 
ernment 22 8.1 
People do not like being told what to 
do; the policy affects the individual's 
freedom 21 7.7 
The problem is too complicated; a 
policy cannot be worked out 14 5.2 
People's ignorance of the policy /the 
economic situation 9 3.3 
Management will give in to men /will not 




No answer given 
14 5.2 
(1) 60 of the 270 managers mentioned 
two items separately and 
these have been recorded as two 
separate items. There are, 




Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
question: "Given that most firms co- operate, what 
do you think should be done about any firm or the 
managers of the firm if the firm deliberately dis- 
obeyed any Government order forbidding the firm to 
pay a wage increase ? "(1) 






The firm should be fined severely 57 21.1 
No action should be taken 51 18.9 
The firm should be fined 39 14.4 
The Government should prosecute /Take 
action - vague answers 26 9.6 
The firm should be fined (severity to 
be dependent on the size of the pay 
increase /infringement of the law) 15 5.6 
The Government should hold back con- 
tracts /subsidies /grants /tax allowances 
from the firm 15 5.6 
The managers /directors /people concerned 
should be imprisoned 10 3.7 
The firm should be fined (severity to 
be dependent on the size of the firm) 7 2.6 
The Government should take over /close 
the firm 7 2.6 
The managers /directors /people concerned 
should be fined 6 2.2 
Respondent did not know /No answer given 51 18.9 
(1) 14 of the 270 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 284 entries in the table. 
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A1?pNDIX as 
Relation between the respondents' comprehension 
assessment ratings and their views about the 
future use of a prices and incomes policer 
Respondents' 
Comprehension 
Respondents' stated preference of the 














Much above and above 
average comprehension 
Average comprehension 
















Distribution of answers of 128 respondents 
to the question: "Which body other than the 
Government do you feel could be capable of 
controlling a prices and incomes policy ?" 






T.U.C. /Trade Unions and C.B.I./ 
Employers /Employers' Federations 42 15.6 
C.B.I. /Employers /Employers' 
Federations 26 9.6 
T.U.C. /Trade Unions 26 9.6 
Trade Unions and Employers in each 
industry 16 5.9 
Government /N.E.D.C. and T.U.C./ 
Trade Unions and C.B.I. /Employers/ 
Employers' Federations 4 1.5 
N.E.D.C. 2 0.7 
Other answers 8 3.0 
No answer given 4 1.5 
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APPENDIX 40 
Distribution of answers of 117 respondents 
to the question: "Why do you disapprove of 
the tripartite body ? "(1) 






The final decision should be in the 
Government's hands; this organisation 
should merely act as advisers 43 15.9 
The organisation would never agree; 
too many interests involved in this 
organisation 24 8.9 
The neutrals give no benefit /are 
useless /do not know enough 23 8.5 
The organisation is too unwieldy/ 
too confusing 9 3.3 
Other answers 15 5.6 
No answer given 5 1.9 
(1) 2 of the 117 managers mentioned two items separately and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 119 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 41 
Distribution of answers of 160 respondents to the 
question: "Why do you approve of the Government's 
statement on comparisons of incomes ? "(1 ) 






A man's own merit /worth should be 
assessed 47 17.4 
Each industry /trade has its on 
results and should not be compared 
with others 38 14.1 
There are too many factors involved 
in any job to enable it to be com- 
pared with others 25 9.3 
Productivity ought to be the factor 
used to assess a man's worth 23 8.5 
Each firm has its own results and 
should not be compared with others 18 6.7 
People draw envidious comparisons 9 3.3 
Other answers 4 1.5 
No answer given 28 10.4 
(1) 32 of the 160 managers gave two separate answers 
and these 
have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 
192 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 42 
Distribution of answers of 270 respondents to the 
question: "Why, do you think, does the Government 
object to general comparability with other incomes 
as a criterion for income increases ? "(1) 






Comparisons lead to a spiral /leap- 
frogging of wage claims 68 25.2 
Each industry /trade has its own 
results and should not be compared 
with others 23 8.5 
People choose invidious comparisons/ 
compare themselves to the highest 
group and this leads to further pay 
increases 23 8.5 
Comparisons involve no increased 
productivity 19 7.0 
Jobs cannot be compared; there are 
too many factors involved to enable 
a comparison to be made 15 5.6 
People ought to be paid according to 
their worth /merits 15 5.6 
Other answers 14 5.2 
No answer given 98 36.3 
(1) 5 of the 270 respondents mentioned two separate answers and 
these have been recorded as separate answers. There are, 
therefore, 275 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 43 
Distribution of answers of 203 respondents to the 
question: "Why do you think the lower paid workers 
have a strong case for consideration for a pay in- 
crease ? "(1) 






The lower paid are on a subsistence/ 
existence level 76 28.1 
The lower paid cannot cope with 
rising prices /increasing cost of 
living 54 20.0 
The lower paid workers' incomes do 
not encourage them to work; social/ 
unemployment benefits are higher 32 11.9 
There is too big a differential in 
pay between the lower paid and others 11 4.1 
This is necessary for social justice 9 3.3 
Other answers 14 5.2 
No answer given 21 7.8 
(1) 14 of the 203 managers mentioned two separate answers and 
these have been recorded as separate items. There are, 
therefore, 217 entries in the table. 
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APPENDIX 44 
Distribution of answers of 151 respondents to the 
question: "Why do you think that there ought to be 
a national minimum wage ? "(1) 






It is better to have a man working for 
an income than receiving the same pay 
through unemployment benefit; to stop 
people deliberately seeking unemploy- 
ment benefit 29 10.7 
To give people a decent standard of 
living 28 10.4 
It costs so much to live, a basic 
standard is needed 22 8.1 
Some employers take advantage of their 
employees /pay very low wages 19 7.0 
To be fairer to all; for social justice 19 7.0 
To reduce the level of poverty 12 4.4 
To stop industrial unrest 8 3.0 
Other answers 11 4.1 
No answer given 13 4.8 
(1) 10 of the 151 managers mentioned two separate 
answers and 
these have been recorded as separate items. 
There are, 
therefore, 161 entries in the table. 
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APF'EiVDIX 45 
Actual incomes of groups some respondents felt most/ 






Civil Servant - Joint Permanent Secretary 9,200 
Permanent Secretary 8,600 
Under Secretary(1) 5,250 
Doctor (Houseman - just qualified)(2) 1,100 - 1,300 
Enrolled Nurse (newly qualified)(2) 595 - 755 
member of Parliament (1) 3,250 
Old Age Pensioner - single(3) 234 
married 380 
Police Constable(4) 870 - 1,205 
School teacher (primary school - female)(5) 680 - 1,340 
(before April 
1968) 
730 - 1,465 
(after April 
1968) 
Sources: (1) Scottish Information Office. 
(2) Scottish Home and Health Department. 
(3) Ministry of Social Security. 
(4) Department of Employment and Productivity. 
(5) Scottish Education Department. 
